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Abstract 
 
Organizations are the literal bricks-and-mortar of government, the means by which 
political choices are turned into delivered goods and services, yet they are largely 
absent from prominent theories of state capacity, institutions, and political economy 
in developing countries. In three papers, I show that this omission is theoretically and 
empirically unjustified: not only is there a great deal of heterogeneity among 
organizations within the same government, but the complexities of organizations can 
interact with institutional and political economy factors in a manner that alters these 
literatures’ conclusions about public service delivery, bureaucracy, and reform. The 
first paper, “From Institutions to Organizations in the Study of State Capacity”, 
draws on interviews with senior managers from 40 organizations in Ghana’s central 
government to document the vast range of variation in management quality among 
them, explore its roots in theories of relational contracts, and connect theories of 
organizational performance to the institution-centric literature on state capacity in 
developing countries. The second paper, “Policy Implementation, Distributive 
Politics, and Fiscal Institutions”, analyzes an original database of 14,000 small 
infrastructure projects in Ghana’s local governments, and shows that the fiscal 
institutions used to fund projects are associated with large differences in completion 
rates, even after controlling for project characteristics and district, community, and 
contractor fixed effects. I develop a theory of policy implementation as intertemporal 
bargaining among political actors who face commitment problems with respect to 
project distribution, and show that fiscal institutions can mitigate the negative effects 
of these distributive pressures. The final paper, “One Size Does Not Fit All”, shows 
that the quality of budget execution and compliance with budget processes varies 
dramatically across ministries in Ghana’s government, and that the drivers of budget 
performance are heterogeneous and often idiosyncratic. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE STATE 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Abstract 
 
This chapter introduces the dissertation’s motivation and the key distinction between 
viewing the administrative apparatus of the state as a set of organizations and viewing 
it as an institution. I survey how this distinction applies to prominent literatures on 
bureaucracy and public service delivery, develop an overarching theoretical 
framework that ties together the three substantive papers, and introduce each paper. I 
then provide some brief background on Ghana’s state bureaucracy in comparative 
perspective, and conclude by delimiting the scope of the dissertation. 
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Introduction: 
The Organizations of the State 
 
The starting point of this dissertation is the observation that the administrative 
apparatus of the state is composed of a set of organizations. While “the state” exists in 
the abstract, it takes tangible form in these ministries, agencies, departments, and 
commissions, each with their own office buildings, authorizing laws, and human 
resource divisions. Organizations are the literal bricks-and-mortar of the state: they 
are the street-level “front office” of the state that interacts with citizens as well as the 
administrative “back office” through which organizations are funded, staffed, 
monitored, and audited by still other organizations. While this observation may seem 
so obvious as to be trivial, it has far-reaching consequences for both theoretical and 
empirical approaches to studying government performance and the development of 
state capacity. 
 
First, thinking about the state bureaucracy as a unitary institution rather than a set of 
linked organizations influences the choice of the appropriate unit of analysis – in 
particular, it lends itself to an analytical focus on variation in performance across 
governments rather than within governments. This focus on measuring and explaining 
variation across geographically defined units – societies, nations, sub-national regions 
– has dominated theoretical and empirical approaches to studying state capacity, 
governance, and public service delivery. It is undoubtedly true that variation in 
performance across governments is significant, but a growing number of studies from 
diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives have documented that the 
variation within governments can also be significant, and perhaps even greater than 
the variation across governments (e.g. Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Leonard 
2010; Gingerich 2013; Rasul and Rogger 2014). From both a theoretical and 
empirical perspective, then, the assumption that within-government variation is 
second-order to across-government variation is just that: an assumption. 
 
Second, studying the state as a unitary institution has implications for the types of 
determinants and mechanisms that are examined in the effort to explain performance. 
If performance is assumed to vary primarily at the societal level, then inevitably the 
variables that are called on to explain this variation must also vary at the same level. 
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Thus, while the determinants explored by the empirical literature on long-run 
economic and institutional development are bewilderingly diverse, what they share is 
that they do not vary within the societal unit of analysis. This focus on across-
government variation biases the choice of mechanisms to be examined towards those 
that are long-term, abstract, and out of the control of any individual actor or group – 
since, almost by definition, only these types of determinants and mechanisms can 
operate at the level of an entire society. While there are advantages to this approach, it 
means that the existing body of literature on institutions and state capacity has little of 
practical relevance to say about the key questions of whether and why some 
organizations within a given government perform better than others, and what 
individual actors or groups can do to improve government performance. 
 
Finally, neglecting the organizational basis of states can lead scholars of developing 
country governments also to overlook the rich bodies of work from organization 
theory, public administration, American politics, and organizational economics that 
address precisely the questions that bedevil the institutionalist approach to states – 
such as whether and how political principals can actually control public 
bureaucracies, the extent to which organizational functioning is determined by the 
organization’s external political and institutional context, and the internal dynamics of 
organizational performance. Yet while these literatures have thoroughly interrogated 
these dynamics in the context of developed countries, there is much less work that 
examines these same issues in developing countries, where many of the presumptions 
of this literature – for example that laws and administrative regulations will be (or 
even can be) enforced – may not hold. 
 
The three papers of this dissertation represent three attempts to grapple with the 
organizational basis of government in developing countries. Each makes a novel 
theoretical argument that starts from this organizational perspective, and each 
supports this argument with empirical evidence drawn from original fieldwork. While 
each paper attempts to provide some guidance for efforts at reform, my broader hope 
is that the dissertation demonstrates the need to start asking different questions about 
governments in developing countries. In particular, rather than asking why one 
country’s government performs better than another country’s, scholars and 
policymakers alike can often learn more by asking why one organization in a 
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country’s government performs better than another. This dissertation does not claim 
to provide a complete answer to this genre of question – and indeed I will later 
suggest that the complexities of organizations may make a truly complete answer 
impossible – but it does aim to provide theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
steps towards a more insightful and relevant approach to the problem of government 
performance in developing countries. 
 
Before proceeding, a definitional note: throughout this section and indeed this 
dissertation, I use terms like state capacity and organizational performance that are 
multi-dimensional and highly contested (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, Talbot 2010, 
Fukuyama 2013, Rotberg 2014). I regard these as essentially contested concepts 
(Gallie 1956; Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu 2006) in the sense that definitional 
debates about them are productive but also unresolvable. Since my primary focus is 
on highlighting and understanding within-government variation in performance, I do 
not seek to adjudicate or add to these debates, although each paper makes clear the 
specific sense in which I am using performance and defends my methodology for 
measuring it. Likewise, for convenience and to illustrate my argument I often discuss 
them as unidimensional constructs (e.g. “better” and “worse” organizations). While a 
more nuanced treatment may be a fruitful area for future research, this simplification 
facilitates the more basic task of this dissertation: to point out the salient fact of 
variation in performance within governments and to consider its causes, mechanisms, 
and consequences. 
 
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section provides a 
very brief and selective review of the main bodies of literature that bear on these 
questions, focusing on how they conceive the relationships among states, institutions, 
and organizations. Section 1.2 then integrates these diverse approaches into a 
common conceptual framework for studying the determinants of organizational 
performance in government. Section 1.3 situates the three papers of this dissertation 
within this framework, and Section 1.4 discusses the relevance of the Ghanaian case 
in comparative perspective. Section 1.5 concludes by delineating the scope of the 
dissertation. 
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1.1 STATE AS INSTITUTION OR STATE AS ORGANIZATIONS? 
 
The literature on the long-run development of state capacity and governance quality 
focuses heavily on differences across countries, arguing that these are driven by 
national-level variation in various geographical, historical, institutional, political 
economy, cultural, and even genetic factors (North 1990; Putnam 1993; Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001; Besley and Persson 
2009; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson 2012; Ashraf and Galor 2013). 
Another strand of research examines bureaucratic quality and formal political 
institutions more directly, by using cross-national governance indicators (Evans and 
Rauch 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; Teorell, Dahlström, and 
Dahlberg 2011). While these studies differ in their hypotheses and conclusions, they 
share in common an inability to explain significant organization-level differences 
within the same government, since these organizations are typically located within a 
few miles of each other in the capital city, are staffed from the same population pool, 
and are subject to the same formal institutions and national-level political context. In 
their focus on cross-country variation, these literatures implicitly assume that 
variation among organizations is negligible, either because such variation is not 
substantial or is solely a matter of exceptional cases, and that organizational 
performance is constrained fairly tightly by these national-level variables.  
 
This perspective has come to dominate thinking about governance and reform in 
recent decades. As I will argue more fully later in this dissertation, much of this 
follows from North’s (1990) distinction between institutions as the formal and 
informal “rules of the game” and organizations as the “players” of this game; his 
conscious decision to focus on institutions rather than organizations; and his 
accompanying assumption that organizations are rational actors that maximize some 
objective function within the constraints defined by their institutional context. While 
this institutionalist approach has influenced a large literature that focuses explicitly on 
questions of how institutional development stems from various political economy, 
historical, and other factors (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; North, Wallis, 
and Weingast 2009), its basic assumption – that the state is best seen as an institution 
– has also become pervasive in the more applied practitioner literature on governance 
(e.g. World Bank 2002). Even critics of the one-size-fits-all approach to governance 
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such as Grindle (2011) and Andrews (2013) frame their critiques and 
recommendations in terms of institutional reform, providing little basis for 
understanding why there might be variation among organizations within the same 
government. Likewise, the mainly case study-based literature on “islands” or 
“pockets” of effectiveness in developing country governments (Grindle 1997, Tendler 
1997, Leonard 2010, Roll 2013) emphasizes that such variation is “exceptional”, thus 
reinforcing the notion that organizations are tightly constrained within the institutional 
and political context within which they operate. 
 
In stark contrast, a large literature in American politics and public administration 
explicitly examines whether and how the operation of government organizations can 
be controlled by political principals and legal frameworks (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Moe 1990; Macey 1992; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999; de Figueiredo 2002; Huber and Shipan 2002). These authors point 
out that political control of the bureaucracy may be imperfect due to the costs of 
monitoring and the incomplete nature of laws and regulations, giving rise to a 
potentially significant amount of agency discretion. The primary analytical focus of 
this literature is on the control mechanisms that politicians select to induce the 
bureaucracy to do what they want – in particular, the tradeoff between rules and 
discretion – and the strategic opportunities and considerations involved in this. 
However, this literature has limited applicability to developing country contexts, 
because it assumes that administrative laws are enforceable (even if incomplete) and 
that bureaucrats are competent. While these may be appropriate default assumptions 
in countries with relatively strong states, these conditions are often absent in weak 
states. Indeed, Huber and McCarty (2004) show that integrating low bureaucratic 
capacity into a standard delegation model weakens politicians’ control of the 
bureaucracy, reverses many of the standard conclusions of the literature, and 
diminishes politicians’ incentives for reform. This literature thus provides 
considerable grounds for scepticism that bureaucracies are tightly constrained by their 
institutional and political contexts. 
 
The large literatures on differences in organizational performance in both the public 
and private sectors (primarily of developed countries) provide a further reason to 
doubt the appropriateness of North’s assumption that organizations are tightly 
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constrained by their institutional environments. Studies of government performance in 
OECD countries have long taken organizations as their unit of analysis and 
documented substantial differences in performance among them (Wilson 1989; Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill 2000; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Meier, O’Toole, and 
Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Talbot 2010). There is even stronger evidence in the private 
sector, where numerous studies have documented large and persistent differences in 
productivity and management quality among organizations even within the same 
narrowly defined field (Gibbons and Henderson 2013), with evidence most heavily 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, Syverson 
2011) but extending also to other fields such as hospitals (Carrera and Dunleavy 
2010; Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen 2015). While average levels of 
management and productivity do vary from country to country and are influenced by 
common factors, such as contract enforcement and competition levels, the importance 
of heterogeneity in performance among organizations has been widely recognized and 
become a key element of influential models even outside of organizational economics, 
such as international trade (e.g. Melitz 2003). If these “persistent performance 
differences” (Gibbons and Henderson 2013) can exist even in ruthlessly competitive 
for-profit sectors where organizations’ outputs and outcomes are easily measured, 
then presumably the scope for differences in performance among ex ante identical 
organizations is even larger in the public sector, where outputs and outcomes are 
typically difficult to measure, incentives are weak and diffuse, competition is scarce 
or non-existent (Wilson 1989, Prendergast 2003), and there is no built-in mechanism 
to allow inefficient organizations to exit.1 
 
This cross-sectional evidence that organizational performance may not be tightly 
constrained is supported by a growing body of experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies that demonstrate that specific interventions and policy design features can 
improve policy outcomes in both the public (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 
2007; Zamboni and Litschig 2013; Banerjee et al 2014; Yanez-Pagans and 
Machicado-Salas 2014) and private sectors (Bloom et al 2013; Atkin et al 2015; 
Blader et al 2015; Martinez et al 2015). These findings are convincing in the context 
of particular programs over relatively short time frames, but a shortcoming of this 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Patrick Dunleavy for this last point. 
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approach to studying organizations is that it is unclear whether these interventions 
would still be effective outside of narrow and carefully controlled implementation 
settings, in bureaucratic and political equilibrium, or once scaled up to national level 
(Rodrik 2009, Deaton 2010, Olken and Pande 2012). Because this literature is geared 
towards understanding discrete policy changes, it has largely neglected to address the 
organizational context in which these policies are implemented. Yet complex issues 
like corruption, management, and governance are rarely “solved” with a single policy 
change; rather, addressing them requires sustained and iterative effort over a long 
period of time, both through internal organizational processes and external oversight 
and control mechanisms. This is the conceptual starting point for this dissertation’s 
analysis of organizational performance in the developing country governments.  
 
1.2 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
This section presents a conceptual framework that differentiates the state as an 
institution from the state as a set of organizations, and arrays the factors that influence 
organizational performance accordingly. The framework is not intended to be 
comprehensive, to privilege certain hypotheses, or to propose specific mechanisms, 
but rather to reconcile the conflicting perspectives and assumptions discussed in the 
previous section and show how they relate to each other. Likewise, the distinctions 
made by the framework are not always black-and-white, and many theoretical 
perspectives concern the connections between different levels of explanations; 
nevertheless, the framework provides a useful way of organizing and reconciling an 
extremely diverse set of theories and literatures. 
 
The framework rests on two distinctions. First, some determinants of organizational 
performance apply to all organizations in a given government, while others apply to 
only a subset – or just a single organization. Obvious examples of the former would 
be any of the variables put forward by the cross-national literature on institutions, 
governance, and state capacity. For instance, a country’s wealth, average level of 
education, judicial system effectiveness, generalized social trust in organizations, or 
quality of political leader all influence the performance of government organizations, 
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but presumably do so relatively consistently across all organizations.2 Less obvious 
examples are what Ménard (2014) refers to as “meso-institutions”: the cross-cutting 
institutional and organizational arrangements that instantiate abstract institutions and 
provide the means through which particular organizations are embedded in their 
institutional context. In the public sector context this could include central 
management agencies such as the finance ministry, state audit organization, and civil 
service personnel management organization, as well as more general societal 
institutions such as judicial courts and administrative tribunals. When these function 
more effectively, this presumably enhances the operation of all the operational 
ministries and agencies that they regulate or provide services to. 
 
Second, among the determinants of organizational performance that vary within a 
government, I distinguish between determinants that are external to an organization 
and those that are internal to it. The external factors that influence an organization’s 
performance are those related to its specific context and its structural characteristics, 
such as: the task characteristics of the organization, for example the degree to which 
its outputs or outcomes can be measured (Wilson 1989) or the degree of discretion 
required by frontline bureaucrats (Mintzberg 1983); its degree of legal, financial, 
policy, and managerial autonomy to go about these tasks (Carpenter 2001); its budget 
structure (Dunleavy 1991); and organization-specific political economy factors such 
as interest group configurations, policy networks, and the alignment of the 
organization’s critical tasks with these stakeholders’ interests (Wilson 1989). These 
factors are external to the organization in the sense that they are not under the 
organization’s direct control, at least in the short- to medium-term, although in the 
long term organizations can of course cultivate relationships with interest groups, seek 
changes to their authorizing laws, develop alternative sources of revenue to give them 
more autonomy, and so on. 
 
On the other hand, factors internal to the organization are those over which the 
organization does exercise direct control, even if actually controlling them is not 
                                                
2 This may not always be the case, for example if trust or education is more important to the activities 
of some organizations than to others’. This would be an example of an interaction between general 
societal factors and organization-specific structural characteristics. Exploring such interactions would 
be a fruitful area for further study. 
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trivial. The most obvious example, and the one on which this dissertation dwells the 
most, is management: broadly understood as the structures, processes, and practices 
that are used to get work done on an everyday basis. This also includes self-reflective 
processes related to the organization’s efforts to measure its own performance, 
diagnose problems, and identify and implement improvements. Importantly, 
management consists both of the formal, codifiable, de jure way in which the 
organization’s staff are intended to behave, but also on the informal, difficult to 
communicate, de facto implementation or non-implementation of these formal 
features. While actually improving management in an organization can be difficult – 
see for example Gibbons and Henderson’s (2013) useful typology of problems of 
perception, inspiration, motivation, and implementation in improving management 
practices – organizations are rarely directly constrained from doing so by external 
forces. This distinguishes internal factors like management from external aspects of 
the organization’s context or structural characteristics over which it has considerably 
less control. 
 
Combining these two distinctions yields a stylized three-level framework for 
classifying the potential determinants of organizational performance in the public 
sector: 1) government-wide factors, that affect all organizations in a government and 
are external to any one organization; 2) aspects of organizational context and 
structural characteristics, that affect only a subset of organizations but are external to 
these organizations; and 3) management, which varies at the organizational level and 
is internal to the organization. Table 1 illustrates this framework.  
 
Although these distinctions are conceptually useful, they are not meant to be absolute, 
as some hypothesized determinants span multiple categories, interact across 
categories, or could be classified in different categories in different situations. For 
example, a factor like personnel quality could influence organizational performance 
across all three levels: the overall level of education in a polity, the quality of human 
resources in a particular sector (for example if a country has an especially strong 
tradition or educational system in a particular field), and the effectiveness of a 
particular organization’s hiring practices at recruiting talented individuals into the 
organization. Likewise, the effect of organizational leadership on performance may 
operate largely through mechanisms internal to the organization, but especially in the 
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public sector is often determined externally through appointments. Similarly, in the 
public sector some internal management practices are in fact regulated or mandated 
by externally defined laws and administrative regulations, either government-wide or 
sector-specific (in an organization’s authorizing law, for example). While these 
considerations certainly nuance the application of the framework to thinking about the 
determinants of government performance, the distinctions on which the framework 
rests are nonetheless important ones. 
 
 
Table 1: Conceptual framework for the determinants of organizational performance 
Type of determinant 
External/ internal    
to organization 
Scope within 
government 
Government-wide 
e.g. National-level economic variables, political 
institutions, social norms, judicial system effectiveness, 
quality of central management agencies 
External All        
organizations 
Organizational context and structural characteristics 
e.g. Task characteristics, autonomy, budget structure, 
policy networks, interest group orientation 
External Subset of 
organizations 
Management 
e.g. Organizational processes, organizational slack, “X-
inefficiency”, relational contracts, leadership, 
organizational culture 
Internal Subset of 
organizations 
 
 
 
Note also that the possibility of multiple equilibria in internal organizational factors 
means that these factors may not collectively be fully determinative of organizational 
performance. In particular, factors that are external to the organization may operate as 
constraints on the performance of organizations, much as institutions function as 
constraints on the actors embedded in them.3 If organizations operate efficiently 
within these constraints, then these constraints directly determine organizational 
performance: relaxing them (for example, if a government’s finance ministry 
improves its management of the budget) leads to an improvement in organizational 
performance, while tightening them worsens performance. However, recognizing that 
many determinants of organizational performance are internal to the organization 
implies that many organizations may be operating inefficiently, within rather than on 
                                                
3 In this dissertation’s first paper, I discuss the roots of this view of institutions as constraints in North’s 
(1990) influential work. 
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their notional production frontier. If this is the case, then relaxing or tightening the 
external constraints to organizational performance may have no effect – for a badly 
managed organization, the effectiveness of the ministry of finance may not be a 
binding constraint.  
 
The idea that organizations often operate inefficiently has a long history in 
organization theory and management studies (Cyert and March 1963, Leibeinstein 
1966) and the more recent economics literature on relational contracts has shown how 
this inefficiency can develop within an organization through a dynamic process due to 
the challenge of developing shared understandings, expectations, and norms.4 The 
dynamic way in which relational contracts develop inside organizations suggests that 
there could be multiple performance equilibria possible for any given organization, 
and thus that ex ante identical public bureaucracies – as defined by the combination of 
government-wide factors and organizational context and structural characteristics – 
could perform at significantly different levels. This multiple-equilibria characteristic 
of organizational performance creates a role for the type of path dependence that is 
usually associated (in analysis of the state) with the literature on historical 
institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015). 
While I explore this idea in more depth later in this dissertation, I note it now to point 
out that the conceptual framework put forth in this section is broad enough to 
encompass not only different sets of determinants of organizational performance, but 
also different logics about the mechanisms through which these determinants map 
onto organizational performance. 
 
1.3 THREE PAPERS ON WITHIN-GOVERNMENT VARIATION 
 
The three papers of this dissertation each ask different research questions, use 
different methods, and draw on different sources of data. The papers also fit into the 
conceptual framework presented above in different and complementary – although by 
no means comprehensive – ways. What they share is a common motivation: 
understanding within-government variation in performance. Accordingly, each paper 
asks two questions: 
                                                
4 Gibbons and Henderson (2013) provide a useful review. 
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1. What is the extent of within-government variation in performance? 
2. What mechanisms generate this variation? 
 
The first, primarily descriptive, question is of interest because each paper 
demonstrates the existence of substantial variation in contexts where existing 
empirical evidence of variation is very limited, and where existing theoretical 
approaches do not provide adequate explanation for this variation. The second, more 
analytical, question then uses this variation to motivate and examine a novel 
theoretical argument. Although each paper also makes other, more topic-specific 
contributions, these two central questions run through all three papers. 
 
The first paper, “From Institutions to Organizations: Management and Informality in 
Ghana’s Public Bureaucracies”, addresses within-government variation in 
organizational performance head-on by gathering data on management quality in 40 
central government organizations and analyzing the resulting distribution. Using 
management quality as a proxy for organizational performance, it finds that not only 
is there a broad range of variation in management quality across organizations – 
whether measured by quantitative benchmarks or qualitative description of everyday 
management practices – but that this variation is substantial and systematic, and is not 
limited to a handful of exceptional “islands” of excellence. Instead, the distribution of 
organizational performance in government is smooth and continuous, ranging from 
extremely dysfunctional organizations to exceptionally well managed ones. In 
between these two extremes, organizations differ from one another in marginal yet 
collectively significant ways.  
 
This variation is poorly explained by the institution-centric theories of state capacity 
in developing countries, which focus exclusively on government-wide determinants of 
organizational performance, so I develop an alternative but complementary approach 
grounded in theories of relational contracts that can explain variation in management 
quality, organizational culture, and organizational performance even among ex ante 
identical organizations. I find qualitative evidence consistent with this explanation, 
and link it to theories of informal institutions.  
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In terms of the conceptual framework presented above, the paper aims to focus in on 
variation in internal management practices while holding constant the government-
wide factors on which much previous research has focused. As I discuss in the paper, 
isolating the effects of internal factors from organizational characteristics is extremely 
difficult because the vast number of potential organizational characteristics to 
consider makes any attempt to identify them empirically vastly overdetermined: 
although my sample size of 40 organizations is larger than most qualitative, case 
study-based approaches by an order of magnitude, the number of organizational 
characteristics that could conceivably affect organizational performance is an order 
magnitude larger still, even without considering interactions among them. I deal with 
this in a limited way by demonstrating that quantitative variation also exists within 
sub-groups defined according to key organizational characteristics, as well as by 
drawing on qualitative evidence from interviews to establish that the patterns of 
variation are qualitatively consistent with relational contracts theory. Future research 
with larger sample sizes could help address this challenge, but the finite number of 
government organizations in most small- and medium-sized governments – about 
200, in Ghana’s central government – nevertheless poses a challenge. This is therefore 
an area in which mixed-method approaches are likely to be particularly important, and 
this paper contributes one methodology for doing this in an integrated manner. 
 
The second paper, “Policy Implementation, Distributive Politics, and Fiscal 
Institutions: Evidence from Unfinished Infrastructure in Ghana”, takes a very 
different approach. Drawing on an original database of over 14,000 small 
infrastructure projects undertaken by Ghana’s local governments, it examines how the 
fiscal institutions through which projects are funded affect project completion. These 
fiscal institutions are similar to Ménard’s meso-institutions, in that they provide a 
tangible connection between the organizations that actually implement policy and the 
more abstract national-level budget institutions and resource management by Ghana’s 
state. I am able to examine the effect of these fiscal institutions on project completion 
by taking advantage of a unique feature of the dataset: the same types of projects are 
executed in the same districts and communities by the same pool of contractors 
through different funding sources. This lets me control for all the observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the politicians, bureaucrats, and local authorities 
where the projects are being implemented – corresponding to the second and third 
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levels of the conceptual framework – and thus isolate the operational effects of the 
fiscal institutions. (I use coefficient stability tests to examine issues of endogenous 
project selection into funding mechanisms, and argue that such a selection mechanism 
is unlikely to account for more than a fraction of the observed variation.) I also 
demonstrate one mechanism through which fiscal institutions affect project 
completion: by mitigating the consequences of intertemporal bargaining failures over 
project distribution among local elites facing commitment problems. I present 
evidence consistent with this view, most notably that the effect of fiscal institutions 
on project completion is strongly conditioned by the ruling party’s vote share in the 
district, and show evidence against alternative explanations.  
 
This paper complements the first in several ways. Whereas the first paper relies on a 
process-based measure of performance – management quality – gathered through 
intensive qualitative interviews that are then post-coded with a numerical 
benchmarking scheme, the second paper examines an output-based measure of 
performance – whether infrastructure projects are completed or left abandoned mid-
construction – measured using secondary data I digitized from government 
administrative records. And while the first paper investigates technical aspects of 
management that are internal to the organization, the second paper uses district fixed 
effects to partial out differences in internal management or personnel quality across 
districts and instead seeks to understand how political factors – namely distributive 
pressures and bargaining among local political actors – affect policy implementation. 
 
The third paper, “One Size Does Not Fit All: Budget Institutions and Performance in 
Ghana’s Spending Ministries”, combines aspects of both of these papers. It uses fiscal 
data and structured interviews with 23 budget schedule officers in Ghana’s Ministry 
of Finance to investigate differences across Ghana’s spending ministries in the quality 
of budget management and in various measures of budget performance. These 
ministries are all subject to the same formal budget institutions and national-level 
political and institutional context, so variation must be driven by organization- or 
sector-specific factors. As with the first paper, the existing comparative literature on 
budget institutions and performance focuses almost entirely on differences across 
governments rather than within them, thus giving little explanation for any variation 
within countries. I find that not only is there substantial variation across ministries in 
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expenditure outturns and volatility, compliance with formal budget processes, and 
other outcomes such as extra-budgetary spending, but that there is no correlation 
between procedural compliance and budget outcomes. That is, performing the on-
paper aspects of budget management has little relationship with budget performance. 
Instead, I find that the drivers of ministries’ budget performance are heterogeneous 
and often idiosyncratic to the particularities of individual sectors and organizations. 
 
Like the first paper, “One Size Does Not Fit All” focuses on within-government 
variation in order to cancel out the government-wide factors affecting budget 
performance. However, it spends more time considering the relationship between the 
external context and structural characteristics of organizations and their internal 
management in determining performance. It does so using both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, although it is again constrained in this by the inherently 
limited sample size of ministries within a given country. At the very least, though, its 
findings suggest that variation in performance is only weakly explained by the types 
of structural characteristics of organizations that might be thought to be important 
determinants. While a more sweeping or generalizable conclusion about the 
determinants of budget performance would make a more easily digestible “takeaway” 
message, the idea that the mechanisms that generate organizational performance could 
be heterogeneous and highly idiosyncratic – both in terms of external and internal 
determinants – perhaps provides a deeper challenge to scholars and reformers alike. 
 
1.4 GHANA’S STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Ghana is a useful site in which to study these issues because it is something of a “best 
case” for governance and institutional quality in Africa. Ghana is a stable and 
institutionalized democracy with two dominant parties that have alternated in power 
twice since 1992. The country has little recent history of large-scale violent conflict, 
and appears to have set its more recent history of coups d’état behind it. Ghana’s 
economy is relatively prosperous and its population relatively well educated, and the 
country has a free and active press and a vibrant civil society. Although some ethnic 
tensions do exist and both major parties draw to some extent on ethno-regional bases 
of support, these ethnic divides are less severe and politically mobilized than in many 
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other countries. Together, these features mean that Ghana is often viewed 
internationally as a bright spot for governance in Africa. 
 
Despite these apparently favorable institutional and political conditions, Ghana’s 
public bureaucracies have been persistently perceived as inefficient, poorly managed, 
and corrupt, resulting in a long string of reform programs since the 1980s that have 
each aimed to improve management and productivity in government: the Public 
Administration Restructuring and Decentralization Implementation Committee 
(PARDIC), Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP), National Institutional Renewal 
Programme (NIRP), Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP), 
Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP), Public Sector Re-
Invention and Modernization Strategy (PUSERMOS), Public Sector Incomes 
Administration Reform, Subvented Agency Reform, and Single Spine Pay Policy 
(SSPP) (Ayee 2001; Owusu 2006; Antwi, Analoui, and Nana-Agyekum 2008; Eghan 
2008; Wereko 2009; Annan-Prah and Ohemeng 2015). The history of these reforms 
and fluctuations broadly tracks international trends in public management and donor 
programming: Africanization and central planning in the 1950s and 1960s; tensions 
between civilian and military rule in the 1970s; retrenchment, decentralization, cash 
budgeting, and agencification in the 1980s and 1990s; medium-term expenditure 
frameworks, poverty reduction plans, anti-corruption initiatives, integrated financial 
management systems, e-government, and performance management in the 2000s and 
2010s. This long history of both government- and donor-led reforms – which is 
shared by many other African countries – suggests that if Ghana’s public 
bureaucracies are inefficient, it is not for lack of reform effort and international “best 
practice”. 
 
In terms of political institutions, Ghana has a hybrid regime with a president elected 
by national popular vote and a unicameral parliament composed of representatives 
elected from single-member constituencies. Although the presidency and parliament 
could, in principle, be controlled by different parties, this has not occurred since the 
return to democracy in 1992. Parliament’s role in policymaking and implementation is 
limited to debating and voting on bills proposed by the executive branch, and 
conducting ex post scrutiny and hearings on audit reports and occasionally other 
issues on an ad hoc basis. I describe the country’s administrative and bureaucratic 
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structures in more detail in each of the three papers, but broadly speaking the central 
government bureaucracy retains many elements of its colonial-era British heritage, 
and since the 1980s the country has undergone a partial but progressive 
decentralization of some government functions – particularly those related to the 
delivery of small-scale, basic public goods and services – to district governments. 
This combination of executive dominance, colonial bureaucratic origins, and partial 
decentralization is shared by many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, so the study of 
bureaucracy and within-government variation in performance in Ghana is likely to 
have wider relevance. 
 
5. SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Having discussed what this dissertation seeks to accomplish, it is worth noting some 
things that it does not seek to do. Although I study within-government variation in 
performance among organizations, I do not seek to provide a general answer to the 
question “What causes some organizations to perform better than others?” This 
questions seeks a simple answer of the form “variable X causes organizational 
performance”, and thinks about organizational performance in the same way that 
cross-country regression studies approach the determinants of economic growth or 
institutional quality.  
 
Although it is an intuitive question to ask, I argue that it is in many ways the wrong 
question. I have discussed one practical reason for this: governments are composed of 
a finite number of organizations that each have dozens or even hundreds of potentially 
relevant characteristics, so organizational performance is empirically overdetermined. 
Even absent practical considerations, however, the conceptual framework presented in 
Section 1.2 suggests a deeper reason related to the multiple levels of determinants of 
organizational performance: while “X causes organizational performance” may be a 
logically coherent way of thinking about external factors that influence an 
organization’s performance, it is more problematic when X is a factor that is internal 
to the organization, such as management or organizational culture. Since internal 
determinants of organizational performance are (by definition) endogenous to the 
organization, their causal effects cannot be identified using observational data. While 
they can be identified through experimental methods, this raises serious concerns 
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about external validity, since any experimental intervention that is plausibly 
exogenous must (also by definition) be initiated by external forces and thus can no 
longer be truly internal. Finally, the multiple equilibria character of management and 
the important distinction between de jure and de facto practices limit the 
generalizability of any such intervention, since its effects are strongly contingent on 
organizational context and other non-verifiable aspects of its implementation. 
 
Instead of asking what causes organizational performance, this dissertation instead 
focuses on understanding the mechanisms through which some organizations perform 
better than others. The first paper measures variation in management quality and 
explores relational contracts as a mechanism that generates this variation, but does not 
attempt to explain why some organizations have “good” relational contracts. The 
second paper measures variation in project completion rates across different fiscal 
institutions (project funding sources) and identifies a political economy mechanism 
that generates these differences, but does not attempt to explain the origin of these 
fiscal institutions or why they are designed differently. The third paper comes closer 
to investigating the determinants of organizational performance, but nevertheless 
finds that both observable organizational characteristics and compliance with budget 
procedures have little correlation with budget performance, instead concluding that 
the drivers of performance tend to be heterogeneous across and idiosyncratic to 
particular organizations.  
 
To return to the cross-country growth regression analogy, in emphasizing mechanisms 
and heterogeneity my approach is much more similar to the “growth diagnostics” 
approach that, instead of asking “What causes economic growth on average?”, asks 
“What is the binding constraint to economic growth in this particular country at this 
time?” (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2005; Hausmann, Klinger, and Wagner 
2008). My approach helps provide a more robust theoretical foundation to the idea 
propounded by the applied governance and development literature that “good enough 
governance” (Grindle 2011) or “problem-driven iterative adaptation” (Andrews 2013) 
are preferable to one-size-fits-all approaches to governance reform. However, this 
dissertation is focused on understanding the roots of variation in performance rather 
than contributing directly to the design of reforms – diagnosis, rather than 
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prescription. While I note some specific implications for reform in each of the three 
articles, I instead reserve discussion of reform for the dissertation’s conclusion. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
FROM INSTITUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS: 
 
MANAGEMENT AND INFORMALITY IN  
GHANA’S PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Abstract 
 
Studies of state capacity in political science and economics have largely sought to 
explain variation in bureaucratic quality over space or time through the lens of 
national-level factors, notably the quality of institutions. However, these institutional 
approaches are unable to explain variation among organizations within the same 
government. I develop a complementary approach grounded in organizational 
economics, in particular relational contracts theory, that is consistent with 
organizational-level variation in bureaucratic quality within governments and 
generates predictions about the changing qualitative relationship between formal and 
informal practices across this spectrum. I find empirical support using original 
interview-based data on management quality from 40 organizations in Ghana’s central 
government. The range of variation in management quality across organizations is 
substantial and systematic, is not limited to a handful of exceptional “islands” of 
excellence, and is qualitatively more consistent with theories of relational contracts 
and organizational culture than prevailing theories of formal and informal institutions. 
I suggest a number of ways in which institutional and organizational approaches can 
usefully complement each other in the study of government bureaucracies and their 
reform. 
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From Institutions to Organizations: 
Management and Informality in Ghana’s Public Bureaucracies 
 
A large and influential literature has sought to explain variation in societies’ economic 
and political performance through the framework of institutions – the formal and 
informal “rules of the game” that define the action sets within which actors operate 
(North 1990). Since state capacity plays an important role in economic and political 
development, this institutional lens has also come to dominate studies of state 
capacity and the quality of government bureaucracies, especially in developing 
countries. For example, the World Bank’s widely used World Governance Indicators 
list “government effectiveness” as one dimension of governance quality alongside 
other abstract elements of institutional quality such as “rule of law” and “protection of 
property rights”.5 Across a wide range of theoretical and methodological perspectives, 
from rational choice to historical institutionalism to the literature on good governance, 
the language of institutions has become the default vocabulary for the study of state 
bureaucracies and their reform. 
 
Yet for all its theoretical and empirical successes, the institutions framework has run 
up against important limitations in understanding the functioning of government 
bureaucracies. First, the institutions literature has focused heavily on explaining 
variation in performance at the national or societal level across space or time, and thus 
cannot explain within-government variation among ministries and agencies that face 
identical institutional, historical, geographic, and socio-cultural contexts. While the 
implicit assumption of the institutions literature is that such organization-level 
variation is non-existent (or at least is second-order to society-level variation), an 
increasing body of case studies (Grindle 1997, Tendler 1997, Leonard 2010, Roll 
2013) and large-N studies (Gingerich 2013, Rasul and Rogger 2014) shows that 
within-government variation cannot be assumed away even as a first approximation. 
This empirical evidence also presents a deep theoretical challenge to the institutions 
literature: if we observe a wide range of outcomes across organizations operating 
                                                
5 This is defined as “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p.4) 
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within the same institutional context, how much do these institutions actually 
determine or constrain performance? Understanding this cross-sectional variation can 
therefore shed new light on the difficult question of how institutional equilibria 
change over time that has challenged both rational choice  and historical scholars of 
institutions (North 1990; Greif and Laitin 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hacker, 
Pierson, and Thelen 2015). 
 
Second, while institutional perspectives recognize that both formal and informal 
aspects of institutions are important and potentially interactive, they offer limited 
analytical tools for understanding the interactions of formal and informal factors in 
actual bureaucratic practice (North 1990, Ostrom 1990, La Porta et al 1999, Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004, Stein and Tommasi 2008, Andrews 2013). This is because the 
analytical focus on informal institutions is simultaneously very broad and very 
restrictive, and because it overlooks the role that organizational hierarchies play in 
consciously and continuously trying to shape the informal norms and practices of their 
members. Informal institutions is a broad category in that it potentially encompasses 
everything from subconscious socio-cultural cognitive frames to highly regularized 
and actively enforced norms, and factors that are general to an entire society as well 
as those that are propagated within specific institutional sub-fields or organizations. 
Yet it excludes or elides a wide range of informal processes, actions, and behavioral 
regularities that are extremely important for the functioning of bureaucracies, but are 
not institutionalized. Furthermore, while much of the literature on informal 
institutions examines how they can emerge organically from strategic interaction 
among actors, informal norms and practices within organizations are the product not 
just of organic interactions but also the deliberate interventions of leadership and 
managers to cultivate useful norms (i.e. “organizational culture”) and govern day-to-
day practices that require the exercise of discretion by its members. Even formal 
structures and processes, such as incentive schemes and performance monitoring, may 
be consciously designed to affect informal norms and practices. While institutionalist 
approaches thus correctly emphasize that informality is an important feature of 
government bureaucracies, an approach tailored to the specificities of how informality 
functions within organizations could provide richer insights. 
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The central argument of this paper is that, for many purposes, there are theoretical and 
empirical advantages to studying government bureaucracies from an organizational 
rather than an institutional perspective. Organizations are the literal bricks-and-mortar 
of governments; political choices over laws, policies, and resource allocations are 
implemented not by an abstract notion of “government effectiveness” but by 
particular ministries, departments, and agencies through complex, painstaking, and 
sometimes ineffective bureaucratic processes. Though organizations have long been a 
key unit of analysis for scholars of public administration and management, 
particularly in wealthy democracies (Wilson 1989; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 
2003; Talbot 2010), studies of the state as institution and state as organizations have 
increasingly diverged. This seemingly semantic distinction has significant 
consequences for research, because institutional and organizational approaches are 
associated with different research questions, different bodies of theory, and different 
sets of empirical methodologies. This divergence is even more evident in the 
assessing the impact of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) on studies of state 
capacity: while the Northian “institutions” branch of the NIE has thoroughly 
transformed the way political scientists and economists think about the development 
and functioning of government bureaucracies, the influence of the Williamsonian 
“organizations” branch of the NIE has been largely restricted to particular niches of 
the public administration sub-discipline. 
 
More specifically, I argue that the theoretical and methodological tools of 
organizational economics and organization theory provide insights into the two 
shortcomings of institutional approaches identified above: 1) explaining within-
government variation in organizational performance, and 2) analyzing the interaction 
of formal and informal processes in these bureaucracies. A large body of empirical 
research shows large and persistent differences in productivity and management 
quality among organizations even within the same narrowly defined field (Gibbons 
and Henderson 2013; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Syverson 2011; Dunleavy and 
Carrera 2013; Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen 2015). This literature also 
explores the micro-foundations of variation in performance among ex ante identical 
organizations, outlining theories based on: the necessarily incomplete nature of formal 
contracts, since appropriate actions cannot always be codified ex ante or verified ex 
post; and the repeated nature of principal-agent interactions within organizations. 
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Together, these create the potential for multiple equilibria in organizational 
performance, and make informal methods of management and control necessary 
complements to formal ones.  
 
These theories of organizational performance as determined by relational contracts 
provide an integrated view of formal processes and informal norms and practices 
within organizations. 6  In this view, the organization functions as a nexus of 
institutions, both formal and informal. It is also an important agent of endogenous 
institutional change, in that it acts calculatively and purposively to shape the 
incentives, norms, and behavior of its members. The informal factors on which it 
seeks to act include both general, organization-wide norms (e.g. organizational 
culture), as well as the task-specific exercise of discretion by agents. This 
organizational approach not only provides a more appropriate basis for the analysis of 
the day-to-day functioning of organizations but also sheds light on the workings of 
institutional mechanisms by revealing the ways in which they are – and are not – 
constraining on the actors that operate within them. 
 
I empirically illustrate the contributions of an organizational approach by drawing on 
original interview-based data on management practices from 40 organizations in 
Ghana’s central government, using an adaptation of Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) 
influential methodology for benchmarking management quality. These organizations 
are all located near each other in the capital city, sometimes even sharing the same 
building, and are thus subject to identical sets of institutional, historical, socio-
cultural, and national-level political factors; in many cases formal uniformity of 
structures and even specific practices is dictated by a common set of legal and 
                                                
6 In contrast, historical institutionalism makes an explicit distinction between institutional enforcement 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2009) and the analysis of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). In 
showing how formal structures can co-exist with and reinforce informal practices, relational contracts 
bears some similarity to Greif and Laitin’s (2004) theory of endogenous institutional change that rests 
on the concept of quasi-parameters that are exogenous in the short run but endogenous in the long run. 
But whereas Greif and Laitin’s quasi-parameters typically occur as an unintended byproduct of formal 
institutional structures, the development of positive relational contracts in organizations – 
organizational culture – is typically the result of deliberate efforts of managers and is directly and often 
consciously linked to the design of formal structures, processes, and incentives within the organization. 
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administrative regulations. Yet the range of variation in management quality across 
organizations is substantial and systematic, and is not limited to a handful of 
exceptional “islands” of excellence. Across this spectrum, a qualitative pattern 
emerges: in the worst-managed organizations, formal management processes are 
either undefined or unexecuted, and substitutive informal norms are absent or rare; 
somewhat better-managed organizations execute most formal processes but without 
the support of complementary informal norms and practices, thus following the letter 
of the process but not its spirit – perfunctory performance, in the language of 
relational contracts (Williamson 1975, Hart and Moore 2008); and the best-managed 
organizations not only define and execute formal processes, but also cultivate and 
encourage complementary informal processes to ensure that management processes 
are executed according to their spirit – consummate performance). Both of these 
empirical results are consistent with the predictions of an organizational approach 
based in relational contract theory, but are not well explained by prevailing 
institutionalist approaches in their rational choice, historical, or governance and 
development varieties. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the 
relationship between organizational and institutional theories of government 
bureaucracy, and draws implications for empirical analysis. Section 2.2 details the 
methodology, sample, and context for the analysis of management practices in 
Ghanaian government organizations. Section 2.3 shows that the changing qualitative 
relationship of formal and informal processes across the spectrum of management 
quality is consistent with relational contract theories of management, and Section 2.4 
demonstrates that aggregating these practice-level differences reveals the existence of 
substantial and systematic variation in management quality at the organization-level. 
Section 2.5 concludes by discussing the relationship of an organizational perspective 
on government bureaucracies to approaches rooted in institutions and political 
economy, and considers other implications for research on states, institutions, and 
development.  
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2.1 INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 
 
This section highlights two shortcomings of institutionalist approaches to studying 
government bureaucracy: their inability to explain organization-level variation within 
governments, and their weak predictions about the interaction of formal and informal 
factors. It argues that alternative theoretical approaches from organization economics, 
in particular relational contracts theory, can address both of these shortcomings. 
Finally, the section sets out the quantitative and qualitative empirical implications of 
this theoretical framework, and discusses how the empirical distribution and patterns 
of bureaucratic performance can provide guidance on whether (and when) it is more 
appropriate to analyze government bureaucracy as an institution or as a set of 
organizations.7 
 
Institutions and organizational performance 
The explosion of literature on institutions, governance, and development in the past 
two decades has been fundamentally shaped by North’s distinction between 
institutions as the formal and informal “rules of the game” and organizations as the 
“players” of this game (1990, 1-2).8 Like North, this literature has largely focused – 
empirically and theoretically – on institutions, to the neglect of organizations. In large 
part, this neglect stems from North’s assumption that organizations operate efficiently 
within the constraints of a society’s institutions. North is explicit about this: after 
referring to Williamson’s (1975, 1985) transaction cost theories of organization, he 
writes “Whatever the merits of these alternatives…the focus in this study is on 
                                                
7 The purpose of this discussion is not to hypothesize a specific model or determinant of bureaucratic 
performance; indeed, organizational approaches to bureaucracy and relational contracts theory are both 
broad enough to encompass numerous potential models and determinants. Nonetheless, the distribution 
of a variable is informative about the process through which it is generated (Jones et al 2009), and it is 
this broader question of the applicability of institutional and organizational frameworks with which this 
paper is concerned. 
8 For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2005, p.388) influential review of the literature on 
institutions and development cites North’s definitions. North’s definition of institutions is a broad one, 
encompassing everything from formal political institutions to diffuse factors such as culture, social 
capital, and trust. While these are all important theoretical constructs in their own right, in this paper I 
follow North’s distinction and group them together for brevity in order to more clearly juxtapose 
institutional and organizational theories of bureaucracy. 
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organizations as purposive entities designed by their creators to maximize wealth, 
income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional 
structure of the society.” (1990, 73) With this assumption, a theory of institutions as 
constraints on organizations becomes a theory of institutions as determinants of 
organizational performance – that is, organizations are assumed to be operating at 
their notional production frontier.9 Since institutions are defined as society-wide, they 
provide no theoretical explanation for organization-level variation in performance 
within governments. While institutionalists would likely not deny that any 
organization-level variation is possible within institutions, the assumption is 
nevertheless that such variation is either negligible or second-order. 
 
Likewise, the empirical and theoretical literature has overwhelmingly focused on 
explaining the causes and consequences of variation in institutional quality across 
countries or other geographic units (Tilly 1990, Evans and Rauch 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, 
and Robinson 2012; Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon 
2011). While more recent models of state capacity have sought to distinguish between 
different aspects of state capacity, such as fiscal and legal capacity (Besley and 
Persson 2009), even these more sophisticated models do not provide a general 
explanation for variation among organizations in the same government. Even the 
qualitative, case study-based literature that seeks to identify “islands” or “pockets” of 
effectiveness in developing country governments (Grindle 1997, Tendler 1997, 
Leonard 2010, Roll 2013) inadvertently reinforces this homogenizing assumption by 
emphasizing that such variation is “exceptional”.10 
 
                                                
9 This is a consequence of how North defines the scope of his work: “the emphasis in this study is on 
the institutions that are the underlying rules of the game and the focus on organizations (and their 
entrepreneurs) is primarily on their role as agents of institutional change; therefore the emphasis is on 
the interaction between institutions and organizations.” (1990, 3) While North’s view of organizations 
as agents of institutional change does recognize that causality may also run from organizations to 
institutions in the long term, institutions are nevertheless determinative of organizational performance 
at any given point in time. 
10 For instance: “It is well established that even in countries that have poor governance and weak public 
sectors, exceptional well-functioning government and government-supported agencies do exist.” 
(Leonard 2010, 91) 
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What larger-N research does exist at the organizational level, however, suggests that 
variation within government may be the norm rather than the exception. In their study 
of 63 government organizations in Nigeria, Rasul and Rogger (2014) document 
extensive variation both in management quality and output delivery. Gingerich (2013) 
draws on a survey of civil servants in 30 organizations across three countries in Latin 
America to argue that within-country variation across organizations is actually greater 
than cross-country variation, for a variety of survey items related to politicization, 
capacity, and corruption – this calls into question the institutionalist assumption that 
organization-level variation is second-order compared to institution-level variation. 
Studies of government performance in OECD countries have long viewed 
organizations as a fundamental unit of analysis (Wilson 1989, Ingraham et al 2003, 
Talbot 2010), and have documented substantial differences in performance among 
them.11 
 
Outside of the public sector, the potential for organizations to operate inefficiently has 
long been a key theme in the study of organizations. Early theorists questioned 
economic models of firms as perfectly rational maximizers with concepts such as 
organizational slack (Cyert and March 1963), X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966), and 
organizational culture (Schein 1985).12 A growing body of empirical research shows 
large and persistent differences in productivity and management quality among 
organizations even within the same narrowly defined field (Gibbons and Henderson 
2013), with evidence most heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Bloom 
and Van Reenen 2007, Syverson 2011) but extending also to other fields such as 
hospitals (Bloom et al 2015, Carrera and Dunleavy 2010) and schools (Bloom et al 
2014). These “persistent performance differences” among ex ante identical 
organizations appear to be the norm, not the exception, within organizational fields 
(Gibbons and Henderson 2013). Both theoretically and empirically, the institutionalist 
treatment of organizations as purposive rational maximizers within institutional 
                                                
11 Some of this literature also discusses inherent differences across organizations in the nature of 
management, for example due to different types of tasks or budget structures (Mintzberg 1983, Wilson 
1989, Dunleavy 1991). While these can be important, for brevity my discussion focuses on theoretical 
and empirical literature on true inefficiency in the sense of organizations operating within their notional 
production frontier, given external constraints. 
12 Other perspectives view cultural dispositions as semi-inherent to organizations (e.g. Douglas 1992).  
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constraints is at odds with the vast scholarship on management and organizational 
performance. 
 
Relational contracts and management practices 
Relational contract theories of dispersion in organizational performance among ex 
ante identical organizations rest on the idea that contracts are necessarily 
incomplete. 13  This is particularly true of the employment contract and the 
management practices that specify the actions of managers and employees within this 
contract. Contracts may be incomplete in two senses: future states of the world and 
the associated actions for each party to take may be impossible to fully anticipate and 
specify ex ante (Simon 1951, Kreps 1996); and/or some value-creating aspects of 
parties’ actions may be unverifiable by third parties ex post, and thus unenforceable 
(Hart and Moore 2008). This incompleteness implies that it is generally efficient for 
both parties to retain some level of discretion – indeed, as a practical matter it is 
almost impossible to completely eliminate discretion. 14  In a repeated game 
framework, this creates short-term incentives for both employees and managers to 
play Defect strategies (by shirking on effort or reneging on promises of rewards, for 
example), even if the cooperative equilibrium is both socially and privately efficient 
in the long term (Kreps 1996).  
 
Management in organizations is therefore both technical – in the specification of 
tasks, contingencies, and the design of incentives – and relational, in that it requires 
building shared expectations, understandings, and norms over time.15 This creates the 
potential for substantial long-term divergences in performance among organizations, 
along with path dependence arising from minor stochastic shocks (Chassang 2010). 
                                                
13 I focus on relational contracts that are within rather than between organizations. My discussion of 
relational contracts here is highly stylized and oriented towards building intuition about why 
performance might differ among organizations embedded in identical institutional, historical, socio-
cultural, political, and task contexts. See Gibbons and Henderson (2012) for a concise formal 
exposition of these models. 
14 Agent discretion has long been an important element of theories of management and public 
administration (Mintzberg 1983, Wilson 1989), and much of the recent work on relational management 
practices in organizational economics formalizes these arguments. 
15 Nelson and Winter’s (1982) work on routines in organizations places a similar emphasis on the 
accretion of shared understandings and processes over time. 
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The relational aspects of management are likely to be even more important in public 
sector organizations than private sector ones: outputs of public sector organizations 
are often non-priced and/or difficult to measure (Wilson 1989, Prendergast 2003)16; 
and public sector organizations often have multiple principals, thus weakening the 
potential effectiveness of incentive schemes (Dixit 1996).17 
 
The idea that shared norms can be used to sustain cooperation without the 
intervention of formal enforcement mechanisms is, of course, a familiar one for 
scholars of institutions (Ostrom 1990, Greif 1993, Putnam 1993, Nunn 2008, Nunn 
and Wantchekon 2011), and studies such as La Porta et al (1997) have demonstrated 
that variations in generalized trust in large organizations across countries are 
positively correlated with levels of economic and institutional development. The 
contribution of an organizational perspective is to emphasize that socio-cultural 
norms, expectations, and cognitive frames not only vary across organizations within a 
given society from their societal “mean”, but also that they are explicitly 
organizational phenomena in that organizations invest a great deal of effort and 
resources into shaping and maintaining them. Indeed, hierarchy in organizations exists 
explicitly in order to facilitate cooperation among and coordination amongst members 
of the organization, and the cultivation of shared understandings and beliefs amongst 
individuals constitutes much of what managers actually do in organizations (Gibbons 
and Henderson 2013). The determinants and consequences of “organizational culture” 
are central questions for scholars of management (Schein 1985) and increasingly for 
empirical organizational economics (Martinez et al 2015, Gibbons and Kaplan 2015).  
 
                                                
16 As Prendergast (2003) notes, public sector tasks are in the public sector precisely because they 
cannot be efficiently delivered through market mechanisms, and thus observed (non-commercial) 
public bureaucracies are necessarily inefficient. 
17 Dixit’s (1996) multiple principal model is one of many non-relational contract theoretical models 
that can be used to explain why the political principals of public organizations may not be able to 
realize their preferred outcomes. But whereas inefficiency arises in the multiple principal model arises 
due to competing incentives being offered to the agent by the multiple principals, the lack of strong 
incentives is a more common scenario in developing country bureaucracies. 
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In this sense, the organization functions as a nexus of institutions.18 While they are 
certainly influenced by more general societal institutions, whether formal (e.g. 
contract enforcement) or informal (e.g. trust), organizations design and promulgate 
among their members a mutually reinforcing bundle of formal rules and informal 
norms. Whereas changing a formal institution in society typically requires negotiation 
and coordination among multiple actors, organizations centralize the design and 
enforcement of many formal rules in a calculative hierarchy that exists largely for this 
purpose. Likewise, informal institutions in society arise either organically through 
long-term repeated interactions or (occasionally) through deliberate coordination 
amongst elites. In contrast, organizational hierarchies attempt to directly shape 
informal norms amongst their members – albeit with great difficulty and uncertain 
success – and link this effort to the design of formal structures and processes, such as 
incentive schemes. Organizations are therefore far from being passive “price-takers” 
of institutions, at least with respect to their internal functioning. 
 
In addition to general, organization-wide cultures and norms, a key function of 
management is to develop shared informal norms about the execution of specific tasks 
that require agents to exercise discretion. Since the optimal exercise of discretion 
cannot always be specified ex ante or verified ex post, the performance of any tasks 
involving discretion cannot be fully governed by formal management tools like 
organizational manuals, standard operating procedures, or administrative regulations. 
Examples of tasks that require agents’ discretion include those where the principal 
cannot perfectly observe either the state of the world or the agent’s action, or those 
that involve an important non-measurable quality dimension. In these cases, the utility 
to the principal of an agent performing only the formal (fully specifiable and 
verifiable) aspects of a task may be substantially less than if the agent performs both 
the formal and the informal aspects of the task. Hart and Moore (2008) model these as 
perfunctory and consummate performance – actions consistent with the letter of the 
contract versus those consistent with the spirit of the contract, respectively. 19 
                                                
18 This is analogous to Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) theory of the firm as a nexus of property rights. 
19 Hart and Moore (2008) assume that the agent is indifferent between perfunctory and consummate 
performance; more generally, deadweight loss is created (and multiple equilibria are possible) if and 
only if the agent’s cost of performing the informal aspect of the task is less than the utility it creates for 
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Likewise, discretion for agents also implies discretion for principals (managers), in 
deciding whether the task was performed perfunctorily or consummately and thus in 
how the reward or punish the agent. As Gibbons and Henderson (2012, 2013) argue, 
building these relational understandings often requires employees and managers not 
just to solve a problem of credibility of mutual commitments over the use of 
discretion (sustaining cooperative equilibria) but also a simultaneous problem of 
clarity (building shared understanding of what actions constitute cooperation and 
defection in which states of the world). Informality is thus an important feature of 
bureaucracies even when formal contracts and management practices can be perfectly 
enforced. 
 
This view of the relationship between formal processes and informal norms and 
practices in organizations improves over institutionalist approaches in several ways. 
For example, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) categorize informal institutions as 
potentially complementary, substitutive, accommodating, or competing according to 
their convergence with formal institutions and the strength of formal institutions. 
While useful, this approach takes as given the design and strength of both formal and 
informal institutions, whereas a relational contracts approach emphasizes that within 
organizations these are jointly and consciously shaped. Likewise, by defining 
informal institutions as those that are shared “created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p. 727; 
emphasis in original), it explicitly excludes that much of what managers in 
bureaucratic hierarchies do is create, communicate, and enforce management 
practices that involve both formal and informal behaviors.20 Finally, this literature 
limits its focus purely to institutionalized informal behaviors rather than those driven 
simply by incentives or other “behavioral regularities” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p. 
727), whereas management in organizations is typically concerned with all of these. 
Corruption, for example, can be thoroughly institutionalized or a simple result of 
agency problems and imperfect monitoring. Andrew’s (2013) discussion of 
                                                                                                                                       
the principal. The language of perfunctory and consummate performance is originally from Williamson 
(1975, p. 69). 
20 To take an extreme example, Gibbons and Henderson (2013) refer to the employee handbook of the 
retailer Nordstrom which, for many years, consisted solely of the sentence: “Use good judgment in all 
situations.” 
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institutional reform comes closer in recognizing that public sector reform requires 
changes not just to formal structures but also to informal socio-cultural norms and 
cognition. But whereas this approach regards informal factors as “content” to be 
“supplied” by reforms alongside formal content (Andrews 2013, p. 66), relational 
contract theory emphasizes that, by its very nature, informal “content” cannot be 
specified ex ante in the same way as formal reforms can be. This qualitative 
understanding of the relationship between formality and informality in organizations 
is thus crucial to theories of bureaucratic performance and reform. 
 
Implications for empirical analysis 
This paper’s aim is to explain why we observe variation in performance among 
organizations within a common institutional setting and to explore the mechanisms 
that generate this variation, not to hypothesize a specific set of determinants of 
organizational performance. Indeed, relational contracts theory implies that asking 
“what are the exogenous determinants of organizational performance?” is in some 
ways the wrong question, since organizations that share the same context and external 
features may perform very differently for purely internal, endogenous reasons. 
Instead, this paper’s empirical analysis seeks to examine the extent to which 
quantitative and qualitative patterns of variation in management quality among 
organizations are consistent with and well explained by organizational (as opposed to 
institutionalist) theoretical approaches. These empirical predictions are not about the 
determinants of organizational performance, but rather about its distribution – the 
extent and distribution of dispersion in performance among organizations within a 
government – and its qualitative mechanisms – how organizations are well or poorly 
managed, rather than why. The distribution and mechanisms of management in turn 
shed light onto the processes through which it is generated, and thus can inform 
hypotheses about how these processes might be influenced.  
 
The distribution of performance among organizations operating in identical 
institutional contexts is an indirect indicator of how constraining institutions actually 
are on organizations.21 Institutionalist perspectives on state bureaucracies explicitly or 
                                                
21 The definitions of government performance and good governance are heavily contested (Rothstein 
and Teorell 2008, Talbot 2010, Fukuyama 2013, Rotberg 2014). While I focus on one specific measure 
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implicitly assume that organizations are purposive, rational actors that maximize 
some objective function within overall institutional constraints (North 1990), and so 
there is little reason to expect substantial variation in outcomes among them (other 
than perhaps some random noise). This corresponds to the stylized distribution 
illustrated in Figure 1(a), where deviations from the overall mean are uniformly low. 
If this distribution pertains in reality, then the assumption that institutions tightly 
constrain and thus determine bureaucratic quality is a sound one, and an 
organizational perspective would contribute little. The literature on “islands” of 
effectiveness in developing country governments takes this distribution and 
theoretical framework as a baseline, then argues that “exceptional” well functioning 
organizations can exist (Grindle 1997, Tendler 1997, Leonard 2010, Roll 2013). But 
because this literature relies exclusively on small-N case studies, it cannot identify 
whether such organizations are indeed exceptional – as illustrated in Figure 1(b) – or 
whether they are simply the upper end of a continuous distribution that includes not 
just very strong and very weak organizations, but also a full spectrum in between.  
 
 
Figure 1: Three stylized distributions of management quality 
 
 
 
This is the perspective implicitly adopted by medium- or large-N organization-
focused empirical work (Ingraham et al 2003, Talbot 2010, Gingerich 2013, Rasul 
and Rogger 2014). Figure 1(c) illustrates this as a uniform distribution with large 
deviations from the mean. For simplicity a uniform distribution is shown to illustrate 
                                                                                                                                       
of performance – management quality – the broader point about within-government variation is 
generally applicable. 
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the framework’s distributional prediction, but it is equally compatible with other 
alternatives (such as a normal distribution) that are both continuous – to distinguish 
them from 1(b) – and have a substantial degree of variation – to distinguish them from 
1(a). If organizational factors are important and systemic determinants of performance 
above and beyond institutional factors, the overall distribution of performance across 
organizations will resemble the distribution in Figure 1(c). The following section 
discusses methodological details of how this paper defines and measures 
organizational performance, and compares its distribution in Ghana’s government to 
these hypothetical distributions.22 
 
On the question of mechanisms, the relational contracts view of management predicts 
that the way in which formal and informal factors interact will change qualitatively 
when moving along the spectrum of overall management quality. That is, although 
formal and informal factors always interact, the difference between good and bad 
organizations is not simply “better” interactions, but qualitatively different ones. 
Table 1 illustrates three qualitative typologies of management. Perfunctory 
performance of a task involves carrying out the formal aspects of the task that are 
fully codifiable and verifiable, but not the associated informal aspects that also create 
value. Consummate performance, however, involves carrying out both the formal and 
the informal aspects of the task. In better-performing organizations, then, qualitative 
examination of day-to-day tasks would show managers and employees collaborating 
not just to design and enforce formal rules, but also to cultivate the complementary 
informal practices that enhance the efficiency of the formal practice. In less well-
managed organizations, however, agents might follow formal rules, but only to the 
                                                
22 The definition of “substantial” in this context is, of course, contestable, since organizational 
performance has no natural scale. One option is to compare it to cross-country variation, as Gingerich 
(2013) does in arguing that within-country variation in governance quality across organizations 
actually exceeds variation across-countries, using self-reported survey data. However such 
comparisons raise methodological issues about cultural and contextual differences affecting item 
interpretation, as well as other possible sources of survey bias. This paper’s approach is to use an 
objectively defined methodology for benchmarking management that covers a range of variation that is 
“substantial” quantitatively in that it has been widely used in other contexts and shown to be predictive 
of significant variations in performance, and qualitatively in that the benchmarks cover a range of 
variation in practices comparable to what public sector reform efforts seek to realize. Section 2.2 
discusses measurement in more detail. 
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extent they are codifiable and verifiable. Finally, in the worst organizations, agents 
may not even execute these formal processes, and managers may not attempt to or be 
able to enforce them. In this state of non-performance, positive informal practices 
(now substitutive rather than complementary of formal practices) only exist on an ad 
hoc basis – due to exceptional individuals, for example – rather than being 
systematically fostered and institutionalized, and thus should be empirically rare. Note 
that this framework is agnostic about the design of these formal and informal 
practices; rather they are shaped on an ongoing basis through a relational process, and 
the assumption is that regardless of whether a given management practice is 
theoretically optimal, executing it is better than not executing it.23 
 
 
Table 1: Formality, informality, and performance in organizations 
 Non-performance 
Perfunctory 
performance 
Consummate 
performance 
Formal processes defined and 
executed No Yes Yes 
Supporting informal norms and 
practices cultivated No No Yes 
 
 
 
Qualitatively, then, the empirical analysis examines the extent to which this spectrum 
of performance – from non-performance to perfunctory performance to consummate 
performance – is an accurate characterization of day-to-day bureaucratic functioning 
and management in government organizations. Unlike the distributional predictions, 
these qualitative predictions of relational contract theory are not necessarily in tension 
with institutionalist approaches to formal and informal institutions; rather, they are 
considerably more specific. If they are accurate, then, their specificity provides a 
stronger – or at least complementary – analytical basis for understanding the 
functioning of government bureaucracy than institutionalist approaches. They also 
                                                
23 This may not be true in cases where the organization’s political principles heavily incentivize 
outcomes but also impose rigid and poorly designed formal rules that hamper the achievement of these 
outcomes; Helmke and Levitsky (2004) cite the Soviet blat system as an example of an 
“accommodating” informal institution that improved efficiency by working around a formal institution. 
These seem less likely to be important in the contexts of developing country bureaucracies, where 
outcomes are typically not strongly incentivized and formal rules are often weakly enforced. 
! 54 
predict that, to the extent they result from relational processes in organizations rather 
than generalized socio-cultural institutions, informal norms and expectations will vary 
substantially across organizations, and that better-managed organizations will try to 
actively foster positive informal norms through official channels. 
 
I address these quantitative and qualitative predictions in reverse order: Section 2.3 
examines qualitative variation at the level of two specific management practices, and 
Section 2.4 then aggregates these practice-level variations up to the organizational 
level in order to draw a picture of the overall distribution of variation in management 
quality in Ghana’s central government. Before this, however, the next section 
discusses details of measurement and methodology.  
 
2.2 MEASURING MANAGEMENT 
 
To examine the extent to which performance varies across organizations within the 
same government, I conduct semi-structured interviews on management practices 
with senior managers in 40 organizations in Ghana’s central government. Broadly 
defined as the cumulative operation of formal structures and processes and informal 
norms and practices within an organization, management is a close proxy for 
organizational performance: better-managed organizations perform better than worse 
managed ones, all else equal. To measure management quality, I adapt the 
methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007; BVR henceforth) from organizational 
economics, which uses semi-structured interviews with senior managers to benchmark 
the effectiveness of a variety of management practices in the organization.24 This 
method produces an indicator of performance that is more comparable across 
organizations than the outcome-based measures used by most cross-national studies, 
and is also largely attributable to and within the control of the organization itself.25 
                                                
24 This method has been shown to be highly correlated with productivity in organizations as diverse as 
manufacturing firms, schools, hospitals, and non-governmental organizations, in developed as well as 
developing countries (see Bloom et al 2014 for a survey). 
25 In contrast, organizational outputs depend on the supply of resource inputs and outcomes may 
depend on the interaction of these outputs with societal factors or the actions of other government 
organizations. While certain aspects of management are not entirely within an organization’s control 
(for example due to labor laws or budgeting processes), in Ghana these largely apply government-wide 
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Likewise, it is also more comparable across organizations than qualitative small-N 
methods, making it possible to incorporate a large enough sample to be representative 
of the overall population of organizations in a government.26 
 
In contrast to most survey-based approaches to studying management, the BVR 
method uses interviews with managers to investigate the actual state of practice in 
their organization, rather than asking what the management practices are supposed to 
be on paper or what interviewees’ perceptions of management quality are. This focus 
is particularly important in the context of governments in developing countries, since 
it is widely recognized that de facto practices frequently diverge from de jure ones in 
this context (Andrews 2013) and much of the comparative governance literature has 
so far relied on perception-based measures of experts or the subjects themselves 
(Kaufmann et al 2010; Teorell et al 2011, Gingerich 2013), both of which may be 
subject to various biases (Schwarz 1999, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001, Olken 
2009). To get at de facto practice, the conduct of the interviews included a number of 
measures to elicit honest answers and avoid social desirability bias, such as starting 
with open questions (e.g. “How do individual staff know what tasks and targets they 
are responsible for?”) rather than the types of closed questions (“Do individual staff 
have tasks and targets?”) that are common to most surveys; following up with more 
specific probing questions (“So how do officers know what to do when they get to the 
office on Monday morning?”) and requests for examples; and asking whether “on 
paper” management practices were actually carried out and meaningful in reality (“Do 
these targets actually influence what individuals do on a day-to-day basis, or are they 
                                                                                                                                       
and thus cannot explain variation. In fact, examining the implementation of these common de jure 
processes provide a useful test to alleviate concerns that variation is being driven by organizations 
choosing to implement management practices that are different but not necessarily better or worse. 
26 The BVR approach has also been adapted to African public sectors by Rasul and Rogger (2014), 
who use it with government organizations in Nigeria. Although there are many similarities between 
Rasul and Rogger and this article, the two projects were independently conceived and implemented. I 
first became aware of the Rasul and Rogger study in May 2013, mid-way through fieldwork for this 
article. However, the details of this article’s methodology differ in important ways from both BVR and 
Rasul and Rogger’s adapation of it – these distinctions are discussed below. 
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just on paper?”). Finally, all interviews were conducted anonymously at both the 
individual and organization level, so respondents had no incentive to misreport.27 
 
The interviews focused on 15 aspects of management across four sub-groups: 
operations management, target setting, performance monitoring, and human resources 
management. Following BVR, these practices are evaluated against a pre-defined 
scoring grid on a scale of 1-5, with scores defined according to objective benchmarks 
rather than subjective relative perceptions (such as Likert scales).28 Appendix 2.1 
provides full details of each practice, sample questions associated with it, criteria for 
benchmarking, and examples. The benchmarking criteria are designed to be neutral 
with respect to the style of management and instead focus on whether for each 
practice the organization has a process or routine that is consciously designed and 
followed in reality, and which it continuously seeks to improve. The framework is 
thus largely agnostic with respect to the many prominent debates in the academic 
literature on public management that focus more on defining optimal practices 
(distinguishing between the 90th and 99th percentiles) than on explaining 
organizations’ failures to adopt anything resembling an optimal practice 
(distinguishing between the 10th and 90th percentiles). To aggregate the scores, each 
practice was converted into a normalized z-score and then averaged across the 
organization, with missing practices excluded, and the resulting average was then re-
converted to a z-score for use in analysis.29 
                                                
27 It is of course still possible that respondents could lie about actual management practices, but the 
combination of open-ended questions and probing follow-ups means that to do so, a respondent must 
both: 1) want to lie despite having no incentive to do so; and 2) be aware of what a better management 
practice would be. 
28 While this approach is more effective at eliciting information about sensitive and/or informal 
practices than typical closed-ended survey questions, it also requires the interviewer to use more 
discretion in posing and coding questions. While this could engender concerns about possible 
interviewer bias, this method is at least more transparent about how discretion and judgment are used 
by the interviewer than the strictly qualitative case study approaches that have thus far been used to 
study informal practices and institutions. 
29 To check whether reported practices depended heavily on the individual being interviewed, I 
conducted two interviews with individuals from different divisions in each of the 20 ministries. The 
correlation of overall z-scores between interviewees in the same organization is very strong (0.84) and 
highly statistically significant. Figure A1 in Appendix 2.2 shows this relationship graphically. The 
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Table 2: Organizations in sample 
Ministries (20) Agencies and Departments (20) 
Administration sector 
• Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional 
Affairs 
• Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
• Ministry of Information 
• Ministry of Justice and Attorney-General's 
Department 
• Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development 
• Department of Community Development 
• Ghana Revenue Authority 
• Information Services Department 
• Registrar-General's Department 
 
Economic sector 
• Ministry of Environment, Science, 
Technology, and Innovation 
• Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
• Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources 
• Ministry of Tourism, Culture, and Creative 
Arts 
• Ministry of Trade and Industry 
• Environmental Protection Agency 
• Fisheries Commission 
• Ghana Irrigation Development Authority 
• Ghana Standards Authority 
• Ghana Tourism Authority 
• Minerals Commission 
Infrastructure sector 
• Ministry of Communications 
• Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 
• Ministry of Roads and Highways 
• Ministry of Transport 
• Ministry of Water Resources, Works, and 
Housing 
• Department of Rural Housing 
• Ghana Highway Authority 
• Ghana Investment Fund for Electronic 
Communications 
• Ghana Shippers' Authority 
• National Petroleum Authority 
Social sector 
• Ministry of Education 
• Ministry of Employment and Labour 
Relations  
• Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Protection 
• Ministry of Health 
• Ministry of Youth and Sports  
• Department of Children 
• Department of Cooperatives 
• Ghana Library Authority 
• National Health Insurance Authority 
• National Youth Authority 
Note: Organization names are reported as at mid-2013, when fieldwork for this article was conducted. 
Some organizations have since been renamed, merged, or split. Sectoral classifications based on 
Government of Ghana budget classification, with the exception of the Ministry of Energy, which is 
coded as Infrastructure rather than Economic sector due to its expenditure profile. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
difference is due to some combination of measurement error and genuine differences in management 
practices between divisions in the same organization. This correlation is higher than that found in re-
interviews by BVR. This may be explained in part by methodological differences – BVR’s resurveys 
were of a manager in the same organization but a different plant, whereas I focused on two individuals 
within the same building. The BVR resurveys were also conducted by different interviewers, which 
likely increased the variance of scores. For the purpose of analysis, in the organizations where two 
interviews were completed, I first averaged each practice score between the two interviews before 
converting them to z-scores and aggregating. Although averaging the two interviews mechanically 
reduces the variance of scores among ministries somewhat, alternative aggregation schemes, such as 
using only the first interview in each organization, do not change the conclusions of the analysis. 
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I conducted these interviews in person with management-level staff in 40 
organizations in Ghana’s central government, comprising all twenty of Ghana’s 
ministries (excluding security sectors such as the Ministry of Defense) and one 
randomly selected agency of each ministry, thus covering a representative sample of 
organizations across nearly the whole of government.30 Respondents in specific 
positions within each organization were targeted for interviews, in order to minimize 
the potential for selection bias, and although timing and availability necessarily 
played some role in selection, there is no evidence that responses or management 
scores differed systematically by interview or interviewee characteristics (see 
Appendix 2.2 for more details). 
 
In addition to these numerical measures, I also treat the interviews as rich sources of 
qualitative data. This allows me not only to capture the nuanced interactions of formal 
and informal factors in day-to-day management practices, but also to make 
comparisons across a much larger sample than the small-N methods usually 
associated with research into informal institutions would allow. The qualitative data 
underlying these codings continues to serve to validate these codings and provide an 
important check for consistency in the coding process, which helps to alleviate the 
concerns about interviewer bias often associated with survey research as well as 
qualitative fieldwork methods.31 
                                                
30  The three security sector ministries – Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs and Regional 
Cooperation – were excluded from the study. At the time of the study the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Development was newly created and not yet operational, but was being created out of the 
extant Fisheries Commission, which was included in the sample. To select agencies, I first excluded all 
organizations that are: primarily commercial (state-owned enterprises); very small (below 30 staff); the 
two largest agencies (Ghana Education Service and Ghana Health Service), which are each an order of 
magnitude larger in terms of staff size than any other organization in Ghana’s government; and an 
assorted handful of organizations whose specific functions or structure made them non-comparable to 
other organizations. A random selection of one eligible agency per ministry was then made. The 
Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs had no eligible agencies. 
31 This qualitative data was referred to throughout the interview process in order to ensure that codings 
were consistent. All individual practice scores were finalized before aggregation and analysis, however, 
in order to minimize the potential for data mining and other forms of bias. Drawing on qualitative data 
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2.3 FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY IN GOVERNMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
This section examines qualitative variation within two of the fifteen management 
practices covered by the interviews: defining the tasks and responsibilities of 
employees, and assessing and rewarding performance. There is a wide range of 
variation in these across organizations. However, this variation is characterized not by 
a gaping chasm between a handful of exceptional organizations and a mass of poor 
ones, but by an accumulation of marginal yet collectively significant differences. 
Qualitatively, the observed qualitative relationship between formal processes and 
informal norms and practices corresponds to that hypothesized by relational contracts 
theory, ranging from non-performance to perfunctory performance to consummate 
performance of the practice. 
 
The definition of individual tasks and responsibilities and the assessment of individual 
performance are both critical aspects of management in any organization. Both are 
also subject to some degree of standardization across public service organizations in 
Ghana. For the assessment of individual performance this level of intended uniformity 
is very high, as the process is standardized even down to the specific form used for 
every government employee’s annual appraisal.32 This makes it a particularly strong 
test of this paper’s theoretical arguments: the formal “rules” (and any society-wide 
informal norms) are constant across organizations, so variation in their execution must 
be due to organization-level factors; if this variation comprises not just the execution 
of formal processes but also the fostering of complementary informal norms and 
practices, then these organization-level factors have a strongly relational element. 
                                                                                                                                       
to ensure the consistency of coding is a partial compensation for the inability to statistically control for 
interviewer bias. 
32 Ghana’s governmental structure makes a distinction between the Civil Service and the Public 
Service, each of which have their own staff appraisal system. The staff of ministries and departments, 
which comprise the Civil Service, therefore undergo a slightly different appraisal process than staff of 
the agencies, who are part of the Public Service but not the Civil Service. For the purposes of this 
study, however, the differences between these two appraisal schemes are negligible, and each scheme 
is formally identical across organizations within each service.  
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Defining individual tasks and responsibilities 
The interview item Defining Tasks and Responsibilities deals whether individuals 
know what they are responsible for and do it, as opposed to waiting around to be told 
what to do. In other words, when individuals come to work on Monday morning, how 
do they know what they should be doing? In the best organizations, individual 
objectives and tasks are clearly defined through a combination of formal target 
setting, periodic review meetings, to-do lists, and informal check-ins. This means that 
staff can handle routine tasks with a high degree of autonomy, and understand how 
these connect to the work of their colleagues and the division and organization as a 
whole. In these cases autonomy complements rather than replaces hierarchical 
supervision, as individuals still consult regularly with their directors in one-on-one 
and team meetings and are directly assigned tasks that arise in addition to their 
defined duties.  
 
In organizations on the other end of the spectrum, in contrast, direct hierarchical 
supervision is the sole method for assigning tasks, with the result that officers spend 
much of the time idle and supervisors feel overloaded because they are responsible for 
managing not only their own daily workload, but also that of all their subordinates. 
Service-wide regulations mandate that individual tasks and targets be defined 
annually, as part of the appraisal process, but in poorly managed organizations this is 
either not carried out, or is carried out in a formalistic way using vague or recycled 
objectives that are forgotten as soon as they are written and do not actually guide 
individuals’ work during the year.  
 
As the histogram in Table 3 shows, both of these extremes are represented, but the 
majority of organizations find themselves somewhere in between. Often this means 
partial execution of these processes: targets are defined for individuals, but not 
regularly; job descriptions provide some guidance about general responsibilities; and 
some officers can carry out certain routine tasks autonomously, but periods of 
idleness while waiting for direct orders from a superior are still common. 
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Table 3: Defining individual tasks and responsibilities 
Examines how well the organization allocates tasks and defines individual responsibilities 
Sample questions 
! How are objectives set for individual staff members? 
! Could everyone in the organization say what they are 
responsible for and how that will be assessed? 
! When a staff member comes to work on Monday 
morning, how do they know what to do? 
! How do you know which tasks are best suited to 
different staff? 
Benchmarking criteria 
Score 1 
Objectives are undefined or very 
vague. Staff are expected simply to 
“do what they’re told”. Tasks are 
allocated to individuals on an ad 
hoc basis, with little or no 
consideration of individual 
competences or workloads. Staff 
are often unsure what they should 
be doing. 
Score 3 
Objectives may be formally defined 
but are vague or inconsistently 
applied. Staff have a general sense 
what they are responsible for, but 
completion of most tasks relies 
mainly on the giving/ following of 
direct orders. There is some 
consideration of which tasks should 
be allocated to certain individuals, 
but this is partial, inconsistent, or 
based only on an officer’s formal 
position. 
Score 5 
Individuals understand clearly what 
they are responsible for and what 
they should be doing at all times. 
Objectives are meaningful and are 
defined through a two-way process. 
Tasks are allocated based on 
identified competences. 
Distribution of practices in Ghana’s government 
 
Selected examples 
Below average (score 1) 
! Officers in a social-sector 
ministry have targets defined 
through the appraisal process, but in 
practice they wait for work to be 
minuted to them by a superior. 
! Targets are seen as a formality 
that don’t actually influence work. 
"People set targets, but the fact is 
that in most situations in our parts 
of the world these things are only 
done when there is something 
critical that occurs, like the officer 
wants a promotion." 
! Staff are often idle because they 
don’t have work. "It's not like you 
come to work every time and there 
is something special that you do." 
! One consequence of this is that 
management have to micro-manage 
and are often overworked. 
Average (score 2.5) 
! In one economic-sector ministry, 
directors apportion their division’s 
objectives to officers at the start of 
the year. This is supposed to be 
annual but is not always done. 
! Job descriptions provide some 
guidance about individual 
responsibilities, but not enough that 
officers are always aware of what 
specific tasks they should be doing. 
! “It's not everyone who knows 
what they're responsible for and can 
get on with it without waiting for 
director's minutes...[but] some of us 
who have routine work know.” 
Above average (score 4.25) 
! In an infrastructure ministry, each 
officer sits with their boss at the 
start of every year and reaches 
mutual agreement on a set of 
specific tasks and targets (e.g. 
submitting a report within 48 hours 
of a workshop).  
! Individual tasks are derived 
directly from the division’s targets 
and areas of responsibility.  
! “People are pretty clear on what 
they need to be doing.” 
! Each division meets regularly to 
discuss the status of each officer’s 
work, the connections between their 
roles, and the organization’s targets. 
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Assessing and rewarding individual performance 
A similar range of practices exists with respect to assessing and rewarding individual 
performance. Personnel decisions and payscales are subject to a high degree of central 
control and regulation, and on paper, the process is completely standardized across 
organizations.33 Yet in actual practice, there is a significant amount of positive and 
negative deviance from the intended standard.  
 
On the negative side, in many organizations individual performance is so unimportant 
that the annual appraisal process is not even carried out annually, as intended; rather, 
individuals often complete several years’ worth of appraisals retrospectively as they 
near the date for promotion interviews. In these organizations the appraisal itself is 
essentially a self-assessment that the supervisor merely signs off on, except in cases of 
extreme misconduct, and there is no link between formal or informal assessments of 
performance and promotion or other rewards. 
 
On the positive side, some organizations not only carry out the formal appraisal 
process as designed, but also institute complementary informal measures to make the 
formal process more meaningful. Supervisors hold the standard annual and mid-year 
performance review meetings with each of their staff, but also hold informal 
discussions on performance in weekly divisional meetings so that individuals are not 
only kept aware of their own performance, but also how they compare to others in the 
division. Because there are strong centrally-imposed constraints on pay and 
promotions, organizations find other ways to recognize and reward good 
performance: awards nights for top performers as voted by their colleagues, 
occasional written letters of recognition for exemplary work, opportunities for 
training, and so on. While accelerated formal promotions are rare, it is common for 
these organizations to reward star performers with “informal promotions”: 
appointment to committees, roles as a focal person, and other opportunities that 
further career development and may also entail some financial benefit. In between the  
                                                
33 The Office of the Head of Civil Service and Public Services Commission are heavily involved in 
almost all human resources decisions pertaining to pay, promotion, hiring, and firing, so for all intents 
and purposes these are formally identical within the Civil Service and Public Service. In general, 
however, the Public Service organizations have a slightly higher degree of autonomy in some of these 
respects. 
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Table 4: Assessing and rewarding performance 
Examines whether individual performance is assessed transparently and rewarded proportionately 
Sample questions 
! How does your appraisal system work? Are the 
appraisals actually completed regularly? 
! Are there any financial or non-financial (e.g. awards, 
training, travel opportunities) rewards related to this 
review? 
! Are better performers likely to be promoted faster or 
are promotions given solely on the basis of tenure / 
seniority? 
Benchmarking criteria 
Score 1 
People are rewarded in the same 
way irrespective of their 
performance. Promotions are solely 
based on tenure. 
Score 3 
There is an evaluation system which 
in principle awards good 
performance (financially or non-
financially), but awards are not 
based on clear criteria/ processes. 
Performance can sometimes 
influence career progression. 
Score 5 
There is an evaluation system which 
rewards individuals (financially or 
non-financially) based on 
performance. Rewards are given as 
a consequence of well-defined and 
monitored individual achievements. 
Performance is a key criterion for 
promotion decisions. 
Distribution of practices in Ghana’s government 
 
Selected examples 
Below average (score 1) 
! In an economic-sector ministry, 
staff appraisals are only completed 
once every three years, when it is 
time for the officer to be considered 
for promotion. 
! The appraisal is a self-assessment; 
actual discussions about officers’ 
performance rarely happen.  
! “The appraisals don't improve the 
system. They're a formality.” 
! There is no link between 
performance and promotion. 
Recommendations for promotion 
are based solely on seniority.  
! In principle performance can be 
incentivized with training 
opportunities, but the allocation of 
these is viewed as subjective. “One 
director even says he'll send you ‘if 
your face looks nice’.” 
Average (score 2) 
! Appraisals in one social-sector 
ministry are always done annually, 
but there are no rewards and the 
process is viewed mainly as a 
formality. 
! Better performing officers are 
sometimes more likely to be 
recommended as a focal person for 
an activity and receive additional 
responsibilities, but this is viewed 
as subjective and dependent on 
one’s director and the chief director. 
! In principle non-performing 
officers can be not recommended 
for promotion, but in practice this 
does not happen and 
recommendation for promotion is 
based entirely on years served.  
! The ministry gives officers a bag 
of rice at Christmas as a bonus, but 
this is given to all staff regardless of 
performance. 
Above average (score 3.5) 
! In one infrastructure ministry, 
appraisals are always done 
annually, and individuals’ 
performance is also discussed 
weekly in divisional meetings, so 
officers are also aware of their 
peers’ performance. 
! Each year the ministry holds an 
awards night. Within each division 
staff vote for a top performer, and 
then these individuals vote for an 
overall top performer. 
! Accelerated promotions are rare, 
but non-performing individuals tend 
to be recommended more slowly, so 
better performers rise through the 
ranks faster. 
! The HR division makes an effort 
to recognize officers for exceptional 
work, for example by writing letters 
of commendation for outstanding 
performance on a particular task. 
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extremes of good and bad practice, similar types of informal recognition or rewards 
sometimes exist but are often less transparent in their selection criteria and linked 
only indirectly, or not at all, to performance assessments – bags of rice or small 
bonuses for all staff at Christmas, for example, or highly subjective allocation of 
training opportunities by supervisors.34  
 
Qualitative variation and relational contracts 
For both of these practices, the variation among organizations is clearly qualitatively 
significant, in the sense that improving the practice would require dramatically 
different actions in each organization. Some organizations fail to execute even simple 
required procedures, while others not only execute them consistently but also take 
initiative to go above and beyond these minimum requirements and find ways to make 
them more than mere formalities. In between these extremes, organizations’ 
management practices vary in ways that are more marginal, yet still non-trivial. The 
distribution of practice across the other 13 management practices is similar, albeit 
with some variation across practices (see Appendix 1 for qualitative examples, and 
Appendix 2 for the quantitative distributions).  
 
The qualitative nature of this variation is also consistent with relational contracts 
theory, as outlined in Table 1, but is not well explained by theories of informal 
institutions. While parts of this variation can be characterized using institutional 
theory – the enforcement of formal institutions (Levitky and Murillo 2009), or the 
complementary nature of informal norms in well-managed organizations (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004) – other qualitatively important aspects of management are not. For 
example, the same complementary informal norms in well-managed organizations do 
not exist as substitutive informal norms in poorly managed organizations, as Helmke 
and Levitsky’s (2004) classification of the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions might predict. Relational contracts theory is clear about why this is, 
                                                
34 One of the key results of Rasul and Rogger (2014) is that incentive-linked management practices are 
negatively related to project completion in Nigeria’s civil service; they explain this as a distortion of 
effort and cooperation as a result of incentives that are stronger than optimal. However, I found no 
evidence of any incentive schemes in Ghana’s government that could potentially undermine 
organizational performance through distortion of effort. Whether this is a difference between 
methodologies or between public management in Ghana and Nigeria is unclear. 
! 65 
whereas an institutional framework has little explanation for why institutions do not 
exist in a particular setting. Likewise, actual management practice clearly is shaped by 
and seeks to shape numerous behavioral incentives, regularities, and actions that fall 
outside the realm of “institutions”. These can only be understood by viewing informal 
norms and practices in management as arising due to the need to guide and coordinate 
the use of discretion by managers and agents. 
 
2.4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT QUALITY ACROSS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The previous section demonstrated that there is considerable micro-level variation in 
management practices among organizations within Ghana’s government. This section 
aggregates these micro-level differences to the level of the organization, and examines 
the resulting distribution against the three stylized distributions discussed in Section 
2.2. If practice-level variation is just random noise – idiosyncratic decisions by 
individual managers, perhaps, or simple stochastic error accumulation over time – it 
will average out across organizations and the overall distribution of management 
quality will be relatively flat. If the quality of management practices is correlated 
within organizations, however, then these micro-level differences will aggregate into 
significant differences across organizations. This corresponds to the organization-
focused view of performance and management, which views management as both a 
technical and relational problem that has to be deliberately and systematically shaped 
over time by organizations.  
 
Variation across organizations 
Figure 2 plots the normalized practice z-scores along with the overall organization 
score (the renormalized mean of the individual practice z-scores). The distribution is 
slightly right skewed – the mean is below the median – but there is continuous 
incremental variation in overall scores across the entire spectrum. There is a strong 
within-organization correlation of practice scores – the correlation coefficients 
between each practice score and the overall organization score all fall between 0.61 
and 0.88, and are all highly statistically significant. At the extremes, the within-
organization distribution of the best organizations dominates that of the worst 
organizations. That is, the most lagging management practice in the top few 
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organizations is still better than the best practice of the bottom organizations. Despite 
this, the variation within organizations is still meaningful. An improvement of a 
quartile, from the 10th percentile to the 35th, would require an overall improvement of 
just 0.65 standard deviations, equivalent to an average increase of just 0.58 marks in 
each practice. If each organization simply improved all its practices to the level of the 
75th-percentile practice in that organization, this alone would increase the overall 
organization score by 0.60 standard deviations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Variation in management quality across Ghana’s government 
 
 
 
This distribution is inconsistent with the view that national- or societal-level 
institutions tightly constrain or determine organizational performance. Although 
management quality has no natural scale, the numerical codings of individual 
management practices are based on qualitative descriptions benchmarked to objective 
scales (as opposed to subjective, perception-based, Likert-type scale); this makes it 
possible to link the overall organizational management score to the variation at the 
practice-level that is qualitatively meaningful, and thus show that the differences 
between the worst, the average, and the best organizations are indeed meaningful 
ones. Accumulated across the numerous aspects of management, these minor 
differences add up to organizations that function in fundamentally different ways. 
This is consistent with the findings of the case study literature on “islands” of 
! 67 
excellence in developing country governments, which also draws on primarily 
qualitative evidence. However, the empirical distribution in Figure 2 is not consistent 
with this literature’s view of variation in management as a feature solely of 
“exceptional” organizations. Rather, the distribution is smooth and continuous, 
consisting of minor and marginal differences that collectively amount to significant 
heterogeneity. The largest discontinuity in this distribution is a minor gap at the 85th 
percentile, but this is equivalent to just under half a standard deviation and is far from 
systematic enough to be considered evidence of a bimodal pattern of “islands” of 
excellence.  
 
Variation among similar organizations 
While this is strong evidence that management quality varies substantially at the 
organizational level within Ghana’s government, it does not show whether this 
variation arises from factors internal or external to the organization. For example, 
organizations might have different task characteristics that are inherently more or less 
difficult to carry out, and thus better management could be a reflection of these 
contextual differences rather than (or in addition to) an independent causal factor in 
its own right. If, hypothetically, variation was due entirely to external factors, then 
organizational performance would still be tightly constrained by contextual variables, 
as institutionalist perspectives presume; however, these constraints would not be 
national-level or purely institutional in nature, but specific to particular organizations. 
Investigating the extent to which management quality is driven by internal and 
external factors is beyond the scope of this paper – indeed, it is an entire research 
agenda in its own right (see for example Gibbons and Henderson 2013, Martinez et al 
2015). In principle, this could be tested by conditioning on a full set of observable and 
unobservable characteristics of organizations, but this is obviously unfeasible for 
measurement and the potential number of variables (and their interactions) would be 
vastly larger than the universe of government organizations in any country.  
 
Instead, this paper’s more humble claims are that: a great deal of variation seems to be 
driven by organizational factors (whether internal or external) rather than institutional 
ones; this variation is qualitatively consistent with relational management processes 
playing an important role; and since relational processes imply that management 
quality can vary substantially among ex ante identical organizations (i.e. those with 
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identical external contexts), external factors (whether institutional or organizational) 
are unlikely to fully determine management quality. While conditioning on the full set 
of observable and unobservable characteristics of organizations is impossible, it is 
nonetheless possible to examine as a simple robustness check two ways of restricting 
the analysis to organizations that are more likely to be comparable to each other: 
ministries only, and organizations within the same sector.  
 
 
Figure 3: Range of variation by organization type 
 
 
 
Management within the subset of 20 ministries is even more comparable than among 
the sample as a whole, because Ghana’s structure of government gives all ministries 
identical functions – policymaking, and oversight of subsidiary departments and 
agencies – while all implementation activities are undertaken by departments and 
agencies. Thus the core tasks of the agencies and departments in the sample vary 
somewhat, but those of ministries do not. Figure 3 demonstrates that the range and 
distribution of variation among ministries is comparable to that in the full sample.  
 
Next, Figure 4 shows the distribution of organization-level management scores across 
the four broad sectors of Ghana’s government: Administration, Economic, 
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Infrastructure, and Social (Table 2 lists these by organization). The only significant 
difference across sectors is the lower average performance of social sector 
organizations, although the range of scores in this sector is comparable to that of other 
sectors.35 
 
 
Figure 4: Range of variation within sectors 
 
 
 
While these sub-sample comparisons illustrate that substantial organization-level 
variation exists even after conditioning on some particularly salient observable 
external characteristics of organizations, they are only suggestive (but not conclusive) 
evidence that these external characteristics do not fully determine organizational 
performance. Nonetheless, this study has shown empirical evidence that is both 
quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with internal management factors – based 
in relational contracts theory – playing a large role in the day-to-day functioning of 
organizations. At a minimum, this theory and evidence suggests that, rather than 
presuming that organizational performance is fully determined by institutional or 
external organizational-level factors, the new default assumption for studies of 
bureaucratic quality should be that these factors are not fully constraining. The 
                                                
35 This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level, albeit with an extremely small 
sample size. 
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appropriate question for research on state capacity is not whether management matters 
– it is how much it matters, and how it can be changed.  
 
2.5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper has argued that institutionalist approaches to studying state capacity should 
be complemented by organizational approaches, for both empirical and theoretical 
reasons. Empirically, taking organizations rather than institutions as the key unit of 
analysis makes it possible to understand and begin to explain within-country variation 
in bureaucratic quality. This variation across organizations is empirically important, 
and may in some cases even exceed cross-country variation (Gingerich 2013). 
Studying variation among organizations in the same government also sheds light on 
the operation of institutions, by revealing the ways in which institutions are – and are 
not – constraining on the actors that operate within them.  
 
Theoretically, an analytical focus on organizations enables scholars to draw on a rich 
body of theory from organizational economics, organization theory, and management. 
In particular, relational contracts theory provides both an explanation for overall 
differences in management quality among organizations, and an account of its micro-
foundations in the governance of discretion within organizations. It also offers 
qualitative predictions about the relationship between formal structures and processes 
and informal norms and practices. While organizational approaches are not 
necessarily incompatible with institutionalist frameworks for analyzing the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions, they nonetheless bring to the 
fore the ways in which organizations act as a nexus for institutions, by deliberately 
and calculatively using both formal and informal means to shape the incentives and 
behavior of individuals. Relational contracts theory also permits the analysis of 
behaviors and control mechanisms that are not institutionalized but are nonetheless 
important, whereas these are beyond the scope of institutionalist approaches. 
 
This is not to say that institutionalist approaches to studying government bureaucracy 
and state capacity are never useful. Rather, the claim is that bureaucratic outcomes are 
the joint products of both institutional and organizational factors. To draw on a 
statistical metaphor, if institutional factors represent national averages, then 
! 71 
organizational factors represent deviations up or down from that average. This 
requires researchers to choose their framework according to their question, in ways 
that require going beyond a simple distinction between cross-country versus within-
country. Focusing on institutional differences may be appropriate for cross-country 
studies of mean levels of overall bureaucratic quality, but not for cross-country 
comparisons of particular sectors or agencies – as Gingerich (2013) points out, 
national-level averages may be uninformative about particular organizations if 
organization-level variance within countries is high. On the other hand, an 
organizational framework may be appropriate for studies of the relative performance 
of different organizations within a country (since they share the same national-level 
institutions), but a longitudinal study of changes in the performance of a particular 
organization would need to consider changes in both national-level institutional 
factors as well as changes in organization-specific factors, both external and internal 
to the organization. While these distinctions may seem basic, they are nonetheless 
crucial – yet absent from much scholarship on bureaucracy and its reform. 
 
Deeper engagement with the role of organizations and management also raises a 
difficult set of questions about identifying causality. Empirical studies of the 
determinants of institutional quality often identify causal effects by focusing on 
factors that are deeply historical; this solves the endogeneity problem, but also 
excludes any determinants of institutional quality that present-day actors could 
conceivably affect. Likewise, empirical studies of the determinants of organizational 
performance can estimate the effects of external, exogenously defined characteristics 
of organizations, such as task characteristics or organization-specific political 
economy factors; while these are important and largely under-researched, they also 
exclude by design factors that are internal to the organization, such as management. 
At the level of particular management practices, experimental methods can establish 
the impact of interventions on both formal and informal aspects of management 
(Bloom et al 2013; Martinez et al 2015), yet the external validity of any intervention 
that targets informal norms and practices is necessarily limited because these practices 
are as much relational as technical, so the specifiable details of any intervention are 
incomplete. For both quantitative and qualitative studies, then, there is a major role to 
play for descriptive research on mechanisms and processes, as well as research that 
focuses on cleanly identifying causal impacts. 
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Finally, these same factors that make organizational performance and management 
difficult topics for scholars also make improving them a non-trivial challenge for their 
political principals. While institutionalist approaches to state capacity have largely 
elided this reality, focusing instead on understanding the conditions under which 
political actors rationally want to invest in state capacity (e.g. Besley and Persson 
2009), an organizational approach would bring this “investment” technology to the 
foreground. Even when political actors have long time horizons and an interest in a 
stronger state, are they always able to achieve this, and through what mechanisms?36 
Conversely, when and how can state capacity improve if these preconditions are 
absent, as is perhaps the most prevalent case in developing countries? What is the role 
of specific organizations in the development of broader societal institutions? 
Questions such as these provide a rich agenda for a new wave of scholarship on state 
capacity. Answering them requires a new perspective on the quality of government 
bureaucracy as not just as an abstract institution, but as the outcome of the day-to-day 
workings, inefficiencies, and complexities of the organizations that comprise it.  
 
2.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This paper’s primary objective is to consider how theories of the internal dynamics of 
organizations might be relevant for studies of state capacity. In so doing, it makes 
theoretical and methodological contributions to several literatures. 
 
From the perspective of organizational economics, the paper’s main theoretical 
contribution is to introduce serious consideration of internal organizational dynamics 
into the New Institutional Economics literature on the functioning and development of 
institutions (North 1990, Greif and Laitin 2004), in particular the branch of this 
literature that focuses on the development of states’ administrative capacity (Greif 
2007, Besley and Persson 2009). By emphasizing the ways in which the organization 
functions as a nexus of formal and informal institutions and the role of management 
                                                
36 Indeed, a large literature beginning with McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) treats political 
control of the bureaucracy as an open question rather than a given. While this literature focuses almost 
exclusively on advanced democracies, Huber and McCarty (2004) show that low bureaucratic capacity 
weakens political control of the bureaucracy as well as politicians’ incentives to reform. 
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in shaping the formal incentives, norms, and cognitive frames of the organization’s 
members, the paper suggests the theoretical possibility that organizations might 
function as agents of endogenous institutional change. A related theoretical 
contribution is the paper’s novel suggestion that, in the context of management within 
public bureaucracies, the institutionalist literature’s theories of formal and informal 
institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, Stein and Tommasi 2008, Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, Andrews 2013) can be usefully linked to and recast in terms of theories 
of relational contracts (Hart and Moore 2008, Gibbons and Henderson 2013) from the 
organizational economics literature. 
 
Secondarily, the paper extends the growing literatures on differences in management 
quality and organizational performance in organizational economics (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007; Syverson 2011; Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen 2015) and 
public management (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Talbot 2010; Dunleavy and 
Carrera 2013) to the empirical setting of developing country states. It also contributes 
methodologically by introducing a novel interview-based, mixed-method approach to 
studying management practices that is based on Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) 
influential method and is particularly well suited to contexts where informality and 
inconsistent execution of formal processes are salient aspects of management. 
Integrating the quantitative and qualitative aspects of data collection and analysis in 
this way serves as a useful alternative to other mixed-method approaches that 
combine both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis but base them on 
separate data sources (Lieberman 2005). 
 
Viewed from comparative politics, this paper’s theoretical and empirical argument 
about the importance of within-government, cross-organization variation in 
management quality and performance is not in itself novel. Indeed, this empirical 
variation is consistent with studies that have emphasized the role of particular 
government organizations in individual countries’ historical development (Fisher and 
Lundgren 1975, Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990), mostly focused on 
Europe or East Asia, as well as the literature on business-state relations (Bräutigam, 
Rakner, and Taylor 2002; Opoku 2010) which emphasizes the potential role of 
organization-specific constellations of interests in determining bureaucratic 
functioning. This paper is distinct from this literature in that it focuses on theoretical 
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mechanisms driven by factors internal to the organization – relational contracts that 
evolve endogenously – rather than on the role of external contextual factors 
(especially political economy) in determining organizational outcomes. This paper 
thus complements and extends this existing comparative politics literature on state 
capacity. As the conceptual framework in this dissertation’s introduction makes clear, 
organizational performance is jointly determined by factors that are both external and 
internal to the organization, and rich case studies such as Carpenter (2001) also point 
to the ways in which they can interact over the medium- to long-term. The relative 
balance and interaction between these two sets of determinants, and developing a 
fuller theory of their interaction, is an important area for further research. 
 
Finally, the more applied development and governance literatures on “islands” or 
“pockets” of effectiveness in developing country governments (Grindle 1997, Tendler 
1997, Leonard 2010, Roll 2013) also empirically document and seek to explain – 
through a combination of external and internal factors – the existence of variation in 
management and performance across organizations. This paper contributes 
empirically to this literature by demonstrating that this variation is not due solely to 
“exceptional” organizations (Leonard 2010, 91) but rather to a more continuous range 
of variation across government. While this point about the distribution of management 
quality is an empirical one, the empirical distribution of a variable can generate 
insights about the theoretical mechanism that generates it (as Jones et al [2009] point 
out in a different context). The larger sample of this paper thus complements this 
literature’s overwhelming focus on small-N, case study-based approaches to study 
organization-level variation in performance in government. 
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APPENDIX 2.1: INTERVIEW GUIDE AND PRACTICE EXAMPLES 
 
(1) Operations (Routine) 
Examines how well procedures for routine work are structured (based on most common routine task identified by respondent) 
 • Can you briefly talk me through your procedure for carrying out these day-to-day functions? 
• How structured/ standardized is the process?  
• How often do challenges or difficulties arise with the current way of doing it? 
• How have you tried to address these challenges? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Procedures for undertaking routine operations 
are undefined or are rarely followed in 
practice. The organization relies almost 
entirely on top-down assignment to get work 
done, so execution depends on the individuals 
involved. Main rationale for current practice is 
“that’s the way it’s always been done”. 
Procedures for routine operations are defined 
and generally followed, but may be inefficient 
or arbitrary. Where responsibility for work is 
assigned to individuals, follow-up and checks 
sometimes occur but are inconsistent. There is 
some consideration of how best to undertake 
day-to-day operations but this is mainly on an 
ad hoc basis. 
Routine operations procedures have been 
consciously structured to improve quality and 
efficiency, and staff consistently implement 
these procedures.   
Examples 
 
A social sector ministry frequently has severe 
problems compiling its quarterly reports. To 
solicit inputs they send a circular requesting 
information, but these often arrive late or not 
at all. “The office environment doesn’t 
help…my Director is two floors away, the 
divisions aren’t together at all.” Little effort is 
made to address these recurring problems. 
An economic sector ministry has a semi-
standardized process for undertaking field 
monitoring visits. Monitoring teams have a 
standard composition, but the process for 
initiating and reviewing the visits can vary on 
an ad hoc basis. Disagreements among 
divisions and “turf” wars in writing the reports 
are common, but the ministry has not taken 
any action to resolve these. 
To monitor the performance of its 
decentralized offices, monitoring staff of an 
infrastructure ministry visit each office for one 
week, with arrival on Sunday night and an 
inception meeting on Monday. Days are used 
to visit sites, while files from the local offices 
are reviewed at the hotel in the evening. On 
Friday an exit meeting is used to review the 
findings with the local office staff and discuss 
disagreements. The report goes to Ministry 
management the next week, after which the 
office is given one month to respond. These 
issues are checked up in the next year’s 
monitoring visit. Monitoring officers noticed 
that the monitoring reports were sometimes 
not being read fully, so they tweak the report 
format every year: “If you read the same thing 
over and over you’ll stop paying attention, but 
this way it stays fresh.” 
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(2) Operations (Occasional)  
Examines how well procedures for one-off work are structured (based on most common occasional task identified by respondent) 
 • Can you briefly talk me through your procedure for carrying out these occasional functions? 
• How structured/ standardized is the process?  
• How often do challenges or difficulties arise with the current way of doing it?  
• How have you tried to address these challenges? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria There is no structure or procedure for 
undertaking or managing one-off operations; 
all one-off work is done entirely ad hoc. The 
organization relies almost entirely on top-
down assignment to get work done, so 
execution depends on the individuals 
involved. Main rationale for current practice is 
“that’s the way it’s always been done”. 
The organization makes use of some 
structures and processes to help undertake and 
manage one-off operations, but these may be 
inefficient or arbitrary. Where responsibility 
for work is assigned to individuals, follow-up 
and checks sometimes occur but are 
inconsistent. There is some consideration of 
how best to undertake one-off operations but 
only on an ad hoc basis. 
Appropriate structures and processes have 
been put in place to improve quality and 
efficiency of one-off operations, and staff 
consistently implement these procedures. 
Examples An economic sector ministry contracts out 
policy development to consultants, but aside 
from an inception report there is little 
engagement until the final report is submitted, 
at which time it is often found that the 
consultants have made unsuitable 
recommendations and an in-house committee 
has to be convened to fix the report. Despite 
the recurrent nature of this problem, no 
changes have been made to the process. 
An economic sector ministry has a standard 
procedure for initiating and developing new 
policy documents, but staff receive little 
training in executing it and so the process 
sometimes yields “amateurish results.” 
 
!
 
To develop new policies, an infrastructure 
ministry goes through a systematized process. 
An individual will develop a project proposal 
and initial scoping study, based on which a 
formal project team will be constituted to 
develop a detailed proposal and budget to be 
submitted to the minister for approval. This 
process is followed for all projects, albeit with 
some flexibility for unexpected or urgent 
projects. 
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(3) Process Documentation and Continuous Improvement 
Examines processes for and attitudes towards continuous improvement 
 • When problems occur, how do they typically get exposed and fixed? 
• How often do you discuss and challenge existing processes? 
• Do officers ever suggest process improvements? Can you think of any examples? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Problems are only detected after they have 
affected work. No process improvements are 
usually made when problems occur. Frontline 
staff do not contribute to improving processes. 
Problems are sometimes detected before they 
have negative impacts, but there is no 
structured, proactive process to do so. 
Improvements are made on an ad hoc basis, 
but depend entirely on individuals taking 
initiative. Resolution of problems involves 
some, but not all, of the appropriate 
individuals and staff groups, or includes non-
relevant individuals or groups. 
Exposing problems in a structured way is 
integral to individuals’ responsibilities and 
resolution occurs as a part of normal business 
procedures rather than by extraordinary 
individual effort or ad hoc teams. Resolution 
of problems involves all appropriate 
individuals and staff groups. 
Examples A social sector ministry becomes aware of 
problems only once they have affected work. 
Management occasionally meets but this is not 
regular: “We hardly meet as a team.”  
Management relies entirely on officers to take 
the initiative to raise problems, but even in 
these cases the focus is on logistical problems 
rather than operational performance. "It's the 
way things are done here." 
A social sector ministry has quarterly sector 
working group meetings, as well as monthly 
meetings for a particular programme. 
Challenges and new ideas could be discussed 
at these, although they are viewed mainly as 
routine briefings. However, most problems are 
still not identified until they have negative 
impacts: “You would see if there was a 
problem because it affects your work.” 
An infrastructure ministry holds biweekly 
directors meetings and each division holds 
weekly meetings. The divisional meetings are 
very open, and operational staff see it as their 
job to make their directors aware of issues so 
they can be raised at a higher level. Feedback 
about the division from other divisions is 
discussed – for example whether the division 
is meeting deadlines or submitting receipts to 
the Finance division properly. Almost all 
officers keep electronic diaries so they know 
what is due at what time and when they should 
expect responses. They also use the register of 
outgoing letters kept by the division’s 
secretary to track outstanding issues. All 
monitoring reports are shared with all 
directors on a routine basis. 
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(4) Adopting Practice Improvements 
Examines whether practice improvements are effectively disseminated throughout the organization 
 • How does the organization encourage identifying and incorporating new practices and more efficient ways of doing things? 
• How are these new practices shared around the organization? 
• How does the organization ensure that officers are utilizing these new practices? How often does this happen? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria There is no effort to incorporate new ideas or 
practices. When practice improvements do 
happen, there is no effort to disseminate them 
through the organization. 
New ideas or practices are sometimes adopted 
but in an ad hoc way. These are sometimes 
shared informally or in a limited way, but the 
organization does not actively encourage this 
or monitor their adoption. 
Seeking out and adopting practice 
improvements is an integral part of the 
organization’s regular work. Improvements 
are systematically disseminated throughout 
the organization and monitored for adoption. 
Examples An infrastructure sector agency has occasional 
(but not regular) meetings of all staff, at which 
new ideas could in principle be raised, but in 
practice discussion revolves around 
administrative and logistical issues. “We 
hardly discuss actual work issues and new 
ideas.” 
In an administrative sector ministry, 
discussing new ideas is seen as a matter of 
individual initiative between an individual and 
his/her supervisor. However this is 
encouraged to an extent, and in some cases 
new ideas raised this way have been integrated 
into routine practice and shared with the rest 
of the organization. 
An economic sector agency has a Core 
Transformation Team of nine or ten officers 
who meet every quarter and come up with a 
list of suggestions to improve the 
organization. These are put into a memo and 
sent to management, and fourteen days later 
management will meet with the Team to 
discuss. The members of the team include 
some division heads but also many younger 
officers, and were selected because they are 
bold and outspoken. The agency is also trying 
to create an Idea Forum as an additional way 
of encouraging staff to suggest innovations, 
and sharing new ideas within the division is 
seen as a routine part of work. 
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(5) Target Balance (Organization- and Division-Level) 
Examines whether the organization defines an appropriate range of meaningful objectives and/ or targets to operationalize its goals 
 • What types of objectives and targets are set for the organization and its divisions? (Note: Operational objectives and targets, not overarching 
policy direction) 
• Are objectives/ targets organized into different categories? Do they cover processes, outputs, and outcomes? 
• How much are these objectives/ targets determined by statute/ external parties, as opposed to the organization itself? 
• What about goals that are not externally set (i.e. are chosen by the organization itself)? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Objectives and targets are vague, only 
externally imposed, or non-existent. The only 
targets are lists of activities drawn up as part 
of the budget process. 
Some relevant objectives and targets are 
defined, but these mainly consist of lists of 
activities and related outputs. These may be 
loosely linked to outcome targets. 
A balanced range of objectives and targets is 
defined for the organization, including process 
targets and other performance-related targets. 
Examples An administration-sector ministry’s only 
targets are activities or outputs. Outcomes and 
processes are neither targeted nor monitored. 
A social-sector ministry has targets for inputs, 
outputs, and a handful of interim outcomes, 
although most key outcomes are not measured 
at all. “The [National Development Planning 
Commission] requires that [we] have an M&E 
plan with indicators on four levels: input, 
output, process, and outcome. But we focus 
only on input and output.” One division has 
slightly more thorough monitoring of 
outcomes, collected mainly in conjunction 
with a donor program in that sub-sector. The 
efficiency of internal processes is not targeted 
or monitored. 
In an economic-sector agency, the agency as a 
whole is focused mostly on outcome targets, 
while each division has output targets. These 
output targets contribute to the organization’s 
overall outcome targets. Each division has key 
objectives (long-term); strategies for 
achieving them (medium-term); and specific 
targets (annual outputs). The organization also 
has some process targets, for example dealing 
with permit applications in a certain time 
period. These are defined in the agency’s 
authorizing act. 
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(6) Defining Individual Tasks and Responsibilities 
Examines how well the organization allocates tasks and defines individual responsibilities 
 • How are objectives set for individual staff members? 
• Could everyone in the organization say what they are responsible for and how that will be assessed? 
• When a staff member comes to work on Monday morning, how do they know what to do? 
• How do you know which tasks are best suited to different staff? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Objectives are undefined or very vague. Staff 
are expected simply to “do what they’re told”. 
Tasks are allocated to individuals on an ad 
hoc basis, with little or no consideration of 
individual competences or workloads. Staff 
are often unsure what they should be doing. 
Objectives may be formally defined but are 
vague or inconsistently applied. Staff have a 
general sense what they are responsible for, 
but completion of most tasks relies mainly on 
the giving/ following of direct orders. There is 
some consideration of which tasks should be 
allocated to certain individuals, but this is 
partial, inconsistent, or based only on an 
officer’s formal position.  
Individuals understand clearly what they are 
responsible for and what they should be doing 
at all times. Objectives are meaningful and are 
defined through a two-way process. Tasks are 
allocated based on identified competences. 
Examples Officers in a social-sector ministry have 
targets defined through the appraisal process, 
but in practice they wait for work to be 
minuted to them by a superior. Targets are 
seen as a formality that don’t actually 
influence work: "People set targets, but the 
fact is that in most situations in our parts of 
the world these things are only done when 
there is something critical that occurs, like the 
officer wants a promotion." Officers are often 
idle because they don’t have work. "It's not 
like you come to work every time and there is 
something special that you do." One 
consequence of this is that management are 
often overworked. 
In one economic-sector ministry, directors 
apportion their division’s objectives to officers 
at the start of the year. This is supposed to be 
annual but is not always done. The Scheme of 
Service provides some guidance about an 
individual’s responsibilities, but not enough 
that officers are always aware of what specific 
tasks they should be doing: “It's not everyone 
who knows what they're responsible for and 
can get on with it without waiting for 
director's minutes...[but] some of us who have 
routine work know.” Most officers below 
Deputy Director-level have only a general 
sense of how their work connects to 
organizational performance. 
In an infrastructure ministry, each officer sits 
with their boss at the start of every year and 
reaches mutual agreement on a set of specific 
tasks and targets (e.g. submitting a report 
within 48 hours of a workshop). Individual 
tasks are derived directly from the division’s 
targets and areas of responsibility. For 
example one technical division has an officer 
responsible for each sub-sector within that 
division; these officers take charge of 
handling letters and issues within that sub-
sector, in consultation with their director: 
“People are pretty clear on what they need to 
be doing.” Each division meets regularly to 
discuss the status of each officer’s work, the 
connections between their roles, and the 
organization’s targets: “All our work 
connects.” 
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(7) Target Interconnection and Clarity 
Examines how easily understandable objectives/ targets are and how well they cascade down the organization 
 • How do organizational objectives/ targets connect with divisional and individual activities and objectives?  
• Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex, ambiguous, or unclear? 
• If I asked one of your (mid-level) staff directly about these targets, what would he or she tell me? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Goals do not cascade down the organization, 
are unclear, and are not clearly understood. 
Beyond just following orders, individuals do 
not know how their work is related to overall 
performance. 
Goals do cascade, but only to some staff and/ 
or division heads. Individuals have only a 
general sense of how their work contributes to 
performance and meeting overall objectives. 
Goals increase in specificity as they cascade, 
ultimately defining individual expectations for 
all staff groups. Individuals understand clearly 
how their work contributes to overall 
performance. 
Examples In an administration sector ministry staff just 
have a general sense that their work has to do 
with the mission of the organization, but do 
not see specific connections. 
Divisions in an economic sector ministry take 
their activities from the overall workplan, but 
whether directors brief their staff on these 
targets depends on the director.  
An infrastructure ministry distributes 
organizational targets to its divisions, which 
then meet and agree a distribution of tasks to 
produce these outputs, as well as specific 
individual-level targets.  
(8) Target Time Horizon 
Examines whether the organization links short-term targets and long-term goals 
 • What kind of time scale are you looking at with your objectives/ targets? 
• Are the long-term and short-term goals set independently? Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals? 
• Which goals receive the most emphasis? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria The organization focuses only on a single time 
horizon; either short-term targets or long-term 
goals are absent, or do not meaningfully 
influence the organization’s actual 
functioning. 
The organization has both short and long-term 
goals, but in practice the annual budget cycle 
dominates. Short- and long-term goals are set 
independently so they are not necessarily 
linked to each other. 
Long-term goals are translated into specific 
short-term targets so that short-term targets 
become a ‘staircase’ to reach long-term goals. 
Meeting goals for each time horizon is taken 
seriously. 
Examples A social sector department only has annual 
goals, defined in each year’s budget. 
An administration sector ministry has annual 
targets that are broken down quarterly. These 
are not explicitly linked to the organization’s 
overall mission. 
An infrastructure ministry has qualitative 
long-term goals that are broken down into 
more specific medium-term targets, which are 
subdivided into annual and quarterly targets. 
Officers take short-term targets seriously 
because they view them as flowing into the 
long-term goals. 
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(9) Target Stretch 
Examines whether objectives/ targets are appropriately demanding 
 • How tough are your objectives/ targets to achieve? Do you feel pushed by them? Are they realistic? 
• How are the level of your objectives/ targets set? 
• On average, how often would you say that you meet your objectives/ targets? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Objectives/ targets are either too easy or 
impossible to achieve, and may be little more 
than a ‘laundry list’ of desired outcomes. 
Target levels are chosen with no rationale or 
simply based on the previous years’ with no 
re-evaluation. 
Some objectives/ targets are challenging but 
these are often externally imposed. Target 
levels are based on a rough guess of what is 
possible given previous years’ performance 
and available resources. Some parts of the 
organization are not held to the same 
standards (“sacred cows”). 
Objectives/ targets are genuinely demanding 
for all parts of the organisation and are 
developed through a negotiated process. 
Target levels are set based on analysis of 
relevant technical information. 
Examples An infrastructure agency, individuals set 
targets for themselves and these are never 
checked. “Speaking as a professional, my 
targets should be co-determined by myself, 
my department, and the organization as a 
whole, and should be based on the 
organization's focus for the year. But each 
year we set our targets and don't get any 
confirmation or discussion from the system, 
the organization. We don't sit and challenge 
each other about them. If I do it or don't do it, 
it's nobody's business." 
In a social sector ministry, targets are set at 
the previous year’s level, with adjustments for 
perceived changes in the resource levels and 
the organization’s delivery capacity. 
In an economic sector agency, operational 
divisions first propose targets, then the 
Planning division challenges them on their 
justification and ambition. The divisions then 
negotiate, with the head of the organization 
serving as mediator. 
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(10) Performance Tracking 
Examines whether organizational performance is tracked using meaningful metrics and with appropriate regularity 
 • How do you monitor how well the organization is achieving its goals? 
• Do you use any indicators to track performance? What kind (quantitative/ qualitative)? 
• How frequently are these indicators measured? 
• How are these indicators related to the organization’s objectives/ targets? Are they directly under the organization’s control? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Measures tracked are not appropriate or do not 
indicate directly if overall objectives are being 
met. Tracking is an ad hoc process and most 
processes aren’t tracked at all. 
Performance indicators have been specified 
but may not be relevant to the organization’s 
objectives. Some important performance 
indicators are tracked formally.  
Performance is continuously tracked, both 
formally and informally, using appropriate 
indicators. 
Examples A social sector department has no functioning 
monitoring and evaluation unit, and no 
indicators are defined or tracked. There is an 
annual report, but "It's a make-believe kind of 
approach to assessing ourselves, it's not 
scientific." 
An administration sector agency writes 
monthly and quarterly reports, but indicators 
are limited to activities. They are aware of 
some outcomes but these are not tracked 
formally. 
A social sector ministry tracks a number of 
outcome, input, and financial performance 
indicators through a decentralized online 
system. Some of this indicators are for 
particular agencies or districts while others are 
negotiated on a sector-wide basis with 
agencies and development partners. These are 
all measured annually, and some can be 
updated more frequently. 
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(11) Performance Review and Dialogue 
Examines whether organizational performance is meaningfully reviewed with appropriate frequency and communicated to staff 
 • How do you review performance, formally or informally? How often?  
• Who is involved in these meetings? What type of feedback occurs during these meetings? Who gets to see the results of this review? 
• If I were to ask an officer who is involved in implementation, could he/she tell me how the organization is doing against these indicators? 
• For a given problem, how would you identify the root cause? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Performance is reviewed infrequently or in an 
unmeaningful way (only success or failure is 
noted). The right information for a 
constructive discussion is often not present. 
Conversations are ‘one-way’, focus overly on 
data that is not meaningful, and exclude most 
staff. The purpose of the review is not 
explicitly stated. Next steps are not clearly 
defined. 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
appropriate data, and both successes and 
failures identified. Objectives of meetings are 
clear to all participating, but results are 
communicated only to senior staff and 
conversations often do not drive to the root 
causes of problems. Next steps are mentioned 
but not well defined. 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on 
the indicators tracked, with a focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. 
Purpose and follow-up steps are clear to all. 
Meetings are an opportunity for constructive 
feedback and coaching. Results are 
communicated to all staff. 
Examples A social-sector ministry holds monthly 
management meetings in principle, but these 
have not been regular for the past year. 
Management meetings are “more for human 
management and the condition of the office 
and that kind of thing than results 
management. There's very little discussion of 
what are we supposed to do and where are 
we.” The ministry has quarterly reviews for 
some of its programs, but only the donor-led 
ones are regular. Quarterly and annual reports 
are seen as a formality undertaken to meet 
external requirements, not an opportunity to 
review performance. 
Another social sector-ministry has monthly 
management meetings, which are regular, plus 
an annual review. These are focused on 
performance. It also holds meetings of all staff 
(about three per year) to discuss 
administrative issues. Directors are supposed 
to brief their officers after management 
meetings, but this does not always happen. 
More senior officers would learn about the 
organization’s performance through working 
with their directors. Agreed actions would be 
minuted to the officer responsible –  “That's if 
the minutes can be done in good time, 
sometimes they can take long.” 
An economic-sector agency has several levels 
of performance review: weekly, quarterly, and 
annual. Each level involves different groups of 
staff, so everyone gets to know about the 
agency’s performance. Management meetings 
are held every Monday morning. Each 
division’s quarterly report feeds into the 
agency’s quarterly report, which is viewed as 
an opportunity to review performance. 
Directors meet quarterly with their divisions 
(usually, but not 100% of the time), and 
general staff meetings are held occasionally. 
There is an annual retreat for senior 
management to assess performance and plan 
for the next year; the heads of departments 
brief their staff after returning from this. At 
the beginning of the year a review is held to 
discuss the previous year’s performance. 
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(12) Consequence Management 
Examines how well the organization follows up on and enacts plans to fix identified problems (department/ process-level) 
 • Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow-up plan at one of your meetings, how would you carry that plan forward? What would happen if the plan 
was not enacted? 
• How long does it typically go between when a problem is identified to when it is solved? Can you think of a recent example? 
• How do you deal with repeated failures in a specific department or area of process? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Failure to achieve agreed objectives does not 
carry any consequences. Responsibility for 
following up is poorly defined. 
Responsibility for follow-up may be allocated, 
but there would be no other specific actions 
beyond this. Failure to achieve agreed results 
is tolerated for a period before action is taken 
and sanctions are rare. Difficult problems can 
persist indefinitely. 
Responsibility for follow-up is clearly defined 
and accompanied by other complementary 
steps. Failure to achieve agreed objectives is 
quickly addressed and may lead to sanctions. 
Ongoing efforts are made to fix even difficult 
problems. 
Examples In an economic sector ministry, if an agreed 
action was not taken, “they would say it was 
‘due to unforeseen circumstances’ and they 
would be given another week. I’ve never seen 
any punishment given.”!
 
An economic sector agency assigns problems 
and follow-up actions to directorates, which 
then have to report back at the next meeting. If 
the action was not taken, at the following 
meeting a deadline might be given, but 
nothing beyond this.!
 
An infrastructure ministry assigns problems to 
individuals and notes this in the minutes, 
which are circulated to all directors within 48 
hours of the meeting. If these actions were not 
taken without good reason a formal reprimand 
would be issued, although the ministry is 
shifting to a more team-based system of work 
and thus reducing the use of individual 
reprimands.  
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(13) Assessing and Rewarding Performance 
Examines whether individual performance is assessed transparently and rewarded proportionately 
 • How does your appraisal system work?  
• Are the appraisals actually completed regularly? 
• Are there any financial or non-financial (e.g. awards, training, travel opportunities) rewards related to this review? 
• Are better performers likely to be promoted faster or are promotions given solely on the basis of tenure / seniority? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria People are rewarded in the same way 
irrespective of their performance. Promotions 
are solely based on tenure. 
There is an evaluation system which in 
principle awards good performance 
(financially or non-financially), but awards are 
not based on clear criteria/ processes. 
Performance can sometimes influence career 
progression. 
There is an evaluation system which rewards 
individuals (financially or non-financially) 
based on performance. Rewards are given as a 
consequence of well-defined and monitored 
individual achievements. Performance is a key 
criterion for promotion decisions. 
Examples In an economic-sector ministry, staff 
appraisals are only completed once every 
three years, when it is time for the officer to 
go for promotion. The appraisal is basically a 
self-assessment, actual discussions about 
officers’ performance rarely happen: “The 
appraisals don't improve the system. They're a 
formality.” There is no link between 
performance and promotion. 
Recommendations for promotion are based 
solely on seniority, and out-of-turn promotion 
never happens. In principle performance can 
be incentivized with training opportunities, 
but the allocation of these is viewed as 
subjective: “One director even says he'll send 
you ‘if your face looks nice’.” 
Appraisals in one social-sector ministry are 
always done annually, but there are no 
rewards and the process is still viewed as a 
formality. Better performing officers are 
sometimes more likely to be recommended as 
a focal person for an activity and receive 
additional responsibilities, but this is viewed 
as subjective and dependent on one’s director 
and the chief director. In principle non-
performing officers can not be recommended 
for promotion, but in practice this does not 
happen and recommendation for promotion is 
based entirely on years served. The ministry 
gives all officers a bag of rice at Christmas as 
a bonus, but this is given to all staff regardless 
of performance. 
In one infrastructure ministry, appraisals are 
always done annually, and individuals’ 
performance is also discussed weekly in 
divisional meetings, so officers are also aware 
of their peers’ performance. Each year the 
ministry holds an awards night. Within each 
division staff vote for a top performer, and 
these individuals vote for an overall top 
performer amongst themselves. Accelerated 
promotions are rare, but non-performing 
individuals tend to be recommended more 
slowly, e.g. after five years instead of three. 
The ministry also makes an effort to recognize 
officers for exceptional work: one young 
officer was asked to give an important 
presentation on behalf of his director who had 
traveled. Later he received a written letter of 
congratulations from the Director of Human 
Resources Management on behalf of the Chief 
Director. This officer was highly motivated by 
this gesture – he has kept the letter and even 
read the letter to his children. 
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(14) Identifying Skill Needs and Attracting Human Capital 
Examines the emphasis put on attracting talented applicants and applicants with particular skills 
 • How does the organization identify skill needs and ensure it has enough personnel with particular skills?  
• How does the organization seek out individuals with these particular skills? 
• How do you decide when to send staff for training? How does the organization select which staff to send? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria The organization does not go out of its way to 
recruit talented applicants or applicants with 
particular skills, so hiring is driven entirely by 
staff numbers and availability of funds. 
Training opportunities are not actively sought, 
and when available are not allocated based on 
capacity and/ or need. 
The organization occasionally tries to recruit 
applicants with particular skills, but 
identification of needed skills is not 
systematic and recruitment is only 
occasionally based on identified skill needs. 
The organization rarely goes out of its way to 
recruit talented applicants. Training 
opportunities are occasionally sought, but 
driven mostly by availability. 
The organization actively recruits talented 
applicants and applicants with needed skills, 
based on regular assessments of skill needs. 
Training opportunities are sought and 
allocated to the staff who can most benefit 
from them. 
Examples An administrative sector ministry has no 
needs assessment or training plan, and its only 
targeting of recruits is for those that have a 
university degree and are computer literate. 
A social sector ministry recruits mainly by 
selecting National Service personnel who they 
would like to stay on, or by handpicking staff 
from its agencies and having them put on 
secondment, but this depends on the 
intervention of the Chief Director and there is 
no systematic process for it.  
An infrastructure ministry has an HR 
Development Plan based on a needs 
assessment, and also initiates specific needs 
assessments for emerging issue areas. 
Although they used to rely heavily on long-
term consultants funded by donor projects, 
they now have brought enough expertise in-
house that they only hire consultants for 
specific short-term contracts. To attract and 
retain staff the ministry actively seeks out 
training opportunities for staff, and has set up 
a provident.!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
(15) Dealing with Poor Performers 
Examines whether the organization is able to deal with underperformers 
 • If an officer was not performing his/her job well, what would happen? Can you give me a recent example? 
• How long would under-performance be tolerated? How common is it for officers to be removed from their position (not necessarily fired) 
because of underperformance? 
 Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
Key criteria Poor performance is not addressed or is 
inconsistently addressed. Poor performers 
rarely suffer consequences or are removed 
from their positions. 
Poor performance is addressed, but on an ad 
hoc basis. Use of intermediate interventions, 
such as training, is inconsistent. Poor 
performers are sometimes removed from their 
positions under conditions of repeated poor 
performance. 
Repeated poor performance is systematically 
addressed, beginning with targeted 
intermediate interventions. Persistently poor 
performers are moved to less critical roles or 
out of the organization. 
Examples In an administration sector ministry, poor 
performance is never addressed. In principle 
the person could be spoken to by a supervisor, 
but interviewees were not able to recall an 
instance when this had happened. 
An economic sector ministry takes tasks away 
from poor performers and in some cases 
transfers them. The main sanctions are social; 
formal sanctions only occur in extreme cases 
that border on criminal behavior.!
 
An economic sector agency addresses poor 
performance by shifting problem individuals 
to different departments or regions to see if 
this improves their performance, and offering 
retraining in some cases. Though these steps 
are common, firings never happen. 
[Note: this example was scored 4; no 
organization in the sample scored a 5 on this 
practice.] 
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APPENDIX 2.2: ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INTERVIEW 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This appendix details additional details of the selection of respondents, conduct of the 
interviews, and data quality checks undertaken, noting important differences to the 
standard BVR methodology and Rasul and Rogger’s (2014) adaptation. 
 
Following BVR, the interviews targeted individuals who were senior enough to have 
an overall picture of the organization’s functioning but also low enough to be 
involved in the day-to-day functioning of the organization. Most commonly this 
meant directors of divisions (the second-highest level of the organization), although 
many interviews were also held with deputy directors and a handful with other senior 
officers or the organization’s chief executive. To set up the interviews, Ghana’s 
Office of the Head of Civil Service wrote to each ministry to request their 
participation in the research project. I then made contact with each ministry and 
arranged for interviews with officers of an appropriate level and position.  
 
In order to focus as closely as possible on the actual functioning of the organization, 
the interviews focused on officers in technical, operational divisions as opposed to 
purely administrative ones like finance. The most common interviewee was the 
organization’s Director of Policy, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (PPME); for 
consistency, one of the two interviews in each ministry was conducted with an officer 
from this division or its analogue. Targeting officers in specific positions for 
interviews in this way minimized the potential for selection bias, and although timing 
and availability necessarily played some role in selection, there is no evidence that 
responses or management scores differed systematically by interview or interviewee 
characteristics. For interviewee selection in the agencies, I either received a personal 
referral from the sector ministry to the individual in the agency responsible for policy 
and monitoring functions, equivalent to the organization’s Director of PPME, or was 
directed to this individual through formal correspondence, and then proceeded from 
this introduction as in the ministries. In each case selection bias is not a concern, as 
interviewee selection was still driven by position. 
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The interviews lasted 75 minutes on average and were conducted in person by the 
author in the interviewee’s office. Responses were transcribed by hand during the 
interview (but not recorded) and subsequently post-coded. To encourage honest 
answers, all interviewees were guaranteed that they personally would remain 
anonymous and that their answers would not be associated with their organization. 
Again, this guarantee was particularly important in the context of discussing sensitive 
information in hierarchical government organizations. This follows established 
practice in BVR and other surveys, in conformity with LSE’s human subjects research 
ethics guidelines. In order to focus on actual objective practices rather than 
interviewees’ own subjective perceptions of management quality, interviewees were 
informed that they were participating in a research project on variation in 
management practices in the Ghana’s public service, but were not told in advance that 
their responses were being benchmarked according to a numerical metric. Again, this 
aspect of the research design follows BVR. As in their work, not informing 
interviewees in advance that their responses would be analyzed using numerical post-
codings as well as qualitatively was not deemed a problem because the potential for 
deception was minimal, posed no harm due to the strict anonymity protections 
imposed by the study, and interviewees were sent a report of the study after 
completion of the research. 
 
Conducting the interviews in person is a significant departure from BVR, who 
conducted all interviews by telephone. In-person interviews were preferred in the 
developing country public service setting due to the greater emphasis on interpersonal 
relationships and trust, and were made possible by the location of all organizations’ 
headquarters in Accra. This meant that interviews were effectively single-blind rather 
than double-blind, as in BVR. While this could engender concerns about interviewer 
bias, any such effect is presumably counteracted by the greater consistency achieved 
by using a single interviewer and by the increased data quality arising from in-person 
interviews. This approach differs slightly from that of Rasul and Rogger, who also 
used in-person interviews but did so in groups, and explicitly asked respondents to 
score management practices rather than having the interviewer do so. The impact of 
these methodological subtleties on data quality is an important area for future 
empirical work. 
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Most of these practices are analogous to practices included in various versions of the 
BVR surveys, albeit with slight adaptations to suit the public sector context, while 
others were added after pilot interviews with civil servants in Ghana and the United 
Kingdom. Appendix 2.1 contains the full list of the practices and scoring grid. The 
most notable adaptation was to broaden the emphasis of the benchmarking criteria 
from a focus on quantitative performance measures and financial incentives to give 
equal treatment to qualitative outcomes and non-financial rewards for staff. This was 
done to reflect the relative difficulty of measuring many public sector outputs and the 
lack of consensus about the appropriateness of hard incentive schemes in public sector 
organizations. This treatment of incentives differs significantly from Rasul and 
Rogger’s (2014) own adaptation of the BVR methodology, and may help to explain 
why incentive-related practices were negatively correlated with project completion in 
their study. 
 
 
Figure A1: Within-organization correlation of management scores 
 
 
 
Figure A1 shows that the overall z-scores between two interviews undertaken in each 
organization are strongly correlated. In addition, there is a high degree of 
correspondence between the qualitative details given by interviewees within an 
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organization. The most objective indication of this was given by Practice 13, 
Assessing and Rewarding Individual Performance. Since the same annual appraisal 
process is used by all ministries and an analogous annual process in used by agencies, 
all respondents reported this appraisal process, and in each case, I asked whether this 
annual process was actually always carried out every year. In many cases it was not, 
but importantly, the responses within an organization across the two interviewees 
were always consistent about whether the appraisals were or were not carried out 
annually in practice. This is reassuring evidence that reported variation across 
organizations is driven by real differences in practices, not individual idiosyncrasies 
or misreporting. 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of scores within each practice 
 
 
 
Finally, Figure A2 shows the distribution of scores for each of the 15 management 
practices that comprise the overall index. The distributions vary somewhat across the 
different practices; explaining why these distributions differ would be a useful task for 
future research.   
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Chapter Three 
 
 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS, 
AND FISCAL INSTITUTIONS: 
 
EVIDENCE FROM UNFINISHED INFRASTRUCTURE IN GHANA 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Abstract 
 
I study the relationship between policy implementation and distributive politics, and 
how fiscal institutions mediate this relationship. Using an original database of over 
14,000 small local government infrastructure projects in Ghana, I show that 
approximately one-third of projects are started but never completed, consuming one-
fifth of total capital expenditure, even though they are simple, popular, and visible. To 
explain this, I develop a theory of policy implementation as intertemporal bargaining 
among political actors who face commitment problems with respect to project 
distribution, and predict that the fiscal institutions used to fund projects can mitigate 
the negative effects of these distributive pressures. I find large differences in 
completion rates within districts across different project financing mechanisms, even 
when these projects are selected and implemented by the same politicians, 
bureaucrats, and contractors. Consistent with the theory, the relationship between 
project completion and districts’ partisan alignment varies across these delivery 
mechanisms. I present evidence that this is due to bargaining failures among local 
political actors, rather than corruption, tactical redistribution, or other alternative 
explanations. I discuss implications for theories of public service delivery, distributive 
politics, and fiscal decentralization. 
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Policy Implementation, Distributive Politics, and Fiscal Institutions: 
Evidence from Unfinished Infrastructure in Ghana 
 
“We all have demands on government but we have to be moderate in these 
demands in order that we do not disrupt the budget and government 
expenditure…As the head of your family, you cannot provide all that your 
family needs at once…Alhassan needs a shoe, Fuseini needs a bicycle, your 
wife needs a new cloth, and your mother needs a refrigerator. You cannot 
provide all these at once and so what you have to do is to prioritize…The 
fact that government has not yet provided a certain development that was 
requested does not mean that government will not provide it.” 
 
− John Mahama, President of Ghana (TV3 Network 2015) 
 
* * * 
 
Poor policy implementation is a salient feature of states with weak government 
bureaucracies, yet is not well understood. A particularly striking example is the 
phenomenon of unfinished infrastructure projects, which is anecdotally widespread in 
developing countries: schools, latrines, culverts, and bridges are started, partially 
constructed, but then abandoned and never finished. These types of local public goods 
are technically simple, relatively affordable, highly visible, politically popular, and 
desperately needed in contexts with massive infrastructure deficits. In short, they are 
exactly the type of goods that politicians seek to deliver in theories of pork-barreling, 
clientelism, and distributive politics. Why, then, would governments expend their 
scarce resources to half-build projects that have no value to constituents? 
 
In this paper, I develop a novel theoretical explanation for partial policy 
implementation that revolves around the tension between the technical demands of 
project delivery and the political processes that determine the distribution of projects. 
Politicians typically face greater demand for public goods than they can supply at any 
given time, so they have to prioritize and sequence delivery. Sequencing delivery 
requires intertemporal exchange among political actors, but this is difficult since these 
actors cannot commit to future distributional decisions. When this intertemporal 
bargaining process fails, the path of policy implementation may be inefficiently 
erratic – in particular, politicians may devote resources to starting new projects to 
appease distributive pressures rather than to finishing existing ones. Since projects are 
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implemented in multiple stages and efficient delivery requires continuity once a 
project is started, this political instability increases the overall cost of completing 
projects and leads to some projects being abandoned mid-construction. 
 
A second question is how government institutions can be designed to minimize this 
problem. Delegating implementation to a neutral and capable bureaucracy would be 
one solution but such bureaucracies are the exception rather than the rule in 
developing country governments, and creating them may require reforms across 
dozens or even hundreds of sub-national authorities and central ministries and 
agencies. An appealing alternative for governments and donors is to focus their efforts 
on reforming fiscal institutions – the bureaucratic structures through which funds are 
delivered to implementing units – over which they have more direct control. Yet there 
is little evidence on the operational effectiveness impacts of alternative fiscal 
institutions, and attempts to make such comparisons across polities are usually 
confounded by concerns over unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous institutional 
choice. 
 
To address these issues empirically, I have collected, digitized, and coded 
administrative records of over 14,000 local government infrastructure projects in 
Ghana from 2011 to 2013. These are predominantly small, highly visible, and 
technically simple projects such as classroom blocks and latrines. The median project 
had a budget roughly equivalent to USD 36,000 and was scheduled to last five 
months, and 88.8 percent of projects were scheduled to be complete within one year. 
However, after one year less than half were finished, and even after three years over a 
third of projects remained unfinished and are unlikely ever to be completed. These 
unfinished projects consumed nearly 20 percent of all capital spending, equivalent to 
USD 26.6 million annually, or enough to fully construct over 700 three-room schools 
every year. These descriptive findings represent the most comprehensive evidence 
available to date on the scope and shape of the problem of unfinished infrastructure 
projects in any developing country. 
 
I examine whether fiscal institutions affect project completion by taking advantage of 
a unique feature of the dataset: the same types of projects are executed in the same 
districts and communities by the same pool of contractors through different funding 
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sources. Even after controlling for all these factors, completion rates for observably 
identical projects (e.g. three-room schools) differ significantly across the three main 
funding sources. This within-district variation is of comparable magnitude to the 
variation in completion rates across districts – a project from the best fund source in 
the 25th-percentile district has the same completion probability as a project from the 
worst fund source in the 70th-percentile district. I examine issues of endogenous 
project selection into funding mechanisms using coefficient stability tests, and argue 
that it is unlikely to account for more than a fraction of the observed variation.  
 
To understand the mechanism through which fiscal institutions affect project 
completion, I narrow the comparison to two lump sum transfer programs for which 
the same local-level politicians and bureaucrats have complete control over project 
selection and implementation: an unconditional grant funded by the central 
government, and a mainly donor-funded grant that requires districts to budget to 
complete existing projects before starting new ones. Consistent with the predictions of 
the intertemporal exchange theory of policy implementation, projects funded by the 
donor grant have a higher completion rate, but this effect is strongest in districts that 
voted heavily for the opposition party and disappears entirely in districts that voted 
heavily for the ruling party. I argue that this supports the idea that project non-
completion is driven by bargaining failures among local-level political elites, and 
present evidence against alternative explanations.  
 
This paper connects and contributes to several literatures. First, within the body of 
work on policy implementation in developing countries, Rasul and Rogger (2014) is 
the only other study (to my knowledge) to examine project completion in a large-N 
setting, while most studies focus instead on financial or material losses due to 
corruption (Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Olken 2007, various in Olken and Pande 
2012). None of these studies link implementation to distributive politics. Second, a 
scattered literature on fiscal institutions and fiscal decentralization examines how 
budget institutions affect overall spending and borrowing (Ferejohn and Krehbiel 
1987; von Hagen and Harden 1995; Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein 1999; 
Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003; Rodden 2006) or how the source of funds 
affects their management and public service outcomes (Fisman and Gatti 2002, 
Gadenne 2015). This paper is unique in focusing on the operational impacts of 
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financing mechanisms on project-level data. Third, I extend the recent literature in 
American politics that examines how administrative agencies mediate the workings of 
distributive politics (Bertelli and Grose 2009, Berry and Gersen 2010, Gordon 2011, 
Ting 2012) into a new context and suggest a new mechanism.  
 
More broadly, this study’s findings also have significant implications for the 
burgeoning empirical literature on distributive politics and clientelism, which tends to 
focus either on input-based measures of expenditure choice and allocation (Ward and 
John 1999, Keefer and Khemani 2009, Banful 2011, Jablonski 2014) or on output- or 
outcome-based measures of access or service quality (Besley et al 2004, Franck and 
Rainer 2012, Golden and Min 2013, Kramon and Posner 2013, Harding 2015), and 
assume that these are the outcomes of tactical targeting strategies by parties, 
politicians, or incumbents. 37 Yet this only holds if the determinants of project 
implementation are orthogonal to the determinants of project distribution – an 
extremely strong assumption that is contradicted by this paper. In contrast, I view 
both project distribution and implementation as collective choice processes among 
multiple principals that are more akin to logrolling in their potential for instability and 
inefficiency (Riker and Brams 1973, Weingast and Marshall 1988), so outputs and 
outcomes may differ systematically from inputs and intentions.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops a 
theoretical explanation for the occurrence of unfinished projects rooted in the 
technical attributes of project implementation and the commitment problems facing 
political actors, and discusses how fiscal institutions might mediate this relationship. 
Section 3.2 operationalizes this model in the context of infrastructure delivery in 
Ghana’s local governments and lays out empirical hypotheses, and Section 3.3 
presents the paper’s original dataset. Section 3.4 examines the extent and dynamics of 
project non-completion, shows that there are substantial differences in completion 
rates across fund sources, and argues that these effects are largely causal rather than 
due to selection on unobservables. Section 3.5 shows that the efficiency impacts of 
                                                
37 Burgess et al (2015) use both a measure of expenditure and a measure of physical completion as 
dependent variables, but do not link the two. Implementation considerations are also absent from the 
foundational theoretical models in this area (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, 
Dixit and Londregan 1996). 
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fiscal institutions are conditional on districts’ partisan alignment, and examines 
alternative explanations. Section 3.6 concludes with a brief discussion of implications 
for theory and policy. 
 
3.1 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AS INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING 
 
This section presents a theoretical explanation of why and how the implementation of 
government projects may be undermined by distributive conflict over their allocation, 
and how this can be mediated by the fiscal institutions used to fund projects. This 
theory builds on two insights that are largely absent from the existing literature on the 
political economy of public service delivery in developing countries: 1) all but the 
smallest government projects must be implemented in multiple stages; and 2) in many 
cases project selection is the outcome of a collective choice process among many 
political actors rather than the revealed targeting strategy of a unitary politician, party, 
or incumbent engaging in tactical redistribution. 
 
The basic theoretical mechanism is as follows. Governments typically face greater 
demands for projects than they can supply at one time but projects are discrete and 
expenditure on them is imperfectly fungible, so efficient implementation requires that 
they prioritize and sequence projects. This requires intertemporal exchange among 
political actors, but these actors face commitment problems and thus may not be able 
to strike and maintain such bargains, in which case the government’s expenditure path 
will be erratic. This is inefficient from a technical standpoint, and leads some projects 
to be abandoned mid-implementation. These problems could be avoided by delegating 
implementation to a neutral and capable bureaucracy but this is typically not possible 
in developing countries; however, fiscal institutions may be able to mitigate the 
negative efficiency consequences of distributive pressures by increasing the cost of 
non-cooperation among political actors. 
 
My exposition proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the technical attributes of 
project delivery, in particular the multi-stage nature of their implementation and the 
imperfect fungibility of project expenditure across space and time. Second, I show 
how this “lumpiness” requires intertemporal exchange among political actors who 
face commitment problems, which if unsuccessful leads some projects to be started 
 107 
but never finished. Finally, I discuss the factors that determine whether political actors 
are able to strike intertemporal bargains over project distribution, and show how fiscal 
institutions provide a second-best solution when this bargaining process fails. For 
concreteness I situate my theoretical discussion in the context of the delivery of small 
infrastructure projects by decentralized governments dependent on inter-governmental 
transfers or donor funds – a common situation in developing countries (Gadenne and 
Singhal 2014). However, the underlying mechanism may also be applicable to project 
implementation in other settings. 
 
Implementing projects 
The implementation of all but the smallest development projects happen across 
multiple stages, rather than instantaneously, yet the consequences of this have been 
overlooked in the recent wave of literature on the political economy of public service 
delivery. Numerous studies (mainly focused on corruption) have documented that 
large gaps can arise between inputs and outputs over the course of implementation 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2007; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen 2014), but 
view this implicitly as a static loss rather than examining the dynamic consequences.38 
This contrasts with the mostly qualitative, case study-based implementation literature 
in public administration, in which changing political and technical contexts and 
intertemporal decision-making processes during implementation play a key role 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Grindle 1980, Cornell 2014). Likewise, a growing 
number of studies on infrastructure project delivery document that delays, cost 
overruns, and other implementation problems are the norm rather than the exception 
(Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2004; Flyvbjerg 2007, 2013; Budzier and Flyvbjerg 
2013).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the temporal dimension of project implementation with a stylized 
timeline of the construction of a typical small public infrastructure project.39 After 
                                                
38 Macro-level studies have also found similar gaps between inputs and outputs: for example, IMF 
(2015) calculates measures of investment efficiency using measures of public capital investment stock 
and infrastructure access. 
39 I focus on simple build-transfer projects, in which a private contractor is procured to build a 
government-designed project and the contractor’s involvement ends upon physical completion when it 
hands the project over to the government. The large literature on public-private partnerships (PPPs), in 
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projects are selected, planned, and budgeted, the government goes through a 
procurement process and awards the contract to a private contractor. The contractor 
begins work on the project, and after completing the first stage requests partial 
payment from the government, which then inspects the work completed and, if 
satisfactory, makes payment.40 This cycle then repeats itself: the contractor completes 
the project and requests full payment, and once the government has inspected the 
work and made full payment the project is handed over to the government and can be 
put into use. The multi-stage nature of this process means that, even after making the 
initial policy choice to start the project, the government must periodically renew its 
commitment to the project by releasing funds to the contractor, as stipulated in the 
contract. Failure to do so stops physical progress on the project, and unless payment is 
subsequently made and work resumed, the project will remain unfinished. Non-
completion of projects entails major efficiency losses because projects typically 
generate few benefits for users until they are entirely complete – a school with walls 
but no roof is of little use.41 
 
                                                                                                                                       
contrast, focuses mainly on projects in which the private sector party also maintains a post-completion 
operational role. While I focus on physical infrastructure projects, these features pertain to many types 
of discrete government undertakings. For example, it was reported to the Public Accounts Committee 
of Ghana’s Parliament that the preparation of a Land Bill and Land Use and Planning Bill had overrun 
its planned expenditure by 317 percent and, years later, still had not been submitted to Parliament 
(Daily Guide 2015). The discrete nature of development projects (e.g. building a school) differentiates 
them from more routine services (e.g. teaching in the school); this distinction between projects and 
routine operations is a common one in public administration and management, but has not been 
explored by the literature on the political economy of service delivery. 
40 In some cases the government may make an up-front mobilization payment to the contractor prior to 
the start of work. 
41 This is a slight exaggeration, since projects nearing completion can sometimes be used without full 
functionality. For example, in site visits for this study the research team encountered instances of 
classes being held in a classroom block that had been roofed but construction had stalled prior to 
installation of windows, cladding of the building, and furnishing. Nonetheless, most infrastructure 
projects are characterized by a discontinuous relationship between implementation progress and use 
value. This non-linear relationship between expenditure on projects and their value to users 
distinguishes them from other types of policies, such as targeted grants or routine services, for which 
partial implementation can still generate relatively proportional benefits. 
 109 
Figure 1: Stylized Timeline of an Infrastructure Project
 
 
 
This multi-stage character of project implementation interacts with the imperfect 
fungibility of project expenditure. Project expenditure is imperfectly fungible across 
time periods because mid-project interruptions or delays can increase the overall cost 
of completing the project, thus reducing the benefit-to-cost ratio of the project and 
making it less likely that it will ever be completed. This can be for engineering 
reasons – leaving half-constructed buildings exposed to the elements can result in 
physical decay within just a few months – as well as economic reasons such as 
contractors’ financing and relocation costs, general price inflation, or recontracting 
costs.42 Likewise, there are scale economies in the project implementation process 
itself arising from contractors’ fixed costs of capital and managerial supervision. 
Efficient implementation thus requires continuity once a project has been started. This 
“lumpy” nature of projects also makes expenditure imperfectly fungible across 
potential projects: whereas fungible distributive benefits (e.g. subsidies, tax credits, 
budget allocations) can be divided and shared according to some targeting logic 
without losing value to beneficiaries, expenditure on discrete projects must cross a 
minimum threshold – the cost of completing the project – before it creates use value.43 
                                                
42 For a sample of OECD transportation projects, Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2004) estimate that each 
year of delay is associated with a 4.6 percent cost increase; in developing countries with higher 
inflation and interest rates and weaker legal systems, this figure would presumably be even larger. The 
effect of these cost increases is compounded by nominal rigidities inherent in budgeting, policymaking, 
and procurement processes, which require renewed political and bureaucratic approval of nominal 
contract adjustments even if the real cost of the project does not increase. If nominal rigidities make it 
difficult to adjust contract amounts mid-project, then projects that are destined to overrun their initial 
cost could be abandoned mid-construction rather than completed at an increased cost. 
43 This property is also noted by Dixit in his multi-principal model of government agencies: “multiple 
principals may find it difficult to agree on the split of the total gain from cooperation, or be unable to 
make the internal transfers necessary to implement an agreed-upon split. This is particularly important 
in the political context, where the benefits of the principals are often nonmonetary and are measured in 
Fi  1: Stylized Timelin  of an Infrastructure Project
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Distributive politics, project sequencing, and commitment problems 
A core premise of the vast literature on pork-barrel politics and clientelism is that 
politicians seek to deliver benefits to certain constituencies according to some type of 
tactical targeting logic in order to gain electoral support, and these benefits often take 
the form of locally targeted club goods, like small infrastructure projects, that benefit 
the recipient community but not other communities in the polity. From this tactical 
perspective, unfinished projects must have been left unfinished deliberately, either 
because the intended beneficiary was not the service users but the contractor (Samuels 
2002), to give clients an incentive to return the politician to power to complete the 
project (similar to Robinson and Torvik 2005), to punish opponents, or simply as a 
low-cost signal of intent or promise.  
 
However, political authority is rarely vested in a unitary actor in this way, even 
between elections. Politicians often have to share decision-making power with either a 
legislative assembly, are embedded in informal downward accountability 
relationships (such as interest group lobbying, personalistic ties, clientelist networks, 
or politically costly protests), or are vertically accountable to higher-level politicians. 
These are all especially prevalent in the context of local public good provision.44 
Politicians may therefore be constrained in enacting their preferred targeting strategy 
by the need to maintain the support of a minimum coalition of these political actors in 
any given period. Again this support could be formal, such as obtaining votes for a 
budget in a legislature, or informal, such as interest groups refraining from protest.45 
                                                                                                                                       
noncomparable, non-transferable units, whereas monetary compensations are often illegal” (1996, 
p.98-9). 
44 On informal accountability ties, see for example Helmke and Levitsky (2004) and Tsai (2007). 
Leaver’s (2009) model of “bureaucratic “minimal squawk behavior” provides an example of how 
interest groups can hold appointed officials accountable by appealing to their superiors. 
45 For generality, I refer in this section to one politician who must maintain some level of support from 
multiple political actors, without specifying the identity of the other political actors (who may also be 
elected politicians), the form of the accountability relationship (formal or informal, upward or 
downward), or the amount of support the politician must maintain (which could be more or less than a 
simple majority, and will also depend on the form of the accountability relationship). In the following 
section I will specify these actors and relationships in order to operationalize this model in the context 
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Yet at any given time, resource constraints make it impossible for a politician to 
simultaneously deliver projects to all (or even most) of her constituencies. Since 
project expenditure is imperfectly fungible, this means that the politician and the other 
political actors who have influence over project selection must make collective 
choices about the relative priorities of projects and their beneficiary constituencies, 
and select some projects to be implemented before others.46 However, reaching and 
maintaining such an intertemporal bargain may be difficult because the non-
contemporaneous benefit flows create a commitment problem: neither the politician 
nor the other political actors can commit to their actions in future periods because all 
have clear incentives to renege on their promises ex post.47 
 
                                                                                                                                       
of decentralization in Ghana. However, the logic is also potentially applicable to other contexts, such as 
the relationship between a government minister and interest groups. 
46 The literature on issue attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) explores an alternative mechanism 
through which the necessity of prioritization can affect policy outcomes.  
47 Weingast and Marshall (1988) make this point about barriers to political exchange in legislative 
logrolling. The theoretical literature that emphasizes the credible commitment problems inherent in 
clientelism recognizes that commitment problems mean that observed policy outcomes may not stem 
directly from political actors’ first-best targeting strategy (Keefer 2007, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008, 
Robinson and Verdier 2013). However, this perspective differs from mine in that the commitment 
problem in question is the mapping of electoral promises onto policy choice, rather than policy choice 
onto project implementation, and the inefficiency created is in the choice between private and public 
goods rather than in the implementation of the public goods. More closely related is Robinson and 
Torvik (2005), which suggests that politicians might deliberately support inefficient projects – “white 
elephants” – as a form of credible commitment to redistribution to their clients. However, this seems 
implausible as a general explanation for unfinished projects in the Ghana context, since: 1) most of 
these projects are social infrastructure rather than projects that generate fiscal returns, on which 
Robinson and Torvik’s model focuses; and 2) there is a near-universal deficit of such social 
infrastructure in Ghana, so nearly all these projects potentially create positive social surplus (or at least 
a positive-return project of equivalent cost in the same community could have been identified). It is 
equally implausible that unfinished projects are simply used by politicians as a way to direct private 
transfers to communities (as opposed to contractors) in the form of labor income; not only is labor a 
relatively small share of most capital projects, but a politician could still achieve this aim by seeing a 
project through to completion and also reap the additional political benefits of having provided a club 
or public good. 
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What are the consequences of this commitment problem for project implementation? 
If politicians and political actors are able to reach and maintain intertemporal 
bargains, then there are no negative efficiency effects: projects get implemented 
sequentially according to the plan agreed ex ante. (I discuss below the conditions 
under which such bargains are more or less difficult to reach.) However if the 
politician and political actors cannot reach such a bargain, then implementation will 
be erratic, with some new projects started before ongoing ones are completed. Since 
mid-project delays and interruptions increase the overall cost of completing projects, 
this inconsistent implementation path leads to some interrupted projects never being 
finished.48 
 
Why might politicians not simply form a stable minimum winning coalition with a 
subset of political actors? First, note that this may not be tactically optimal for a 
politician who wishes to win votes (or whose higher-level superiors wish to win 
votes) from all constituencies under her rather than just a simple majority.49 Second, 
there may be uncertainty over the future distribution of political power. While the 
transactions cost literature on politicians’ commitment and credibility problems 
focuses on political alternation as a mechanism of political uncertainty (Alesina 1988, 
Dixit, Grossman, and Gul 2000, de Figueiredo 2002), a large literature emphasizes the 
inherent instability of logrolling coalitions in legislatures; for example, Weingast and 
Marshall argue that “[p]roblems concerning the durability and enforceability of 
bargains are ubiquitous in legislative settings” (1988, p.142). This instability is likely 
to be heightened in the context of developing countries, where formal stabilizing 
institutions (such as committees) are often weak and informal politics are pervasive. 
Third, the salience of political actors’ claims may be endogenous to project delivery: 
                                                
48 An alternative mechanism through which projects could be left incomplete is if politicians and 
political actors resolve their commitment problems by spreading expenditure thinly across many 
projects. However, unfinished projects can still emerge in two ways: spreading expenditure thinly will 
lengthen the completion time of the project beyond what is technically optimal, thus raising the cost 
and increasing the likelihood that the project will become unprofitable for the contractor; and even if 
starting many projects simultaneously avoids the need to make explicit sequencing choices in the first 
period, political actors still cannot commit to finishing all these projects in future periods. 
49 The extent to which this is true may vary across electoral systems, although a full discussion of this 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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if two communities are lobbying for a project to be built, starting a project in one 
community is likely to increase grievances and spur mobilization in the other 
community while decreasing mobilization in the first community. 
 
On the other side of the coin, although theories of repeated games suggest many 
factors are likely to influence whether political actors can sustain intertemporal 
exchange, here I will focus on intra-party mechanisms that are proposed by the 
literatures on legislative bargaining and fiscal decentralization. Weingast and 
Marshall (1988) propose that parties may be able to enforce trades by offering 
rewards to individual representatives for cooperation or punishments for non-
cooperation. Likewise, Rodden’s (2006) analysis of soft budget constraints in fiscal 
federalism argues that partisan links between local and central governments provide 
the most likely avenue through which an inefficient over-borrowing equilibrium can 
be avoided. Partisan ties may also effectively increase the benefits to political actors 
of projects that do not directly benefit their constituency either due to perceived 
collective electoral benefits or affective ties. Polities where politicians and political 
actors are linked by partisan ties are thus more likely to be able to achieve a 
cooperative implementation outcome.   
 
Fiscal institutions as a second-best solution to bargaining failure 
The literature on political control of the bureaucracy suggests two potential solutions 
to the commitment problem described above: delegation to an independent 
bureaucrat, and the adoption of rigid rules to constrain future policy choices. 
However, these options are less applicable to developing countries whose 
governments tend to be characterized both by low bureaucratic capacity and the weak 
enforcement of laws and administrative procedures.50 Project implementation also 
poses a significant challenge for public financial management systems, since it 
requires the mobilization of significant resource sums delivered in a timely fashion 
according to a pre-specified plan, budget, or contract. In contrast, budget systems in 
developing countries are frequently marked by the weak execution of budgets and 
medium-term plans, unpredictable and delayed fund releases, and a general gap 
                                                
50 For example, Huber and McCarty (2004) demonstrate that many standard results of the delegation 
literature no longer hold when bureaucratic capacity is low. 
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between de jure structures and processes and their de facto operation (Andrews 2010; 
de Renzio, Andrews, and Mills 2011; Wehner and de Renzio 2013). Contract 
enforcement by the judiciary in these settings is also likely to be slow, inconsistent, 
and expensive (especially relative to the cost of small infrastructure projects), thus 
removing another potential institutional remedy for instability. These features of 
many developing country polities allow for a significant degree of discretion in 
resource allocation even after plans, budgets, and contracts have been approved and 
signed. 
 
In this context, the fiscal institutions used to fund projects provide an alternative 
potential bureaucratic remedy. Sub-national governments in developing countries are 
usually highly dependent on inter-governmental transfers (Gadenne and Singhal 
2014), and these transfer schemes may impose conditions not only on what type of 
expenditures they can fund but also on their management and performance. One such 
condition that is of particular theoretical interest here is a requirement that recipient 
governments budget to finish existing projects before starting new ones (in the next 
section I show that this institution has an empirical counterpart in Ghana), with the 
threat of some sort of punishment (such as withholding future funds). This condition 
could induce cooperation among local political actors by in effect raising the cost of 
non-cooperation. 
 
Indeed, the macro-historical literature on the development of state capacity 
emphasizes that efficiency, distributional considerations, and institutional 
arrangements have to be analyzed jointly, and that strong institutions facilitate 
welfare-improving inter-temporal bargains by mitigating credible commitment 
problems (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Besley and Persson 2009). But 
whereas this literature treats the emergence of institutions as endogenous to 
distributive preferences, in many polities certain aspects of project financing and 
delivery mechanisms are imposed in ways that are at least partly exogenous. This is 
most obvious in cases where foreign donors supply resources to recipient 
governments but impose conditions on their use (for example review of procurement 
processes or auditing requirements). However, such supervisory and control 
mechanisms can also be imposed by central government on lower levels of 
government in federal or decentralized systems. 
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To the extent that fiscal institutions can indeed induce cooperation among local 
political actors there are major implications for the ability of governments to improve 
public service delivery, since altering the operation of one fiscal institution may well 
be more feasible than improving the operation of dozens or even hundreds of local-
level bureaucratic and political systems. The following section operationalizes this 
theoretical discussion in the context of infrastructure project provision in Ghana’s 
local governments and develops specific hypotheses for empirical analysis. 
 
3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN GHANA’S LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
Ghana’s local governments provide an ideal setting in which to examine these 
dynamics empirically. Ghana is a competitive democracy in which public good 
provision is highly salient and voters have been shown to respond to the delivery of 
visible public goods such as the ones I study (Briggs 2014, Weghorst and Lindberg 
2013, Harding 2015). Yet citizens and voters alike frequently complain about projects 
being abandoned mid-construction.51 National elections are closely contested and 
dominated by two stable parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC, ruling 
since 2008) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP). The President is elected by 
national popular vote, so there is a strong incentive for the incumbent to try to deliver 
public goods in order to win votes and increase partisan turnout across all districts.  
 
At the political level, districts are headed by a District Chief Executive (DCE) who is 
appointed by the President and presides over a directly elected non-partisan district 
assembly, in which 70 percent of members are elected from geographically defined 
single-member electoral areas and 30 percent are appointed by the President.52 DCEs 
do not have a fixed term and so would expect to serve until their party loses power or 
                                                
51 For example, unfinished projects are widely reported on by the media (e.g. Ghana News Agency 
2014), and action against them has been pledged both by Parliament (Citi FM 2014) and the President 
(Joy News 2014).  
52 For convenience and clarity I refer generically to DCEs, but in Municipal Assemblies this position is 
known as Municipal Chief Executive, and likewise Metropolitan Chief Executives in Metropolitan 
Assemblies. 
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they are removed. They are also downwardly accountable to assemblies, only weakly 
in a formal sense (through a requirement that their appointment be approved by a two-
thirds majority of the assembly) but more strongly through informal means such as 
the threat of protest, which could (and occasionally does) lead to removal. Although 
district-level politics are formally non-partisan, district assemblies and DCEs are 
widely perceived in Ghana as politicized, partisan actors. For example, political 
parties often lend informal support to candidates during district assembly elections 
(GNA 2015), DCEs are often accused of unduly politicizing their roles (e.g. Today 
2015), and a nationwide study by Ghana’s National Commission on Civic Education 
found that 68.6 percent of respondents believed that district assemblies were partisan 
in their operation (NCCE 2015). 
 
Presidential elections were held in 2012 and won by the incumbent party. Assembly 
members are elected to four-year terms in elections that occur simultaneously 
nationwide; these took place in 2010, and so the composition of assemblies was 
constant throughout this paper’s study period. District bureaucracies are composed of 
professional public servants, including dedicated staff for planning, engineering, and 
finance. 53 Posting and transfer decisions are made centrally in Accra without formal 
input from the DCE or assembly, and staff are commonly rotated and posted to 
districts outside their home regions. Project selection decisions are made jointly by 
DCEs and assemblies in an annual budgeting process in which the DCE has a 
significant amount of formal and informal agenda-setting power 54 , and while 
implementation is formally the responsibility of the DCE and the district bureaucracy, 
assembly members nevertheless have a significant influence on budget execution and 
project implementation through periodic assembly meetings during the year, as well 
as informal monitoring and lobbying. 
 
Districts are primarily responsible for delivering a variety of public goods and 
services, including facilities for basic education, sanitation, construction and 
maintenance of non-trunk roads, primary care clinics, local economic infrastructure 
                                                
53 Districts can also use their internally generated funds (but not DACF or DDF transfers) to hire their 
own staff, but tend to do so for areas such as tax collection rather than infrastructure development. 
54 DCEs chair the important Executive Committee of the assembly and have a large degree of de facto 
discretion over district assembly affairs. 
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such as marketplaces, and the provision of housing and offices for local government 
staff. Provision of these facilities is highly politically salient, especially for members 
of the district assembly. While districts are restricted to relatively small projects that 
fall below a statutory size threshold, total local government expenditure on capital 
projects is nonetheless substantial: GH 317 million (equivalent to just over US $135 
million) in 2013, or 42.5% of their total revenue.55 However, these resources are still 
only enough to deliver projects to a fraction of the communities in any district at a 
given time.  
 
For example, Kwabre East District Assembly spent GH 1.36 million on capital 
projects in 2013 (just above the national median of GH 1.24 million), and was 
comprised of 42 geographically distinct settlements represented by 31 elected 
assembly members. In the same year, the mean cost for a six-room classroom block 
(the modal project type) was GH 169,909, meaning that even if the district spent its 
infrastructure budget entirely on classroom blocks, it could still only deliver eight of 
them within the year – so roughly two-thirds of its assembly members and over four-
fifths of its communities would not receive anything. A district could spread projects 
somewhat more widely by choosing smaller projects, but this nonetheless illustrates 
the necessity of prioritization and sequencing of project delivery by district 
governments. 
 
This empirical context closely matches the theoretical situation described in the 
previous section: the delivery of locally targeted projects to single-member 
constituencies must be sequenced, but the representatives have no way to commit to 
stages of this sequence beyond the present year (or even within-year period). Since 
forming stable logrolling coalitions may be difficult, this could lead to the assembly 
adopting an erratic policy implementation path that leaves many projects half-
constructed. While DCEs can use their agenda-setting power to stabilize these 
coalitions and enforce an agreed-upon project sequence, their ability to do this is 
conditioned by the underlying partisan sympathies of the assembly: DCEs are likely 
                                                
55 Schedule 3 of the Public Procurement Act (2003, Act 663) fixed this threshold at GHS 200,000, or 
approximately USD 85,000. Calculations based on an exchange rate of USD 1 = GHS 2.35, as at 31 
December, 2013. 
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to be better able to reward cooperation or punish defection and commit to do so more 
effectively when dealing with their co-partisans. Likewise, the project selection 
preferences of the DCE are more likely to align with the collective choices of the 
assembly (either for instrumental or affective reasons) when the assembly is 
dominated by members sympathetic to the ruling party rather than to the opposition; 
to the (considerable) extent that DCEs have discretion in implementing decisions of 
the assembly, this preference alignment may also stabilize project implementation 
paths. 
 
This context also provides an opportunity to understand how fiscal institutions 
influence project delivery and these distributive dynamics. Districts are heavily reliant 
on inter-governmental transfers funded by central government and donors. The two 
largest are the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and District Development 
Facility (DDF), both of which are periodic, lump sum, formula-based transfers to 
districts (similar to block grants in a federal system). 56 For both transfer programs, 
project selection, procurement, and implementation are entirely conducted at the 
district level, by the same politicians and bureaucrats and through the same medium-
term planning and annual budgeting process. Both are restricted to use on capital 
investments rather than recurrent expenditures or private transfers 57 , both are 
financially audited by the same central government auditors as part of the routine 
                                                
56 The DACF allocation formula is approved every year by Parliament and changes frequently. While 
there is evidence that this formula has previously been manipulated to target funds to favored 
constituencies (Banful 2011), this should affect the number of projects completed or undertaken by 
districts, not the completion rate, and thus is not a concern for this study. The DDF allocation formula 
is based in part on an annual assessment of compliance with statutory regulations and administrative 
processes. Districts that perform better receive incrementally higher allocations, while districts that do 
not meet the minimum requirements do not receive funds for investment in that year’s allocation. 
However, failure to meet minimum requirements has been rare after first year (prior to this sample) and 
the disbursements are made with a two-year lag from the assessment year, and as with the DACF any 
cross-district differences in quantity of funds received should affect the level rather than rate of project 
completion. For both fund sources, funds are disbursed to all districts simultaneously so these delays 
affect all districts equally, and there is no evidence of any differential delay in releases or manipulation 
thereof. 
57 Despite this restriction, districts occasionally spend DACF or DDF funds on non-investment 
activities, but these irregularities are reported in audit reports and are relatively infrequent.   
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annual district audit process, and both are administered by small central government 
secretariats to which annual budgets and reports are submitted but which play no 
direct role in implementation. But whereas the DACF is enshrined in the 1992 
Constitution as a minimum percentage of central government revenue to be 
transferred to districts, the DDF was created in 2008-09 as a multi-donor funding pool 
(with the central government also providing minority co-financing).58 As a result, the 
DACF imposes little operational control or oversight on districts’ use of funds (other 
than spending them on capital projects), while the DDF requires that districts budget 
to complete existing DDF projects before starting new ones.59 
 
I also examine a third major source of project funding, the Ghana Education Trust 
Fund (GETFund), which differs from the DACF and DDF in that districts propose a 
list of projects from which a central government committee selects some to fund. 
Unlike the DACF and DDF, GETFund resources are not transferred directly to 
districts but are used centrally to pay contractors directly for work done in the 
districts. 60  While I suggest that the central government also faces distributive 
pressures that could undermine implementation, I cannot test this directly because 
(unlike with the DACF and DDF) the different set of bureaucratic and fiscal 
procedures associated with GETFund projects make it impossible to isolate this effect. 
Nonetheless the completion of GETFund projects provides an indication of the 
priorities and preferences of the central government which will be useful later, so I 
include it in the analysis. These three major fund sources together comprise 48.4 
percent of all projects.61 
                                                
58 The other significant difference between the DACF and DDF is that, due to aggregate fiscal 
constraints, the Ministry of Finance is often delayed in disbursing DACF funds by six months or more. 
For example, the third quarter 2013 funds were actually disbursed in the second quarter of 2014 
(Kunateh 2014).  In contrast, the DDF is disbursed to districts promptly and in full. However, I show 
evidence later that these aggregate budget release delays are not driving the differences in completion 
across these sources.  
59 This is enforced through a combination of ex ante budget scrutiny and ex post physical monitoring of 
a small number of projects, although discovery through both means is far from perfect.  
60 There is no formal rule specifying how GETFund projects or funds should be distributed across 
districts. 
61 The remainder is comprised of projects from districts’ internally generated funds, projects being 
implemented in the district by the central government or donors (sometimes in partnership with the 
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Figure 2: Project Types by Fund Source
 
 
 
This overlapping set of project finance and implementation mechanisms gives rise to 
two hypotheses: 
 
H1: The fund source through which a project is financed influences its 
probability of completion. 
 
H2: The completion rate of DDF projects is higher than the completion rate of 
DACF projects. The relative completion rate of GETFund projects is 
indeterminate. 
 
I argue in the following section that estimated differences across fund sources should 
be interpreted as mostly causal, rather than being primarily due to endogenous sorting 
on unobserved project characteristics. 
                                                                                                                                       
district assembly), Ghana Road Fund projects, projects from the Member of Parliament’s small share of 
the DACF allocation, and Urban Development Grant projects. Project fund source is not reported for 
approximately one-fifth of projects; since half of these are likely to be DACF, DDF, or GETFund 
projects, the estimated effects for these fund sources will be biased somewhat towards zero. 
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However, H1 and H2 focus on whether fiscal institutions impact project completion, 
not whether they do so through the theoretical mechanism I propose. Directly testing 
the prediction that district political alignment in positively related to completion rates 
is problematic, because estimating this relationship across districts introduces 
potential confounds due to observable or unobserved characteristics of districts that 
are correlated both with project completion rates and with district partisan alignment. 
For example, politicians or bureaucrats in districts that support the ruling party may 
be of different quality, have different affective preferences, or face different career 
concerns and private incentives. Instead, I examine this mechanism indirectly, by 
examining how district partisan alignment interacts with the effect of fiscal 
institutions on project completion. 
 
H3: The difference in completion rates between DACF and DDF projects is 
decreasing in the ruling party’s vote share in the district. 
 
Intuitively, project fund source should matter less in districts with a high ruling party 
vote share62 because the DCE and assembly members are more likely to be able to 
sustain cooperation without this institutional commitment mechanism, so the 
requirement imposed by the DDF to finish existing projects before starting new ones 
may be redundant. In districts where a large part of the district assembly is likely to be 
sympathetic to the opposition, however, institutions that mitigate the impact of 
intertemporal bargaining failures among political actors may have an especially strong 
effect.  
 
                                                
62 The ruling party’s vote share from the 2008 presidential elections was chosen because these elections 
preceded district level elections in 2010 as well as the entire sample period of 2011-13 and thus serve 
as an indicator of the underlying affiliation of the district, as opposed to the results of the December 
2012 elections which could have been endogenous to public good delivery in 2011-12. Because Ghana 
has a strongly two-party dominant system, using ruling party vote share as a measure of political 
competitiveness is essentially identical to other measures, such as the winning margin or distance 
between the NDC and the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party. The NDC and NPP were the 
top two parties in every constituency nationwide in the 2008 election and there were only a small 
number of constituencies where any third party obtained a significant number of votes, so these 
measures are all extremely highly correlated.  
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3.3 DATA 
 
To measure the completion of infrastructure projects, I collected, digitized, and coded 
all available district Annual Progress Reports (APRs) for the years 2011-13. These 
reports are written annually by the district bureaucracy and submitted to the National 
Development Planning Commission.63 Each report includes a table listing basic 
information about projects that were ongoing or active during the calendar year. 
Appendix 3.1 contains a sample page from one of these tables. However, APRs were 
not available for all district-years, and some reports had insufficient information on 
infrastructure projects; altogether it was possible to locate 479 out of a potential 602 
APRs (79.6 percent), of which 407 (67.6 percent) had sufficient information to be 
entered into the database. While this level of coverage is perhaps surprisingly high for 
a previously unused source of administrative data, it nonetheless raises concerns that 
reporting completeness may be correlated with project completion. This does not 
appear to be the case, however, as project completion rates are balanced across 
districts’ reporting completeness, as are a wide range of district characteristics (see 
Appendix 3.2). After cleaning and removing non-infrastructure projects, this yielded a 
database of 14,246 projects, which is the core dataset used in this study’s analysis. 
 
All reports were manually double-entered into the database and variables were coded 
algorithmically from the resulting text strings, with manual disambiguation for key 
variables (see Appendix 3.3). Projects were coded into 17 different basic “types”, 
such as schools, clinics, and staff housing. For the parametric analysis in Sections 3.4 
and 3.5, the category “schools” was broken down into five sub-categories according 
to the number of units in each school block, leaving a total of 22 project type 
categories. Project completion was coded as a binary variable by combining 
information from three raw variables. For instance, project completion was coded as 1 
for values such as “COMPLETE”, “100%”, or “INSTALLED AND IN USE”, and 0 
for values such as “ONGOING”, “90%”, or “LINTEL LEVEL”. This yielded a 
unique completion code for 91.6 percent of observations; the remainder were 
                                                
63 In practice, however, some districts do not prepare or submit APRs, while others submit them to the 
Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) but not the NDPC. To collect the APRs, I first worked with staff 
of the NDPC to locate all the soft and hard copy reports that were available centrally at the NDPC, then 
collected all extant APRs that were not available centrally from the ten regional capitals. 
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disambiguated by visual inspection if possible, and given a missing value if it was 
impossible to determine the project’s status conclusively. Since many projects did not 
have commencement dates reported and few districts made use of unique project 
identification numbers, tracking the progress of projects across years was challenging 
and there is significant attrition. Appendix 3.4 discusses the three alternative 
methodologies that were used to track project progress across years and their likely 
directions of bias – the three methods yield qualitatively similar findings – and shows 
that project attrition is uncorrelated with fund source and thus poses little risk of bias 
to this paper’s key empirical results. 
 
The information in the project database is based on the self-reports of the local 
governments themselves and is thus subject to some concern about accuracy, either 
due to poor reporting quality or deliberate misrepresentation. 64  This study has 
therefore taken multiple approaches to probing the accuracy of the APR data. First, it 
should be noted that districts have had little incentive to deliberately misreport any 
data in the APR, because these reports were submitted in hard copy and subject to 
only cursory scrutiny by supervisory institutions, so careful and systematic analysis of 
them was not possible.65 Data quality and reporting honesty are most likely to vary at 
the district level, but since this paper’s analysis focuses mainly on within-district 
variation, misreporting bias would only be a problem if it were differential across 
fund sources. District officials would have no incentive to do so, however, since the 
APRs are not submitted directly to any of the funding institutions and were not being 
used by these institutions for monitoring purposes. Second, for one of the project fund 
sources the government maintains its own monitoring database which is compiled and 
                                                
64 Note however that if district APRs deliberately misreporting completion rates to exaggerate their 
achievements the completion rate would be biased upward, meaning that unfinished projects are even 
more prevalent than estimated here.  
65 Interviews with officers at these institutions have confirmed this, and have not yielded any anecdotal 
evidence of district-level officers being subject to any form of sanction or reproach due to information 
contained in the APRs. There were no concerns on the part of any of these officers that completion data 
on the APRs was being deliberately exaggerated, although some acknowledged that some of the finer 
details (such as the percentage of work completed) may be somewhat rough. Scrutiny of district 
operations is somewhat more intense in terms of financial management due to the Ghana Audit 
Service’s annual audits, but these are not based on the APRs and if anything provide an incentive for 
district-level officers not to misreport the financial status of projects on APRs. 
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maintained independently of the APR reporting system. While this database differs 
somewhat in structure, format, and scope from the APR database, the estimates of 
project completion rates are similar in magnitude.66  
 
Finally, I conducted physical site visits to a small sub-sample of projects that had 
been reported as complete in 2013, spread across four randomly selected districts in 
two regions. The physical evidence from this limited sample suggests that while 
construction quality and maintenance may be issues with projects reported as 
complete, there is little evidence that districts reports of completion status are 
systematically biased.67 
 
3.4 FUND SOURCE MATTERS FOR PROJECT COMPLETION 
 
This section first presents key descriptive statistics on the extent and dynamics of 
project non-completion in Ghana. Although anecdotes about unfinished infrastructure 
                                                
66 The Ministry of Education’s internal monitoring database of 1,146 GETFund projects reports that of 
6-unit classrooms and dormitories started between 2009 and 2013 nationwide, only 36.6 percent had 
been completed. (The GETFund is described in more detail in Section 4.1). Unfortunately it is not 
possible to disaggregate this by year of project commencement, and the date of reporting is not 
indicated (these figures are based on a database provided by the Ministry of Education in January 
2015). In addition, the Ghana Audit Service reports that a June 2013 monitoring effort of 179 school 
projects in seven regions started in 2010 and 2011 found that 27 percent were complete, despite 
scheduled completion times of six to twelve months – a similar length to most GETFund projects in the 
APR database (Ghana Audit Service 2014, 290). While these estimates differ slightly in timespan and 
project coverage, they are in the same range as APR database estimates that GETFund projects have 
one-year completion rates of 24.0-25.4 percent and three-year completion rates of 32.0-56.1 percent. 
Likewise, the June 2013 monitoring report found that 61 percent of the contract value of these 
incomplete projects had been disbursed; the equivalent figure in the APR database is 48.4 percent. 
67 Resource constraints made it impossible to conduct physical site visits on a nationally representative 
scale. Seventeen of the twenty projects were fully complete, while the remainder were functionally 
complete but with minor areas of incompleteness (e.g. no windows, untiled floors, holes in roof, some 
roofing remaining to be done). Sixteen of the projects were in full use; of the remaining four, one was 
in partial use, one was out of use because of cracks and accessibility issues, and one had not been 
commissioned yet. The site visits were conducted in October 2014, ten months after the project had 
been reported as complete; in only one case did people present at the project site report that the project 
had actually been finished in 2014 rather than 2013. 
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projects in Ghana and other developing countries are widespread, empirical data is 
rare. For scholars of public good provision, measuring what percentage of 
government projects get finished is as fundamental a task as measuring poverty 
headcounts is for studies of poverty reduction, so this ignorance is worrying.68 I 
estimate that approximately one-third of projects are never finished, and show that 
non-completion patterns are qualitatively consistent with this paper’s theoretical 
mechanism that emphasizes how time consistency problems on the part of the 
government interact with the temporal dimension of project implementation. 
 
I then take advantage of the overlap between fund sources and project types in 
Ghana’s local governments to test H1 and H2, regarding the relationship between 
project financing and delivery mechanisms and completion rates. Since the same 
types of projects are financed and delivered through different fund sources within the 
same districts and narrowly defined geographic communities, and sometimes even by 
the same contractors, it is possible to control for a broad range of observable and 
unobservable factors that can influence project completion. While the causal effects of 
fund sources are not cleanly identified, the range of controls is so extensive that the 
estimated differences among fund sources are difficult to attribute to anything but the 
effect of the fund sources. I examine the potential for endogenous sorting of projects 
into fund sources on unobservable project or community characteristics using 
coefficient stability tests and other methods; while the possibility of sorting cannot be 
entirely ruled out, I argue it is unlikely to account for more than a small fraction of the 
observed differences among fund sources. 
 
The dynamics of project completion 
Less than half of projects (45.8 percent) finish within their first year, and even after 
three years of implementation 35.5 percent remain unfinished. The completion hazard 
rate decreases monotonically after the first year of a project, so projects that are not 
finished promptly become decreasingly likely to be completed.69 These patterns hold 
                                                
68 What little data there is, however, confirms the severity of the problem: in the only other such large-
N dataset available in a developing country (to my knowledge), Rasul and Rogger (2014) estimate that 
only 31 percent of small government infrastructure projects are fully completed within the budget year. 
69 Tracking project completion across years is complicated by attrition and missing data; I discuss my 
methodology for doing this in Appendix 3.4. I also present upper- and lower-bound estimates for these 
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across different types of project, as Figure 3 shows for the three most common project 
types (schools, latrines, and housing for local government staff). 70  Likewise, 
completion rates remain broadly consistent across years – annual project completion 
rates were 48.6 percent for 2011, 40.7 percent for 2012, and 44.7 percent for 2013 – 
indicating that the phenomenon of unfinished projects is not primarily explained by 
pre- or post-election dynamics (i.e. politicians starting or finishing projects en masse 
just before or after an election) relating to Ghana’s December 2012 election. 
 
These findings could emerge normally if many projects were scheduled to last longer 
than three years, but this is not the case. Most projects are intended to be brief: five 
months for the median, and 88.8 percent less than twelve months. Projects that get 
finished tend to be punctual: the median delay is just one month, 81.0 percent are 
finished in less than twelve months, and just 10.7 percent are delayed by a year or 
more. The median incomplete project, however, is twelve months past its expected 
completion date – a 200 percent delay – and there is a long tail of over a quarter of 
incomplete projects that are more than two years past their planned completion date.71 
While it is impossible to conclusively say that these projects will never be completed, 
just 5.3 percent of completed projects were finished two or more years past their due 
date, so it is empirically improbable. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
projects either finish promptly or not at all. This bifurcation of project outcomes is 
consistent with the mechanism from the theoretical model: due to the non-fungibility 
of project expenditure across time, mid-project delays or interruptions increase the 
cost of finishing the project for engineering, financial, and contractual reasons, and 
thus make it unlikely the government will return to complete the project. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
completion rates under alternative sets of assumptions, which produce quantitatively different estimates 
but do not change the main patterns identified. 
70 It is noteworthy that project incompletion is an issue even for types of projects, such as staff housing 
and office buildings, for which the staff of the districts are themselves the direct beneficiaries. 
71 These figures likely understate the extent to which incomplete projects are behind schedule, since 
many incomplete projects attrite out of the dataset. 
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Figure 3: Completion Rate by Project Year 
 
 
 
Figure 4(a) shows most incomplete projects have had a significant amount of work 
done on them – 60 percent, for the median. It is thus not the case that the phenomenon 
of unfinished projects is due merely to costless signaling of distributive intentions by 
politicians using projects that are never intended to be completed. Further consistent 
with this paper’s theoretical mechanism, nearly half of projects are not touched after 
their first year (4b).72 This is consistent with unfinished projects being due largely to 
intertemporal consistency problems combined with the multi-stage nature of the 
construction process, rather than a “smoother” underlying completion function which 
would be more suggestive of low capacity and resource constraints as driving factors. 
 
Of course, these patterns are also consistent with another potential cause of project 
non-completion: corruption and campaign finance. If politicians’ (or bureaucrats’) 
objective is to embezzle funds, they may direct contracts to favored contractors (who 
may pay kickbacks) who are then placed under little pressure to complete the project. 
In addition, contractors themselves may be important clients of politicians and 
                                                
72 Reported progress is precisely zero for 32.7 percent of projects, but is 10 percent or less for 55.0 
percent. Given that the percent of work complete variable may be reported somewhat imprecisely, 
reported progress in this range is more likely to be due to measurement error than genuine work 
completed.  
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rewarding them with contracts which they are not expected to complete may be a 
clientelist strategy. Finally, politicians and bureaucrats could embezzle the funds 
directly by reporting that they had been disbursed to contractors but instead taking 
them themselves.73 
 
 
Figure 4: Work Done on Incomplete Projects 
 
 
 
To examine this directly, I construct an analog of Olken’s (2007) “missing 
expenditures” measure by subtracting the percentage of physical work complete on a 
project from the percentage of its budget that has been disbursed relative to the 
original contract value.74 Unlike Olken’s measure, however, this measure is two-
                                                
73 Samuels (2002) makes this argument in the Brazilian case, and Luna (2015) presents evidence that 
similar relationships exist among politicians, bureaucrats, and contractors in Ghana’s local 
governments. However,  
74 This measure is an analog to Olken’s missing expenditures measure, not an exact replication. 
Whereas Olken’s measure focuses on embezzled funds by measuring sub-standard material quality in 
completed roads, this paper’s measure focuses exclusively on percentage physical completion 
(regardless of quality). These “quality” and “quantity” margins are not mutually exclusive. The extent 
to which these margins are interactive – if theft of resources on the quality margin increases the cost of 
finishing a project, thus leading to its abandonment – would be an interesting question for future 
research.  
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sided: contractors can be either overpaid or underpaid relative to the work they have 
done. For complete projects (5a), positive values thus represent cost overruns, while 
for incomplete projects (5b) they represent “missing expenditures”.75 In both cases, 
negative values represent delayed payment or non-payment for work done. If 
corruption were the cause of unfinished projects, we would expect to observe positive 
values: a 60 percent complete project with 100 percent of its budget disbursed, for 
example, might suggest that the remaining 40 percent had been embezzled by one 
party to the transaction. Instead, the opposite appears to be the case. Defining 
overpayment as projects with values greater than +10 percent and underpayment as 
values less than -10 percent, underpayment is almost five times more common (44.2 
percent of projects) than overpayment (8.1 percent). 76  Overpayment (“missing 
expenditures”) is slightly more common on incomplete projects than completed ones 
(15.8 percent, compared to 2.4 percent), but underpayment is still several times more 
frequent (50.9 percent of incomplete projects, 39.2 percent of complete projects).77  
 
 
                                                
75 As Olken emphasizes, “missing expenditures” can arise for reasons other than simple theft, even if 
they are highly suggestive of some form of either corruption or extremely poor contract management 
(2007, 203).  
76 The observed differences between over- and underpayment are far too great to be explained by 
normal time lags in processing payment. Governments usually have a contractual period of a few 
weeks or months after contractors have submitted payment requests in which to inspect work and make 
payment. However, there is no correlation between the over/underpayment measure and the month of 
project completion (not shown) – since both financial and physical status is reported in the APRs at the 
end of the year, this correlation would be positive if underpayment was primarily a short-term 
phenomenon. Thus, negative values of “missing expenditure” really do seem to be measuring severely 
delayed payment or non-payment rather than normal lags in processing payment. 
77 Contractors in Ghana frequently complain about delayed payment and non-payment for work by 
Government; there are reports of contractors going unpaid for periods of a year or more for work done 
(Abotsi 2013). This not only affects the completion probability of the project in question (especially if 
the delay increases the nominal or real cost of finishing the project), but also can reduce the completion 
probability of other projects by increasing the cost of tender bids as contractors build the interest costs 
of delayed payment into their estimates, and reducing contractors’ financial capacity. Indeed, one 
seminar participant with extensive infrastructure experience in developing countries referred to the 
“contractor death spiral” that frequently occurs when relatively small contractors in countries with 
weak financial systems encounter payment delays. 
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Figure 5: Cost Overruns, Missing Expenditures, and Underpayment for Work 
 
 
 
The total cost to society of unfinished projects is economically significant, whether 
measured in terms of the direct fiscal cost to government, the opportunity cost of 
foregone public goods, or the financial costs of non-payment to contractors. Since 
35.5 percent of projects are unfinished after three years and expenditure on these 
averages 55.5 of the contract value, 19.6 percent of total local government capital 
expenditure – roughly one-fifth – is spent on projects which are almost certain never 
to be finished. Scaling this percentage by the total capital expenditure of Ghana’s 
local governments in 2013 of USD 135 million implies that annual spending on 
projects abandoned mid-construction is approximately USD 26.6 million.78 This 
wasted expenditure would be enough to fully construct 706 three-room school 
buildings per year. In addition to these costs borne by government and service users, 
                                                
78 Calculations based on an exchange rate of USD 1 = GHS 2.35, as at 31 December, 2013. These 
figures are indicative, since the expenditure on these projects would have spanned the period 2011-13 
and thus could have been somewhat higher or lower depending on exchange rates fluctuations, the 
temporal incidence of expenditures, and changes in aggregate spending. Likewise, the set of project 
fund sources included in the overall local government capital expenditure figures is slightly different 
than the set of fund sources included in the APR database, but it is not possible to disaggregate them by 
fund source to arrive at a more precise estimate. 
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the underpayment of contractors implies an additional annual economic cost of USD 
6.7 million borne by contractors.79 
 
Project completion across fund sources 
How are these completion patterns affected by the way in which projects are funded, 
and the different delivery mechanisms associated with these fund sources? This 
question bears directly on H1 and H2: 
 
H1: Projects funded from different sources have different probabilities of 
completion. 
 
H2: The completion rate of DDF projects is higher than the completion rate of 
DACF projects. The relative completion rate of GETFund projects is 
indeterminate. 
 
Both hypotheses find support in simple comparisons of completion rates. Figure 6 
shows the three-year completion rates of projects for the main three fund sources, 
both for all projects (6a) and for school buildings only (6b). The differences across 
fund sources are substantial: after three years 78.5 percent of DDF projects are 
completed, compared to just 64.0 percent of DACF projects and just 44.8 percent of 
GETFund projects. The same pattern emerges even when restricting the sample to 
school buildings only. The differences between DDF and DACF projects are 
particularly striking, since these projects are planned, procured, and executed by the 
exact same district-level bureaucrats and politicians, thus controlling for the quality, 
composition, and management of politicians and bureaucrats. 
 
To estimate these differences parametrically while controlling for a broader range of 
other factors, I estimate a linear probability model of the following form: 
 1 !!!!!!!!!!,!,!,! = !!,!,!!+ !!,!,!!+ !! + !! + !! + !!,!,!,! 
                                                
79 The average physical completion percentage of projects that are unfinished after their third year is 
64.9 percent, or 9.4 percentage points greater than the percent of the budget disbursed. Scaling this by 
total local government infrastructure expenditure implies an annual underpayment of USD 6.7 million 
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where !!,!,!,! represents the completion status of project i in district j of type k in year 
t,80 !!,!,! is a vector of fund source indicator variables, !!,!,! is a vector of project 
characteristics including construction type (i.e. greenfield projects vs. 
maintenance/repair) and project year (first, second, or third)81, !! is a vector of district 
fixed effects, !! is a vector of project type fixed effects82, !! is a vector of year fixed 
effects, !!,!,!,! is an error term, and ! and ! are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
The coefficients ! - specifically, the differences between them – are the parameters of 
primary analytical interest.83  
                                                
80 Using the annual completion status of a project does not take into account whether the project is a 
first or subsequent year project (although I control for this using indicator variables in most 
specifications). The annual completion status has the disadvantage of differing from the eventual 
cumulative completion status of a project, and is potentially vulnerable to cross-district bias if attrition 
differs systematically across districts. However, using three-year completion rates for full sample 
estimation and cross-district comparisons is not feasible since these cannot be calculated for districts 
with missing report years or that do not report project commencement dates, or for projects that started 
in 2012 or 2013. Where it is possible to calculate both, annual completion rates are highly correlated 
with three-year completion rates across project types and fund sources, and there are no observed 
instances for any major sub-group (such as fund source or project type) of one sub-group having a 
higher annual completion rate but lower three-year completion rate than another sub-group. The annual 
completion rate is thus a robust measure to use both for within- and across-district comparisons. 
81 Project year is coded using the manual linking process; all projects that were not identified as 
continuations of a previous year’s project are coded as year one. This coding scheme was chosen to 
make use of the entire sample while taking account, where possible, of whether a project was in its first 
or subsequent year. While there are theoretical concerns about this variable’s endogeneity to project 
completion and potential bias from differential reporting quality or attrition across districts, in practice 
the inclusion of these variables has little effect on the coefficients of interest or the model as a whole, 
any cross-district bias would be cancelled out by the district fixed-effects, and attrition is independent 
of fund source. 
82 Project type is disaggregated into seventeen categories, with schools further disaggregated into 6 
categories according to the number of rooms in the school block (with a residual category for schools 
with an unknown numbers of rooms), for a total of 22 categories. See Appendix 3 for more details. 
83 I use the linear probability model (LPM) due to the large number of fixed effects variables used 
(thousands, when adding location or contractor fixed effects) which make estimation by logit or probit 
computationally difficult and potentially biased. Where possible, however, estimating the model as a 
logit or probit produces similar results. Estimating a Cox proportional hazards model is problematic 
due to the short time frame and resulting truncation of the data, and the difficulties in linking project 
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Figure 6: Cumulative Project Completion by Fund Source 
 
 
 
 
The results are presented in Table 1. Column 1 shows simple mean annual completion 
rates of the three major fund sources, with the constant term being the completion rate 
of projects from the minor or unknown fund sources. Column 2 adds district and year 
fixed effects, and Column 3 further adds project type fixed effects and characteristics. 
The bilateral differences between the three coefficients of interest are highly 
statistically significant in each case, and also economically significant: the DDF 
annual completion rate is in the range of 10-12 percentage points greater than that of 
the DACF, which is in turn 15-20 percentage points greater than that of the 
GETFund.84 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
observations across years discussed in the previous section. Nevertheless, using this estimator 
generates similar differences across fund sources. 
84 As noted above, these estimates are likely to be biased towards zero and thus understate the true 
differences among fund sources, since roughly two-fifths of the omitted  fund source category is 
composed of projects with unknown fund source, and this presumably comprises a significant number 
of DDF, DACF, and GETFund projects. 
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The specification of Column 3 is already a demanding one, but Columns 4-7 show 
that the key findings are robust to even narrower comparisons. Column 4 includes 
fixed effects for the location of projects – the 5,248 unique villages and 
neighborhoods in which the projects are located – in order to address concerns that 
projects might be sorted into fund sources according to unobserved within-district 
heterogeneity across locations. Even after controlling for all the observed and 
unobserved features of these narrowly defined locations, there is still a gap of 11.7 
percentage points between the completion probability of DDF and DACF projects, 
and another 9.0 percentage points between DACF and GETFund projects. To test 
whether differences are being driven by within-type variation in the size or 
Table 1: Project Fund Source and Completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All         
projects
All         
projects
All         
projects
All         
projects
Schools      
only
All         
projects
Offices & 
staff 
housing
DACF -0.0186 -0.00364 -0.00101 -0.0220 -0.0243 -0.0888 -0.0632
(0.0409) (0.0247) (0.0255) (0.0429) (0.0418) (0.0525) (0.0454)
DDF 0.0907 0.120** 0.122** 0.0949* 0.111* -0.0143 0.0173
(0.0613) (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0412) (0.0499) (0.0509) (0.0591)
GETFund -0.218** -0.201** -0.146** -0.112* -0.108* -0.181** -0.163*
(0.0688) (0.0365) (0.0321) (0.0439) (0.0418) (0.0600) (0.0706)
Classroom block additional facilities
"Ancillary facilities" -0.0633*
(0.0261)
Latrine -0.0198
(0.0605)
Office/ Store/ Library 0.0249
(0.0264)
Constant 0.464** 0.515** 0.408** 0.611** 0.379** 0.823** 0.594**
(0.0588) (0.0212) (0.0600) (0.145) (0.0540) (0.195) (0.0474)
Coeff. equality tests (prob > F)
DDF = DACF 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.166 0.102
DACF = GETFund 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.050 0.192 0.109
DDF = GETFund 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.014
Observations 13,339 13,339 13,339 10,420 4,204 8,801 2,066
R-squared 0.031 0.217 0.244 0.699 0.281 0.765 0.306
Fixed effects
District Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Yes
Contractor Yes
Project characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: Dependent variable is project completion. Project characteristics are construction type (construction/ 
maintenance) and project year indicators (based on manual linking). Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at 
district level in Columns 1-3, 5, and 7, location level in Column 4, and contractor in Column 6.
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complexity of the project, Column 5 restricts the sample to the construction of school 
buildings only, with number of units in the classroom block controlled for in the 
project type fixed effects and additional control variables indicating whether the 
classroom block is being constructed together with various types of additional 
facilities, such as latrines or offices. 85  This specification leaves the estimated 
differences between fund sources almost unchanged, and they remain highly 
significant.  
 
Column 6 estimates the model with fixed effects for the 4,546 unique contractors that 
executed the projects – the fund source coefficients are thus effectively estimated 
within the 15.9 percent of contractors that executed projects from more than one fund 
source.86 Even with this extremely demanding specification, the differences between 
the DDF-DACF and DACF-GETFund coefficients are still 7.4 and 9.2 percentage 
points, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the ten percent level. It is 
all the more remarkable that these results hold in this specification since the choice of 
contractor is endogenous to the procurement process, and the selection of qualified 
contractors (as opposed to less qualified but politically connected or bribe-paying 
firms) is itself one of the main channels that could affect implementation. Finally, 
Column 7 shows that the estimated effects remain substantial even when restricting 
the sample to district administration offices and housing for district staff, both types 
of projects for which bureaucrats themselves are the primary beneficiaries, although 
the DACF-DDF and DACF-GETFund coefficient differences are statistically 
significant only at the ten percent level. As discussed below, the continued 
significance of fund source differences even for these non-patronage project types 
suggests that the differences reflect true causal effects of fund source, not merely 
endogenous sorting of projects into fund sources based on considerations of political 
economy or clientelism. Appendix 6 shows that these results are further robust to a 
range of other sample restrictions and control variables. 
 
                                                
85 Appendix 3.3 contains details of the definition and coding of these additional facilities variables. 
86 A total of 5,113 unique contractors appear in the APR dataset, as detailed in Appendix 3.3, but the 
number used to estimate Column 10 of Table 3 is slightly smaller since some contractors implemented 
only non-infrastructure projects (which are excluded from this paper’s analysis) and some projects are 
missing completion data.  
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The estimated differences in completion rates across fund sources are economically as 
well as statistically significant. In the baseline model in Column 3, the estimated gap 
between DDF projects and GETFund projects is 26.7 percentage points. By way of 
comparison, the standard deviation of annual completion rates across districts is 18.8 
percentage points.87 This means that a DDF project in the 25th-percentile district has 
approximately the same likelihood of completion as an equivalent GETFund project 
in the 70th-percentile district. Given that the cross-district differences include all the 
measurable and unobserved effects of leadership, district socioeconomic 
characteristics, political affiliation, and other variables, the magnitude of the 
estimated within-district differences across fund sources is remarkable. 
 
Endogenous sorting and alternative explanations 
The results presented in Table 1 show a significant and robust association between 
project fund source and project completion but, in the absence of experimental 
variation or convincing instrumental variables for fund source assignment, these 
associations are not cleanly identified as causal. In particular, the estimated 
differences between fund sources could be biased upwards if there is endogenous 
sorting of projects into fund sources based on unobservable project attributes. 
Although the scope for this is reduced by the unusually comprehensive set of controls 
for observables I am able to use, a selection effect could exist if there were some type 
of unobservable within-location variation in community attributes that are correlated 
with completion probability and according to which projects are endogenously sorted 
into fund sources. Local ethnic or partisan composition (Besley et al 2004; Ichino and 
Nathan 2013; Nathan 2015) could be one such source of unobserved heterogeneity: 
politicians might care more about delivering projects to residents in one part of the 
location and therefore allocate projects for that area into a fund source with a higher 
completion rate. Part of the estimated difference among fund sources would then be 
due to these omitted unobservable factors rather than any causal effect of the fund 
source itself. 
 
                                                
87 These district-level completion rates are calculated for the 59 districts for which three years of APR 
data are available. 
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To investigate the potential that such a selection effect could be driving the results, I 
build on the coefficient stability approach developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber 
(2005), Bellows and Miguel (2009), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Gonzalez and 
Miguel (2015), and Oster (2015). The intuition behind this approach is that one way 
to gauge the potential impact of selection on unobservables is to examine how 
regression coefficients react to the inclusion of observable control variables; if the 
inclusion of powerful controls has only a small effect on the coefficient of interest, 
then selection on unobservables would have to be extremely strong in order to explain 
away the estimated coefficient. While such an effect cannot be ruled out, this 
approach can give a sense of how plausible the alternative selection explanation is and 
thus how robust the estimated coefficient is likely to be.  
 
To examine the potential for project selection into fund sources based on 
unobservable within-location heterogeneity, I compare the estimated differences 
across fund sources across two different regression specifications: a “restricted” 
regression that uses fixed effects at district level, as well as controls for year, project 
type, and project characteristics (the baseline regression from Table 1, Column 3); and 
an “unrestricted” regression, which uses fixed effects at the location rather than 
district level. The decrease in estimated coefficient differences between these two 
specifications reveals the degree of project selection into fund sources across 
locations – that is, the extent to which projects from “better” fund sources are targeted 
to “better” locations in the district.88 The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show 
that moving from district to location controls does decrease the estimated differences 
among fund sources, but for the DDF-DACF comparison these movements are quite 
small relative to the effect size: the coefficient difference decreases from 13.2 
percentage points to 11.7 in Panel (a) using a common sample, or from 12.3 to 11.7 in 
Panel (b) that makes use of all observations. The movements in the DACF-GETFund 
and DDF-GETFund differences are somewhat larger – 13.5 to 9.0 and 26.8 to 20.6 
percentage points, respectively. These movements provide an estimate of the degree 
of selection on observables. 
                                                
88 However, a selection process of this nature would only bias the estimated differences upwards, not 
make them zero, since the rationale for the sorting of projects into fund sources is precisely that some 
fund sources have higher completion rates than others. 
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To see how strong selection on unobservable within-location heterogeneity would 
need to be in order to explain away the estimated effect, I calculate the ratio of the 
estimated effect (from the “unrestricted” specification with location controls) to the 
reduction in the effect due to selection on observables. The simple ratio – calculated 
following Altonji et al (2005), Bellows and Miguel (2009), and Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) – is presented in Column 3.89 Oster (2015) refers to this ratio as 
the coefficient of proportionality, !.90 It implies that selection of projects into fund 
sources on within-location unobservable heterogeneity would have to be between 
1.627 and 19.964 times stronger than the selection across locations in order to explain 
away the entire estimated differences among fund sources.  
 
However, Oster (2015) and Gonzalez and Miguel (2015) observe that this simple ratio 
relies on strong implicit assumptions about the covariance properties of the sets of 
observable and unobservable covariates with the dependent variable, and show that 
changes in the coefficients between the restricted and unrestricted regressions should 
be scaled by movements in the R-squared. This correction requires making an 
assumption about RMAX, the maximum possible percentage of variation in the 
dependent variable that could be explained by a notional regression with the full set of 
observable and unobservable explanatory variables; while 1 is an upper bound, RMAX 
may well be below 1 due to measurement error or, as this paper does, using a linear 
estimator on a binary dependent variable.91 
 
                                                
89 The simple ratio in Column 3 is calculated as:  !!!"!!"#$ = !!!!"!!!!"#$!!!!"!!!!"#$ ! !!!!"!!!!"#$   
where !!!!" is the estimated DDF coefficient from the unrestricted regression, !!!!" is the estimated 
DDF coefficient from the unrestricted regression, and so on. 
90 I follow Oster (2015) in notating this coefficient as !. 
91 For Columns 4-7, the corrected proportionality coefficient is calculated as: 
 !!!"!!"#$ = !!!!"!!!!"#! ∗ !!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!"#$ ∗ !!"#!!!!   
where !!!  is the R-squared of the unrestricted regression and !!! is the R-squared of the restricted 
regression. 
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Table 2: Coefficient stability and potential selection on unobservables 
  Coefficient of proportionality ! calculated under  
different RMAX assumptions 
 
Restricted 
specification 
(District FE) 
Unrestricted 
specification 
(Location FE) 
No RMAX 
correction  Reliability ratio 
Binary DV 
correction 
Cutoff from 
randomized 
data 
Most 
conservative 
case 
Altonji et al, 
Bellows & 
Miguel, Nunn 
& Wantch. 
Gonzalez & 
Miguel (2015) 
using Baird et 
al (2008)  Oster (2015)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel (a): Common sample      
DDF – DACF 0.132 0.117 7.668 3.704 2.122 1.777 1.240 
 (0.026) (0.043)      
DACF – GETFund 0.135 0.09 1.950 2.768 1.585 1.327 0.926 
 (0.032) (0.047)      
DDF - GETFund 0.268 0.206 3.374 3.230 1.850 1.549 1.081 
 (0.035) (0.048)      
R2 0.278 0.699      
RMAX   - 0.800 0.875 0.909 1.000 
Observations 10,420 10,420      
Panel (b): All observations      
DDF – DACF 0.123 0.117 19.964 4.305 2.466 2.065 1.441 
 (0.023) (0.043)      
DACF – GETFund 0.145 0.09 1.627 2.800 1.604 1.343 0.937 
 (0.03) (0.047)      
DDF - GETFund 0.267 0.206 3.389 3.491 1.999 1.674 1.169 
 (0.031) (0.048)      
R2 0.244 0.699      
RMAX   - 0.800 0.875 0.909 1.000 
Observations 13,339 10,420      
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at district (Column 1) or location (Column 2) level. Both the restricted and unrestricted regressions also include 
year and project type fixed effects and project characteristic controls (see Table 1 for details).  
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I therefore present four additional sets of proportionality coefficients calculated under 
different assumptions about RMAX: a value of 0.8 proposed by Gonzalez and Miguel 
(2015) based on reliability ratios from resurveys in Baird et al (2008), which is a 
conservative estimate of survey measurement error (Column 4)92; a correction I 
develop for the mechanical error introduced by using a linear estimator on a binary 
dependent variable (Column 5)93; a cutoff proposed by Oster (2015) based on 
experimental studies where selection is random (Column 6) 94 ; and a most 
conservative case where RMAX = 1 (Column 7). The corrected proportionality 
coefficients only drop below 1 – the robustness threshold proposed by Oster (2015) – 
for one comparison, the most conservative case for the DACF–GETFund difference 
(!!= 0.926 in the common sample, ! = 0.937 in the full sample). For the DDF-DACF 
comparison that is of most interest, the corrected ! values range from 1.240 to 4.305. 
 
For selection on unobservable within-location heterogeneity to be explaining the 
differences across fund sources, then, would require that this within-location selection 
process is from one and four times stronger than the selection process across 
locations. To further assess the plausibility of this, consider that the within-location 
                                                
92 Baird et al (2008) resurveyed the same individuals in a rural Kenyan sample at a three-month 
interval, and found that the auto-correlation of a simple, objective, time-invariant response (father’s 
education) was in the region of 0.8. Gonzalez and Miguel (2005) therefore propose 0.8 as a best-case 
RMAX for survey data in a rural African setting, while noting that other high quality data sources (e.g. 
US labor market surveys) also have reliability ratios in the range of 0.7 – 0.9, and that in Africa many 
datasets on economic outcomes exhibit autocorrelations as low as 0.2; see also McKenzie (2012). 
93 The linear probability model (LPM) generates an R-squared less than 1 regardless of the goodness-
of-fit, since the dependent variable is binary but the predictions !" are continuous. The resulting R-
squared thus depends on the strength of the model, as well as on unexplained variation introduced 
mechanically. Calculating an RMAX requires separating out this mechanical component of the error, 
which depends on the distribution of the dependent variable and the predicted !". I do so empirically 
by using the unrestricted regression to generate binary predicted values that match the distribution of 
the dependent variable, then re-running the unrestricted regression with these binary predicted values 
as the dependent variable. The resulting R-squared is 0.875. This value is therefore a mechanical RMAX 
for the use of the LPM on the unrestricted regression. 
94 Oster (2015) uses her method to recalculate coefficient bounds from a sample of experimental 
papers, where selection should be random and thus any coefficient movements due to the introduction 
of additional observables should be due to noise rather than an actual selection effect. She calculates 
that a value of !!"# = 1.3 ∗ !!!!  allows her to retain the results of 90 percent of experimental studies. 
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local partisan geography hypothesis discussed above relies on localities being 
sufficiently large that projects can be club goods accessible only to favored clients 
rather than public goods accessible to all residents of the location. Since the most 
common location definitions are village names (for rural areas) and neighborhood 
names (for urban areas), however, it is unlikely that many of them are larger than the 
catchment area of a school (for example), especially in contexts where existing 
service access and provision is low. While it is not presently possible to link project 
location to demographic information at the sub-district level, a very rough calculation 
suggests an upper bound on the mean population of these locations of 3,000 to 
5,000.95 While the possibility that infrastructure projects are locally excludable even 
within these relatively narrow geographic areas cannot be ruled out, it nonetheless 
seems implausible that sorting of projects into fund sources in order to engage in 
within-location targeting of projects could lead to differential completion rates across 
fund sources of the magnitude observed. Finally, large differences in completion rates 
are observed even for types of projects that are not normally associated with 
patronage because the district administration itself is the main beneficiary, as Column 
7 of Table 1 shows. While this does not exclude the possibility that other project types 
are subject to highly localized targeting, it nonetheless suggests that this effect is not 
driving the results. 
 
I also find little support for other alternative explanations for the observed differences 
among fund sources that – while not inconsistent with fund source having a causal 
effect on project completion – emphasize other mechanisms. One possibility is that 
the DDF’s higher completion rates are simply due to prompt and full release of funds 
to districts, as opposed to the delays that often characterize the Ministry of Finance’s 
releases to the DACF and GETFund secretariats. While district-level data on 
                                                
95 For the 56 districts that reported at least some project locations and for which three years of APR 
data are available, the average number of locations is 46.1, giving a mean population per location of 
3,350 (based on the 2010 Census). The number of projects (mean population per project) for 
Metropolitan Assemblies (the most urbanized) in this sub-set is 160.0 (4,610), for Municipal 
Assemblies is 53.9 (3,031), and for District Assemblies (the most rural) is 38.4 (3,380). However since 
some locations presumably did not have projects in the period 2011-13 and thus do not appear in the 
dataset, the actual number of locations per district (and thus population per location) is likely to be 
even higher (lower) than this. 
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allocations and actual releases are not available, Figure 7 shows that there is little 
correlation between aggregate budget outturns for each fund source – which vary 
strongly across years – and annual completion rates for projects – which vary little 
across years. Since funds are released simultaneously to all districts, the non-release 
of funds cannot be driving the observed differences.   
 
 
Figure 7: Fund Source Completion Rates and Budget Outturns 
 
 
 
Another potential explanation of the results is that fund source-level completion rates 
are driven not by the institutional mechanisms through which they implement policy, 
but by politicians anticipating differences in voters’ attribution of projects from 
different fund sources. For example, politicians might care more about completing 
projects for which voters think politicians are directly responsible, and therefore put 
more effort into completing those projects. If this were driving variation across fund 
sources, however, one would not expect the donor-supported DDF to have a higher 
completion rate than the DACF, which is entirely funded and implemented by the 
government. More generally, attribution and accountability considerations are 
important elements of institutional design for service delivery; to the extent that 
attribution effects account for variation in completion across fund sources, then, this is 
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a point about the mechanism through which projects’ fund source affects completion, 
not about whether the institutional design of this fund source affects completion.96 
 
3.5 PARTISAN ALIGNMENT AND PROJECT COMPLETION 
 
The previous section demonstrated that non-completion of projects is a common 
phenomenon in Ghana’s local governments, that the fiscal institutions used to finance 
projects have a robust association with completion probability (and that there is little 
evidence that selection on unobservables explains more than a fraction of this effect), 
and that the patterns and dynamics of project non-completion are qualitatively 
consistent with this paper’s theoretical mechanism that emphasizes how time 
consistency problems on the part of the government interact with the temporal 
dimension of project implementation. In this section, I test the theoretical argument 
more directly by examining how the estimated differences in completion rates across 
fund sources are related to the district’s partisan alignment. The results are consistent 
with the model’s predictions and are not consistent with alternative theoretical 
explanations that focus on tactical targeting strategies or the private incentives of 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
 
Empirical strategy and results 
Recall H3: 
 
                                                
96 However, even assuming that the estimated fund source effects are entirely causal, the marginal 
effect of shifting a project from (for example) DACF to DDF could be smaller than these estimates if it 
induced actors to change their behavior along other margins. For example, if corruption were more 
prevalent in DACF projects than DDF projects due to stricter monitoring, shifting a DACF project to 
the DDF might lead politicians, bureaucrats, or contractors to substitute corrupt behavior towards other 
DACF projects or non-infrastructure activities. Thus the marginal effect could be to increase the 
completion probability of the project in question but reduce that of other DACF projects, although the 
net marginal effect would still be positive (assuming that the demand curve for corruption is downward 
sloping). A related concern is that the effect of shifting projects to more effective fund sources may 
diminish over time, as Olken and Pande (2012) document often occurs in response to anti-corruption 
interventions. This concern may be slightly smaller in this case, since the programs under study are 
well established and thus the effects are already estimated in bureaucratic and political equilibrium.   
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H3: The difference in completion rates between DACF and DDF projects is 
decreasing in the ruling party’s vote share in the district. 
 
The intuition behind this hypothesis is that project fund source should matter less in 
districts with a high ruling party vote share because intra-party ties among the DCE 
and assembly members are more likely to facilitate intertemporal exchange and thus 
reduce the need for institutions that resolve this time consistency problem. I focus 
mainly on the DACF-DDF comparison in this section because these projects are 
selected and implemented simultaneously by the same politicians and bureaucrats, 
thus holding constant the identity, ability, preferences, and private incentives of 
politicians and bureaucrats and isolating the effect of the financing and control 
mechanisms associated with these fund sources. 
 
To test H3, I estimate the equation: 
 2 !!!!!!!!!!,!,!,! = !!,!,!!+ !!,!,!!+ !!,!,! ∗ !! ∗ !+ !! + !! + !! + !!,!,!,! 
 
where all variables and parameters are as in equation (1) from the previous section, 
but with an interaction between fund source indicators !!,!,! and the vote share of the 
current ruling party (the National Democratic Congress, NDC) from the first round of 
the 2008 presidential elections, !!.97 The coefficents ! are the parameters of primary 
interest, in particular the difference between !!!" and !!"#$.   
 
Note that in this baseline specification !! is not included in the model by itself, since 
it is time-invariant and thus captured by the district fixed effect !!. This lets me 
examine (one aspect of) the relationship between !! and the outcome !!,!,!,! while still 
                                                
97 The ruling party’s vote share from the 2008 presidential elections was chosen because these elections 
preceded the entire sample period of 2011-13 and thus serve as an indicator of the underlying 
affiliation of the district, as opposed to the results of the December 2012 elections which could have 
been endogenous to public good delivery in 2011-12. Ghana has a strongly two-party dominant system: 
the NDC and NPP were the top two parties in every constituency nationwide in the 2008 election and 
there were only a small number of constituencies where any third party obtained a significant number 
of votes, so using ruling party vote share is essentially identical to other measures, such as the winning 
margin or distance between the NDC and the main opposition party. 
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using district fixed effects !! to control for all observable and unobservable district 
characteristics that could otherwise confound the observed relationship. While 
numerous papers have studied how partisan composition is related to variations in 
governance outcomes across polities or geographic units, to my knowledge this is the 
first study to examine how polities’ partisan characteristics affect within-polity 
variation in outcomes in this way. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of this estimation. Column 1 shows that by itself, ruling 
party vote share is not significantly correlated with project completion; however, this 
could be due to omitted variable bias from other district characteristics that are 
correlated with both project completion and partisan vote share. More directly 
relevant to H3 is that the relationship between ruling party vote share and project 
completion varies markedly between DDF projects and DACF projects, as the 
interaction terms in Columns 2-5 show.  
 
In Column 2 (without district fixed effects), DACF completion rates are strongly 
increasing in ruling party district vote share, while DDF completion rates are 
essentially unrelated to it. For the specifications in Column 3-6 it is the relative rather 
than absolute correlations that are of interest, and the gap between DDF and DACF 
completion probability is decreasing in the ruling party’s vote share in the district 
across specifications, consistent with H3. The statistical significance of these 
differences varies across specifications, with p-values ranging from 0.018 to 0.137, 
but this is perhaps not surprising given the demanding specification and the likely 
presence of measurement error in both the dependent and explanatory variables, and 
the sign of the effect remains consistent.98 
 
 
                                                
98 The signs of these effects do not change when estimated separately across years rather than pooled 
for any of these specifications (estimates not shown), although the magnitude and significance does 
vary somewhat from year to year. 
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The magnitude of the estimated effects is economically important, and appears to 
explain a significant amount of the DDF-DACF completion rate gap. Moving a 
project from a district with a 32.2 percent ruling party vote share to a district with a 
65.3 percent share (one standard deviation below and above the mean) reduces the 
DDF-DACF completion probability gap from 16.1 to 5.8 percentage points. Figure 
8(a) illustrates this visually. This is consistent with the theoretical mechanism, which 
posits that fiscal institutions can help mitigate the negative consequences of 
distributive conflict for project completion. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All     
projects
All     
projects
All     
projects
All     
projects
All     
projects
Schools 
only
DACF 0.0290 -0.110 -0.129 -0.0938 -0.114 -0.212
(0.0271) (0.0684) (0.0806) (0.0731) (0.0988) (0.113)
DDF 0.138** 0.149 0.0806 0.166* 0.0679 0.105
(0.0306) (0.0786) (0.0889) (0.0719) (0.0926) (0.132)
GETFund -0.102** -0.141 -0.172 -0.00867 -0.137 -0.274*
(0.0340) (0.0874) (0.105) (0.0806) (0.108) (0.117)
NDC vote share 2008 0.00769 -0.0579
(0.0732) (0.114)
Partisan alignment interactions
DACF * NDC vote share 0.287* 0.269 0.156 0.0566 0.413
(0.142) (0.168) (0.135) (0.206) (0.226)
DDF * NDC vote share -0.0274 0.0864 -0.152 -0.184 -0.00288
(0.166) (0.191) (0.148) (0.190) (0.275)
GETFund * NDC vote share 0.0785 0.0570 -0.226 -0.0913 0.323
(0.176) (0.216) (0.147) (0.199) (0.230)
Constant 0.371** 0.411** 0.411** 0.612** 0.819** 0.368**
(0.0868) (0.0991) (0.0594) (0.105) (0.135) (0.0510)
DDF * NDC Voteshare - DACF * NDC Voteshare
     Difference -0.314 -0.182 -0.308 -0.241 -0.416
     [p-value] [0.018] [0.137] [0.056] [0.113] [0.018]
Observations 13,339 13,339 13,339 10,420 8,801 4,204
R-squared 0.109 0.110 0.245 0.700 0.765 0.281
Fixed effects
District Yes Yes Yes
Location Yes
Contractor Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table 3: Vote share and fund source interactions
Note: Dependent variable is project completion. Project characteristics are construction type (construction/ 
maintenance) and project year indicators (based on manual linking). NDC vote share 2008 is the ruling party's 
voteshare in the 2008 presidential elections in the district (or its antecedent district, for districts that split in 2012). 
Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at district level (location- and contractor-level in columns 4 and 5, 
respectively).
 147 
Figure 8: Partisan Alignment Conditions Fund Source Effects 
 
 
 
Interpretation and alternative explanations 
One possible alternative explanation for the contrasting effects of partisan vote share 
on DACF and DDF projects is that the ruling party is intentionally using project 
completion to reward its partisans and punish its opponents, but is constrained in 
doing so on DDF projects by greater oversight. To assess this, we can examine the 
effect of vote share on GETFund projects, since implementation and completion 
decisions for GETFund projects are undertaken directly by the central government 
through a committee with opaque decision-making and reporting processes. If there 
were a deliberate political strategy to use project completion (or non-completion) to 
target or punish particular constituencies, it should be revealed by GETFund project 
completion patterns. Instead, the interaction term coefficients for the GETFund are 
closer to those of the DDF across most specifications, as shown visually by Figure 
8(b).99 While it is not possible to directly assess or rule out the intentional use of 
project completion as a targeting strategy without more fine-grained data, this is 
suggestive evidence that the different effects of partisan vote share on DACF and 
                                                
99 Column 6 in Table 3 is the exception to this pattern. 
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DDF projects are due to the institutions’ effectiveness in mitigating intertemporal 
bargaining failures, rather than a deliberate tactic.  
 
A second alternative theoretical explanation posits that the performance incentives of 
district-level politicians from the ruling party – especially the DCE – are weaker in 
opposition-leaning districts. This could be because there are fewer intra-party 
promotion opportunities in these districts: a common career advancement path for 
DCEs is to become Members of Parliament, but they are unlikely to be elected on the 
ruling party ticket in opposition-leaning districts. Lacking any career incentive to 
perform well, they may choose to use their terms in office to enrich themselves and 
their supporters through corruption, including through graft in project procurement 
and construction.  
 
As an alternative test of the idea that intertemporal bargaining failure among actors 
with divergent distributive preferences can lead to incomplete projects, I therefore re-
estimate Equation 2 with a different proxy for the ease of inter-temporal exchange 
among district-level political actors: ethnic polarization.100 If a district is polarized 
between two large ethnic groups, then ethnic divisions are likely to be salient and this 
may increase distributive pressures and grievance and thus decrease actors’ ability to 
sustain intertemporal bargains over project sequencing. 
 
 
 
                                                
100 Ethnic diversity is often argued to undermine public good provision (Easterly and Levine 1999; 
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005) and foster conflict (Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005), although other studies dispute this (Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg 2013), 
and Ichino and Nathan (2013) argue that the political effects of ethnicity can depend on local ethnic 
geographies at the sub-district level, particularly with respect to the targeting of locally non-excludable 
public goods like infrastructure projects. Rather than weighing in on this debate, I use ethnic diversity 
as a proxy for more general forms of latent distributive conflict in polities; to the extent it is a weak 
proxy, this should bias any findings toward zero. I use ethnic polarization (calculated following 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, using the Ghana Statistical Service’s primary ethnic categories and 
data from the 2010 Population and Housing Census) rather than ethnic fractionalization because 
polarization maps more readily both onto the two-party dominant nature of Ghanaian politics; using 
fractionalization produces the same patterns, albeit somewhat weaker. 
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Figure 9: Fund Source Interaction with Ethnic Polarization 
 
 
 
Consistent with this, Figure 9 shows that the interaction between project fund source 
and ethnic polarization exhibits the same patterns as district vote share: the gap 
between DDF and DACF completion rates is largest when exchange is difficult 
(ethnic polarization is high), and the effect of polarization on GETFund projects is 
similar to that of the DDF. Although the precise mechanisms through which ethnic 
polarization affects actors’ ability to sustain intertemporal exchange is likely to be 
different than those discussed above for partisan vote shares, this is nonetheless a 
useful robustness check, especially since ethnic polarization and NDC vote share are 
negatively correlated in the data and the results are thus based on different 
components of variation in the underlying construct. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has sought to draw theoretical and empirical connections between the 
literatures on policy implementation, distributive politics, and fiscal institutions. 
While these literatures have each made major contributions to understanding public 
service delivery in developing countries, the relationship among them is little 
explored. This lacuna is surprising since the literature on the development of macro-
historical institutions and state capacity has long emphasized that issues of 
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distribution and efficiency are inseparable, and that the function of economic 
institutions is precisely to resolve the tensions between distribution and efficiency 
created by commitment problems (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). This 
paper demonstrates that this is also true at the level of individual development 
projects, with implications for studies in these fields that neglect these relationships. 
 
These findings also have relevance for the design of fiscal institutions and donor 
programs, as well as public sector reform more broadly. Not only do fiscal institutions 
have a significant influence on project outcomes, they also mediate – and in some 
circumstances can reduce – the potential negative efficiency consequences of 
distributive conflict on project allocation. This is a fertile area for future theory 
development and empirical work, and one with immense practical relevance. Reforms 
to improve bureaucratic capacity and independence or to increase political 
accountability have proved to be slow and uncertain, but this paper has shown that 
different fiscal institutions can lead to different project outcomes even when project 
selection and implementation is conducted by the same politicians and bureaucrats. 
These findings are hopeful, in that they suggest that efforts by donors and finance 
ministries alike to use their control of resource delivery to improve the operational 
efficiency of other government bureaucracies can be successful. While I focus on the 
effects of fiscal institutions rather than the factors that shape their emergence, this 
study also echoes the conclusion of the literatures on budget institution reform and 
soft sub-national budget constraints that the operation of fiscal institutions is deeply 
political (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003; Rodden 2006; Andrews 2013). 
Understanding the relationship between these political and distributive pressures, the 
efficiency of policy implementation, and fiscal institutions is an important frontier for 
research on the political economy of public service delivery. 
 
3.7 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This paper's main theoretical contribution to the public management literature on 
infrastructure delivery is its development of a theoretical mechanism to explain 
unfinished projects that is rooted in distributive conflict. While a growing literature on 
infrastructure delivery examines how management practices, project characteristics, 
and institutional incentives can shape project implementation (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and 
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Buhl 2004; Flyvbjerg 2007, 2013; Budzier and Flyvbjerg 2013; Rasul and Rogger 
2014), this paper focuses instead on the politics of project selection and 
implementation as a potential cause of implementation problems. In this respect it 
builds on the case study-based public administration literature on policy 
implementation, in which changing political and technical contexts and intertemporal 
bargaining during implementation feature prominently (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973, Grindle 1980, Cornell 2014). This theoretical emphasis also distinguishes it 
from the large body of work that focuses on corruption as a cause or mechanism of 
public service delivery failure (e.g. Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2007; 
Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen 2014). 
 
The paper also contributes to the budgeting and public finance literature on fiscal 
institutions, fiscal federalism, and fiscal decentralization, which examines how fiscal 
institutions affect fiscal outcomes such as aggregate spending and borrowing 
(Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987; von Hagen and Harden 1995; Alesina, Hausmann, 
Hommes, and Stein 1999; Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003; Rodden 2006). In 
contrast, I focus on the operational effects of different fiscal institutions, thus helping 
to move this literature beyond its overwhelming focus on macro-fiscal outcomes 
(Wehner and de Renzio 2013). This also links with the economics and political 
science literature on decentralization that studies how variation in the source of public 
funds affects their management and public service outcomes at the sub-national level 
(Fisman and Gatti 2002, Gadenne and Singhal 2014, Gadenne 2015). Whereas the 
sparse empirical literature on this question has focused largely on identifying 
empirical differences in aggregate outcomes (e.g. district-level school enrollment 
rates), my empirical focus is at the project level and is more tightly linked to a 
specific theoretical mechanism. 
 
From the perspective of comparative politics, the paper makes two theoretical 
contributions. The first is to introduce implementation considerations – specifically 
the multi-stage character of infrastructure projects – into the booming literatures on 
distributive politics, clientelism, and the political economy of public service provision 
in developing countries (Besley et al 2004, Banful 2011, Franck and Rainer 2012, 
Golden and Min 2013, Kramon and Posner 2013, Jablonski 2014, Burgess et al 2015, 
Harding 2015). Not only is poor project implementation substantively relevant, but it 
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is also poorly explained by the foundational theories of distributive politics on which 
this literature is based (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Dixit 
and Londregan 1996), which instead focus exclusively on policy choice. This 
theoretical insight also has important methodological implications: whereas the 
existing empirical literature takes the observed distribution of inputs into or outputs 
from public service delivery as revealed measures of politicians’ tactical targeting 
strategies, I point out that the multi-stage implementation process associated with 
many types of public goods may introduce systematic differences between these two 
measures.  
 
To make sense of the poor observed policy implementation outcomes, the paper 
introduces a second theoretical contribution: instead of modeling policy decisions as a 
tactical choice by a unitary incumbent who faces commitment problems with respect 
to voters (Robinson and Torvik 2005, Keefer 2007, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008, Keefer 
and Khemani 2009), I analyze them as the outcome of a collective choice process 
amongst multiple political actors (district assembly members and the DCE) who face 
commitment problems with respect to each other over the future distribution of policy 
choices. Combined with political instability – in this case arising from the inherently 
unstable nature of log-rolling coalitions (Riker and Brams 1973, Weingast and 
Marshall 1988) rather than the possibility of political alternation after an election that 
characterizes much of the other theoretical literature – these two theoretical elements 
explain how project implementation could be poor even when all politicians have 
strong incentives to deliver projects.  Finally, by showing how fiscal institutions can 
mitigate the negative efficiency consequences of these intertemporal bargaining 
failures, this paper is related to the American politics literature that shows that 
bureaucracies mediate the outcome of distributive political dynamics (Bertelli and 
Grose 2009, Berry and Gersen 2010, Gordon 2011, Ting 2012), extending it into a 
new context and proposing a new theoretical mechanism. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORTS 
 
Figure A1: Annual Progress Report Sample Page 
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Figure A2: Storage of APRs in National Development Planning Commission Library 
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APPENDIX 3.2: APR SAMPLE BALANCE AND MISSING DATA 
 
The coverage of the Annual Progress Report (APR) database is remarkably high, 
given that most had to be located in hard copy in the offices of the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC) in Accra or of the Regional 
Coordinating Councils (RCCs) in the ten regional capitals. Altogether 479 APRs were 
located. The maximum notional number of APRs for the period 2011-13 would be 
602: 170 for 2011, 216 each for 2012 and 2013. Of these, 407 APRs contained project 
tables with sufficient information to be entered into the database. The final database 
thus covers 67.6 percent of possible district-year observations. Nevertheless, there are 
concerns that reporting could be correlated with other variables of interest, such as 
project completion rates.  
 
As this Appendix shows, however, there is little evidence that reporting completeness 
is correlated with district characteristics. Figure A3 below plots the unweighted means 
and 95 percent confidence intervals of a wide range of variables, by the number of 
APRs that are missing for each district. The most important balancing test is for 
average annual project completion, this study’s main dependent variable. Although it 
is not possible to calculate this for districts with all three APRs missing, there is no 
statistically significant difference in average completion rates across districts with 
different levels of reporting completeness; indeed districts with more incomplete 
reporting have, if anything, slightly higher completion rates, although this difference 
is not statistically significant. This alleviates the concern that estimated national 
project completion rates may be biased upwards due to reporting incompleteness. 
 
The sample also appears to be balanced across the other variables reported in Figure 
A3. In addition to a wide range of demographic, social, and economic variables drawn 
from the 2010 Population and Housing Census, this includes: districts’ scores on the 
Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT) evaluation undertaken to 
assess districts’ compliance with a set of procedural requirements as part of the 
allocation and disbursement procedure for DDF funds; the vote share in the district of 
the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which was the ruling party during the 
sample period, from the 2008 presidential elections; and budget size, as measured by 
the total revenue of the district in 2013. There are no apparent patterns across 
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reporting completeness in any of the variables examined, so there is no evidence that 
the sample coverage of the APR database is biased. 
 
 
Figure A3: APR Sample Balance on Selected Covariates 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, due to the inconsistent reporting formats used by districts in producing 
their APRs, many observations are missing some important variables. Table A1 gives 
an indication of this for a selected number of variables. Although this affects the types 
of analysis that can be done on the data, there is no indication that the missing 
variables are anything other than a result of districts’ use of different formats.  
 
 
 
  
Table A1: Coverage of Key Variables in Dataset
Variable name Obs. Pct. Variable name Obs. Pct.
Project title 14,246          100.0% Contract sum 9,869            69.3%
Completion status 13,339          93.6% Commencement date 5,518            38.7%
Fund source 11,226          78.8% Completion date - expected 5,061            35.5%
Location 11,326          79.5% Completion date - actual 1,424            10.0%
Contractor 9,319            65.4% Expenditure to date 6,224            43.7%
Note: See Appendix 3 for full variable descriptions. Percentages are as percent of total core sample (n=14,246).
Non-missing Non-missing
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APPENDIX 3.3: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND CODING 
 
All APR database variables were coded algorithmically from text strings by defining a 
set of word or phrases corresponding to values; the particularities of this process for 
each variable, along with other relevant data and coding notes, are detailed below. 
Project numbers and statistics in this appendix are given at the point of coding, and 
thus may differ from those in the final database from which repeat observations and 
non-infrastructure projects have been excluded. 
 
FundSource 
Project fund source was constructed from APR entries for project’s fund source for 
nearly all observations, although in a small number of cases (178, or 1.1 percent) 
there was no dedicated entry for fund source but fund sources were named in the 
project title. These were combined, and then coded into fund source categories 
according to a set of text strings commonly occurring in the data – e.g. for DACF, 
these were “DACF”, “COMMON FUND”, “D A C F”, and “CF”. All projects where 
the fund source was listed as the district itself were coded as using internally 
generated funds (IGF), together with those where IGF was directly identified as the 
fund source. The “Other donor” category comprises 51 sources, each of which 
accounts for only a small fraction of the total. Some of these are clearly identifiable – 
e.g. “USAID”, “EU”, “WORLD VISION” – while others are vague – e.g. “DONOR”, 
“NGO”, “CHINESE GRANT”. “Other GoG” includes all fund sources associated 
with central government other than the GETFund and Road Fund: e.g. “MOE” 
(Ministry of Education), “GOG” (Government of Ghana – typically used to mean 
central government in the Ghanaian context), “SECTOR MINISTRY”. The 
“Other/Unknown” category includes all projects for which no fund source was 
reported, as well as projects that could not be assigned to one of the other categories – 
most notably a small number of projects (143) funded by the local Member of 
Parliament (MP) using the minor allocation of the DACF which is disbursed to them 
as a constituency development fund, and 70 projects for which the “community” was 
listed as a fund source. All projects with more than one identifiable fund source 
(about 3 percent) were coded as “Multiple”. 
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ProjectType 
Project type was constructed using sets of commonly used text strings in the project 
title to first group projects into sixteen types of infrastructure projects: 
 
• Agriculture: dams, irrigation, dug-outs; 
• Borehole: boreholes, wells; 
• Clinic: clinics, health centres, hospitals, wards; 
• Construction – other: abattoirs, computer centers, libraries, taxi ranks, lorry 
parks, community centers, sports stadiums, light industrial areas, warehouses; 
• Culvert: culverts, drains, ditches, gutters; 
• Electricity: electrification, substations; 
• Latrine: latrines, Kumasi ventilated improved pits (KVIPs), toilets, water 
closets; 
• Market: market stalls, stores, sheds, meat shops; 
• Office: administration blocks, assembly/town/council halls, courts, police 
stations, fire stations; 
• Road: roads (paved, graveled, or dirt), bridges, spot improvements, speed 
humps, paving works; 
• School: classroom blocks, kindergartens, nurseries, early childhood 
development centres; 
• School – other: dormitories, dining halls, hostels, school feeding kitchens; 
• Staff housing: bungalows, guest houses, accommodation blocks, residences, 
quarters; 
• Streetlights 
• Waste management: refuse dumps, rubbish storage; and 
• Water: water systems, water harvesting, water supply, reservoirs and storage, 
pipe-borne water works, water distribution. 
 
In addition, two categories of non-infrastructure projects were constructed but not 
included in the analysis: 
 
• Procurement: purchase, supply, distribution, and furnishing (e.g. tractors, 
desks, computers), acquiring land for projects, equipment of facilities; and 
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• Services: a wide variety of activities related to service-provision and other 
non-infrastructure activities, e.g. training, vaccination campaigns, capacity 
building, tax collection, celebrations, monitoring, public education, 
sponsoring. 
 
The guiding principle in distinguishing between infrastructure and non-infrastructure 
projects was that projects involving physical transformation were coded as 
infrastructure (e.g. building a classroom block), whereas projects consisting only of 
related activities that did not themselves involve physical transformation (e.g. 
acquiring land to build a classroom block, supplying a classroom block with 
textbooks) were coded as non-infrastructure. 
 
This algorithmic coding resulted in unique project types for 74.4 percent of projects, 
while 12.8 percent were not assigned a type and another 12.8 percent were assigned 
two or more types. These 5,569 projects were manually inspected and disambiguated 
if possible, or if the project genuinely straddled two types it was coded as “multiple”. 
 
Finally, the category “school” was sub-divided into six categories according to the 
size of the classroom block: five categories for 2-, 3-, 4-, 6-, and 12-unit classroom 
blocks, and a sixth residual category for classroom blocks of indeterminate size, or 
reported projects which actually involved more than one discrete structure (e.g. 
construction of two 3-unit classroom blocks). Number of units was coded 
algorithmically by defining a set of 41 common text string permutations used to 
denote construction of a single classroom block (e.g. “1NO 3-UNIT [CLASSROOM 
BLOCK]”,  “[CONSTRUCTION] OF 3-UNIT [CLASSROOM BLOCK]”). 
 
Prior to analysis, projects with missing type or coded as “services”, “procurement” 
were dropped. The project categories used in the analysis therefore comprise the 
fifteen non-school infrastructure types listed above; six types of schools (five 
according to classroom block size, and one residual category); and the type “multiple” 
comprising all projects that could not be manually coded into a unique type.  
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ConstructionType 
Project titles often include a phrase that identifies whether the project constitutes new 
(greenfield) construction, or repair, maintenance, renovation, or rehabilitation of an 
existing project that had been completed previously. The former category was coded 
as projects including the general text string “CONSTRUCTION OF” and 
abbreviations or misspellings of this; project type-specific construction verbs such as 
“DRILLING OF”, “PAVING”, and “SPOT IMPROVEMENT”; and strings indicating 
that the project is a greenfield project in its second or subsequent year, such as 
“COMPLETION OF”, “CONTINUE”, and “CLADDING”. (The APRs are 
inconsistent in the extent to which they alter these prefaces for a given project across 
years (i.e. whether they change “CONSTRUCTION OF” in the first year of a project 
to “COMPLETION OF” in its second year), so these were coded together as 
greenfield projects.) Project titles containing general phrases such as 
“MAINTENANCE”, “REPAIR”, “RENOVATION”, and “REHABILITATION”, or 
project type-specific phrases such as “DESILTING”, “RE-ROOFING”, 
“RESURFACING”, and “RESHAPING” were coded as 
maintenance/repair/renovation projects. Altogether 76.4 percent of projects were 
coded as greenfield construction, 11.9 percent as maintenance/repair/renovation, and 
the remaining 11.6 percent could not be uniquely identified as either type. 
 
ProjectCompletion 
Project completion was coded as a binary variable by combining information from 
three raw variables, of which one or two are typically reported in each APR: 
ProjectStatus (e.g. “COMPLETED”, “INSTALLED AND IN USE,” “100 WORK 
DONE”), Remarks (similar), and PercentWork (on the scale 0-100; 100 coded as 
complete). Projects were coded as complete if they were at a stage where physical 
construction work had been completed, regardless of whether they had been formally 
handed over, furnished, commissioned, and put into use – for example 
“COMPLETED YET TO BE FURNISHED AND COMMISSIONED” was coded as 
complete. This yielded a unique completion coding for 91.6 percent of observations; 
the remainder were disambiguated by visual inspection if possible, and given a 
missing value if it was impossible to determine the project’s status conclusively.  
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Although the gap between physical completion and putting the facility into use is of 
potential interest, physical completion was chosen as a cutoff point for the purposes of 
the APR database because: 1) the status of post-construction activities like furnishing, 
commissioning, and use are reported inconsistently in the APRs; and 2) the analytical 
focus of this paper is on infrastructure project construction, not subsequent service 
provision using those facilities. 
 
Contractor 
A total of 6,798 unique contractor names are listed in the APR database for 10,701 
infrastructure projects. However, many of these are clearly the same contractor but 
with different spellings (e.g. “WRKS” for “WORKS”), abbreviations (e.g. “LTD.” for 
“LIMITED”), or omissions (e.g. dropping “LIMITED” or “INC.”). In order to 
combine these, contractor names were stripped of these and other generic elements of 
company names (e.g. “ENTERPRISE”, “TRADING”, “MESSRS.”, “M/S”, 
“COMPANY”), as well as punctuation marks and spaces. This reduced the number of 
unique contractor names from 6,798 to 5,113. Using these corrected contractor names 
rather than the raw names slightly changes the point estimates on fund source 
regression coefficients, but not the differences between these coefficients, which are 
the quantities of interest. 
 
District 
In mid-2012, 45 of Ghana’s 170 districts were split to create 46 new districts (one 
district was split into three), leaving a total of 216 districts. The 46 new districts were 
all entirely contained within a single parent district, so there was no realignment of 
borders between districts. The 2011 and 2013 APRs thus reflect the 170 and 216 
districts, respectively. For 2012 districts reported according to the new (216) district 
names, although many of the newly created districts did not report as they had only 
been in existence for approximately six months and were still waiting offices, 
personnel, etc. This creates some concern about duplications or omissions in the 
reporting of projects in split districts that started prior to the split, and it is unclear 
how consistently these matters were handled across districts. However, restricting the 
sample to districts that did not split in 2012 does not affect any of the results 
presented above, and the regression results are robust to the inclusion of district-year 
fixed effects that would capture any disruption caused by these administrative splits, 
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so the potential data concerns created by the district splits do not appear to affect the 
analysis.  
 
For purposes of project linking and fixed effects, the post-split “parent” district (the 
one that maintained the existing district capital, political leadership, and the majority 
of its administrative staff) is treated as the same district as the pre-split combined 
district, regardless of whether it changed its name, while the new “child” district is 
treated as a new district. 
 
The other secondary data sources drawn on by this paper differ in whether they report 
the old 170 or new 216 districts for 2012. This means that in some cases (e.g. with 
budget data) APR data from a post-split 2012 district is matched to other secondary 
data from a pre-split 2012 combined district. Of data sources that are time invariant 
over 2011-13, the District Medium Term Development Plans (DMTDPs) and pre-
2012 electoral data both use the 170 districts, while the 2010 Population and Housing 
Census initially used the 170 districts but has been recoded to correctly reflect the 
new 216 districts. 
 
Classroom Block Additional Facilities 
For all classroom blocks for which it was possible to identify the number of units (2, 
3, 4, 6, or 12), three indicator variables representing additional facilities included in 
the project were defined: latrines and toilets (project titles including the strings 
“LATRINE”, “TOILET”, “KVIP”, etc.); offices/stores/libraries (“OFFICE”, 
“STORE”, “COMMON ROOM”, “LIBRARY”); and general ancillary facilities 
(various spellings and abbreviations of “ANCILLARY”). These variables were not 
coded as mutually exclusive, although it is not common for one project to combine 
multiple types of ancillary facilities. A residual variable was defined for the 38.0 
percent of projects that do not appear to include any of these ancillary facilities.  
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APPENDIX 3.4: ATTRITION IN PROJECT LINKING 
 
Because very few districts assign unique tracking numbers to projects, linking 
projects across years had to be done manually. For each district for which all three 
years of data were available, records of projects coded as being in the same location 
(e.g. village, neighborhood) in different years were visually inspected according to 
their project title, fund source, completion status, contract sum, and other potentially 
identifying information, and linked if they were obviously the same project. 
Conditional on being incomplete in 2011 or 2012, only 33.8 percent of projects could 
be identified in the following year, indicating a high degree of attrition in reporting 
and linking. This gives rise to two concerns: first, differential attrition rates across 
fund sources could bias the within-district estimates of fund sources completion 
rates. 101  Second, attrition is likely to be correlated with project completion (if 
bureaucrats stop reporting unfinished projects that have been abandoned) and thus 
poses a challenge for estimating the overall completion rate.  
 
To investigate the first possibility, I construct an attrition indicator variable equal to 
one if a project that is incomplete in 2011 or 2012 can be linked to the same project’s 
record in the following year (2012 or 2013, respectively), and zero otherwise. This 
variable is defined only for projects in districts that have three years of APR data. I 
then use this as the dependent variable in an attrition probability model, estimated as a 
linear probability model, where the key variables of interest are fund source indicator 
variables.  
 
The results are presented in Table A1. Column 1 estimates the model with no controls 
and indicator variables only for the three major fund sources; Column 2 adds the 
baseline set of district, year, and project type fixed effects, plus project characteristics; 
Column 3 adds indicator variables for the remaining minor fund sources; and Column 
4 estimates the model for school buildings only. The differences among the 
coefficients on the three major fund sources are small and are not statistically 
                                                
101 Attrition rates also vary across districts, and it is possible that districts interpret the reporting 
mandate in slightly different ways: some may report all projects that were underway in the district, 
whether or not they were active during the year, while others may only report projects that were active 
or included in annual budgets. However, this does not pose a major threat to this paper’s main analyses, 
as the district fixed effects would cancel out district-level differences in attrition. 
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significant in any of the specifications. Among the minor fund sources, projects 
funded by districts’ own Internally Generated Funds (IGF) have the highest attrition 
rates, together with those with multiple fund sources. There is slightly more variation 
across coefficients in the schools only specification in Column 4, but with a reduced 
sample size that creates a great deal of statistical uncertainty about the parameter 
values. Overall, none of these results create cause for concern that this paper’s main 
results are driven by differential reporting attrition rates across project fund sources. 
 
 
 
Table A2: Project Attrition by Fund Source
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All         
projects
All         
projects
All         
projects
Schools       
only
Project fund source
DACF -0.137 -0.004 0.007 -0.016
(0.030)** (0.044) (0.065) (0.119)
DDF -0.107 0.008 0.018 0.061
(0.034)** (0.066) (0.079) (0.123)
GETFund -0.086 -0.033 -0.015 -0.006
(0.028)** (0.067) (0.100) (0.142)
IGF 0.148 0.093
(0.113) (0.160)
Other donor 0.004 0.105
(0.092) (0.147)
Other GoG -0.034 0.297
(0.083) (0.208)
Road Fund 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Multiple 0.132 0.019
(0.117) (0.157)
Constant 0.712 0.613 0.595 0.735
(0.014)** (0.142)** (0.155)** (0.275)*
Coeff. equality tests (prob > F)
DACF = DDF 0.457 0.823 0.847 0.369
DACF = GETFund 0.143 0.604 0.701 0.885
DDF = GETFund 0.585 0.581 0.668 0.424
Observations 2033 2033 2033 780
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Fixed effects
District Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Project type Yes Yes Yes
Project characteristics Yes Yes Yes
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Dependent variable is project attrition - whether a project that is unfinished in a given year 
can be located in the following year's report, conditional on the report being contained in the APR 
database. Other/unknown is omitted fund source category. Project characteristics are construction 
type (construction/maintenace) and project year indicators (based on manual linking). Huber-White 
robust standard errors clustered at district level.
 175 
To address the second concern, I therefore estimate three different sets of completion 
rates, which are almost identical for projects’ first year but diverge thereafter: 
 
• Upper bound. Projects are classified into years (1-3) according to their 
reported year of commencement (e.g. a 2012 observation of a project that 
started in 2011 is in its second year). No correction is made for attrition. 
Sample is all projects with non-missing commencement year. 
• Middle estimate. Projects are classified into years according to manual linking 
(see above). Incomplete projects that cannot be traced to the subsequent year 
are treated as missing in the subsequent year (i.e. no correction is made for 
attrition). Projects that have not been linked to an observation from previous 
year are assumed to be in their first year. Sample is all projects from districts 
for which all three years of data are available. This is the method used in the 
main body of the paper. 
• Lower bound. Same as middle estimate, but incomplete projects that cannot be 
traced to the subsequent year are assumed not to have been finished (i.e. 
attriting observations are treated as incomplete). 
 
The upper bound estimate will be biased upward if unfinished/abandoned projects are 
more likely to attrite from the dataset than completed projects, which is probable. 
Likewise, the lower bound estimate will be biased downward if untraceable projects 
are actually completed in the subsequent year but not reported, or if the projects were 
completed and reported but not linked by the manual tracing methodology. The 
middle estimate is situated between these two but may also be biased, although the 
direction of this bias is unclear a priori. To the extent that the middle and lower 
estimates incorrectly group projects that are in their second or subsequent years but 
are appearing in the dataset for the first time as first-year projects, the first-year 
completion rates may be biased; in practice however this bias appears to be small, as 
the first-year completion rates are very similar under all three estimates. 
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Figure A4: Three Completion Rate Estimates 
 
 
 
Figure A4 presents the three-year completion rates using these different estimation 
methods. The differences in the second and third years among the methods are large, 
although the key qualitative finding (that projects’ completion hazard rate decreases 
after the first year) remains. However, Figure A5 (analogous to Figure 7 in the main 
text) shows that the differences across fund sources vary little across the estimation 
methodologies. This provides further reassurance that the main findings of the paper 
are not affected by concerns over attrition. 
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Figure A4: Project Completion by Fund Source – Alternative Estimates 
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APPENDIX 3.5: SAMPLE PROJECT PHOTOS 
 
Figure A6: Incomplete Staff Bungalow  
 
 
Figure A7: Abandoned Excavation for a Classroom Block, with an Additional 
Unfinished Classroom Block in the Background 
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Figure A8: Unfinished Classroom Block 
 
 
Figure A9: Borehole at a School – In Progress 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: 
 
BUDGET INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IN  
GHANA’S SPENDING MINISTRIES 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Abstract 
 
A large literature investigates the link between budget institutions and performance 
across countries, but little attention has been paid to variation across spending 
ministries within countries. Since these ministries operate under the same formal 
budget institutions and national-level context, they are the ideal sites in which to study 
the gaps between de jure and de facto budget practices, and between budget 
allocations and actual expenditures. These gaps can be substantial, especially in 
developing countries, but are poorly understood. This article demonstrates that there 
is large and systematic variation among spending ministries in Ghana in expenditure 
outturns and volatility, compliance with formal budget processes, and other outcomes 
such as extra-budgetary spending. The findings pose a challenge to theories of budget 
institutions and their reform: not only is there no correlation between procedural 
compliance and budget outcomes, but the drivers of ministries’ budget performance 
are heterogeneous and often idiosyncratic. The existence of substantial variation in the 
quality of budget execution among ministries also has implications for the validity of 
analyses that use either budget allocations or actual expenditure to measure the 
outcomes of policy processes. 
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One Size Does Not Fit All: 
Budget Institutions and Performance in Ghana’s Spending Ministries 
 
Research on budget institutions and performance has largely focused on the role of 
finance ministries, legislatures, and national-level political factors, with the behavior 
and performance of spending ministries treated as a consequence of these higher-level 
institutions. This approach is logical when budgets are well executed and political 
principals have strong control of the bureaucracy and expenditure, but outside wealthy 
democracies these conditions are the exception rather than the norm: in a sample of 45 
mostly developing countries, for instance, Addison (2014) finds that nearly 70 percent 
of ministry budget heads are over- or underspent by 5 percent or more. Even in 
developed and transition countries, budget execution is a complex managerial task 
(Pitsvada 1983; Thompson 1993; Dougherty, Klase, and Song 2003) and budget 
overruns are common for certain types of public organizations (Kornai, Maskin, and 
Roland 2003; Kornai 2009) and projects (Flyvbjerg 2013; Engel, Fischer, and 
Galetovich 2009). Yet there is little theory or systematic evidence on budget 
execution in spending ministries (also referred to as line ministries or spending units) 
and its determinants. What scarce literature does exist (Stasavage and Moyo 2000, 
Simson and Welham 2014) suggests that there may be dramatic differences in budget 
execution among spending ministries even within the same country, but does not 
investigate this within-country variation systematically. 
 
This article seeks to shed new light on these questions by examining variation in the 
quality of budget preparation and execution among spending ministries in Ghana’s 
central government. This variation is particularly interesting because spending 
ministries are all subject to the same formal budget institutions and processes, as well 
as the same national-level political and bureaucratic context. Holding these constant 
brings into focus two prominent themes from recent research on public financial 
management (PFM) reform in developing countries: the widespread existence of 
significant gaps between de jure and de facto budget practices (Andrews 2010a; de 
Renzio, Andrews, and Mills 2011; Wehner and de Renzio 2013), and the importance 
of context and informal institutions in determining performance and reform success 
(Hallergberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009; Andrews 2013; Cangiano, Curristine, and 
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Lazare 2013).102 These studies have largely relied on country case studies and cross-
national comparisons, with the result that the discussion of de facto practices remains 
somewhat impressionistic, raising doubts about whether broad generalizations about 
informality might sometimes conceal as much as they reveal. Killick, for example, 
calls Ghana’s expenditure budget a “façade”, “essentially ritualistic, with little bearing 
on reality” (2005, 1) – is this extreme emphasis on informality empirically justified? 
By examining variation in performance and practices among spending ministries 
within one country, this article adds empirical precision to the study of the 
relationship between the design and implementation of budget systems, and 
demonstrates that contextual factors and informal practices can vary dramatically 
even within the same country. 
 
Empirically, the article begins by using fiscal data to confirm that ministry-level 
expenditure outturns in Ghana are characterized by large deviations from allocations, 
but that the extent of expenditure overruns and volatility varies widely across 
ministries. To understand the mechanisms and causes behind this variation in a 
context where the availability of administrative data is very limited (as is the case in 
most developing countries), the article then draws on structured interviews with 23 
budget schedule officers in Ghana’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) to construct two 
budget performance indices for each spending ministry: a Processes Index, reflecting 
how well the ministry fulfills the procedural requirements of budget preparation and 
execution; and an Outcomes Index, reflecting the incidence of extra-budgetary 
requests, accumulation of avoidable arrears, and strategic manipulation of activity 
costings. Both indices reveal significant variation among ministries. On the 
procedural side, some ministries execute formal budget processes almost perfectly, 
while others hardly carry them out at all. The same is true of budget outcomes: some 
ministries exhibit all the shortcomings of spending over and outside the budget which 
have been challenges for Ghana’s PFM system as a whole, while other ministries are 
models of fiscal discipline. The variation across ministries is not well explained by 
structural factors such as budget size and complexity, expenditure composition, or 
revenue sources. Furthermore, the Processes and Outcomes indices are uncorrelated 
                                                
102 Although these themes have gained increased prominence and traction recently, they have also been 
pointed out by earlier authors such as Caiden and Wildavsky (1980) and Schick (1998). 
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with each other: the ministries that execute budget processes well are not necessarily 
the ministries with good outcomes, and vice versa.  
 
Digging deeper into the mechanisms and causes underlying this disconnect reveals 
that, rather than sharing a common explanation, the drivers of ministries’ budget 
performance can be quite idiosyncratic to organizations’ particular circumstances. The 
article draws on qualitative interview data on extra-budgetary spending in three 
social-sector ministries to show that it has distinct causes in each case: poor technical 
planning in one ministry, a highly unpredictable sectoral context in another, and 
pressure stemming from political competition in a third. Much as the same symptom 
in a patient can be due to different diseases, the same problem in different ministries 
can have different causes. This diversity of practices, performance, and contexts 
across spending ministries poses the question of the extent to which it can be optimal 
to apply the same set of budget institutions and processes to all ministries within a 
given country. There is, of course, a need for some level of consistency and 
harmonization across different organizations in government, but the absence of any 
theoretical or empirical literature that directly addresses this question suggests that the 
homogenizing, one-size-fits-all approach to spending ministries in budgeting is by 
default rather than conscious design. 
 
While budgeting and spending decisions have been the focus of key theoretical 
discussions of bureaucratic behavior (Wildavsky 1964, Niskanen 1971, Dunleavy 
1991), this article is (to the author’s knowledge) the first study to systematically 
document and explore variation in budget performance and management among 
spending ministries in a single country.103 A handful of articles note some variation in 
expenditure outturns across ministries in developing countries but do not explore it in 
depth (Stasavage and Moyo 2000, Simson and Welham 2014). The most commonly 
used international PFM assessment tool, the Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) review, includes only one performance indicator (PI-2) that 
                                                
103 A large literature examines political control of executive agencies through administrative procedures 
(e.g. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). I do not discuss this literature here because it focuses 
mainly on policy decisions rather than budget management, and its applicability in developing 
countries is limited by the poor enforcement of administrative rules. The relationship between 
administrative constraints and budget performance would be an interesting area for future research.  
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focuses on differences among spending ministries, and this is only in the context of 
aggregate compositional deviations in expenditure (PEFA Secretariat 2012). 
Likewise, the existence of systematic differences in budget execution across 
ministries has important implications for the validity of theories of policy processes 
that rely on budget allocations to measure policy change (e.g. Jones et al 2009; 
Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010). 
 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses 
theoretical perspectives on spending ministries in PFM, while Section 4.2 discusses 
budget institutions in Ghana and examines the distribution of expenditure outturns 
across ministries. Section 4.3 presents the interview methodology, discusses variation 
in budget processes and outcomes across ministries, and demonstrates that the two are 
uncorrelated. Section 4.4 draws on qualitative evidence to investigate the different 
underlying causes of one budget problem: extra-budgetary spending. The article 
concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for theories of the design, 
implementation, and reform of budget institutions. 
 
4.1 CHALLENGES FOR THEORY 
 
Because spending ministries typically appear as secondary, undifferentiated actors in 
theory and empirical research on budget institutions, there is little theoretical guidance 
for analyzing variation in budget performance among spending ministries. A large 
literature has examined how formal institutions and processes affect expenditure 
budgets and outcomes at the national level (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981; 
Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987; von Hagen and Harden 1995; Alesina, Hausmann, 
Hommes, and Stein 1999), but these factors do not vary across spending ministries 
within a country. There is also a burgeoning literature on the distribution of changes 
in budget allocations in Western democracies and how this distribution is shaped by 
institutional and political features (Jones et al 2009). Some of this literature bears on 
within-country, organization-level variation by disaggregating among sectors, 
government functions, or expenditure types (Breunig and Koski 2006 & 2012) or 
analyzing differences across similar organizations, such as school districts (Robinson, 
Flink, and King 2014). However, studies of budget allocations have limited relevance 
for developing country contexts where large deviations of actual expenditures from 
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allocations are the norm rather than the exception (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, Addison 
2014). 
 
In response to the perceived shortcomings of reforms aimed at formal budget 
structures and processes, a recent body of literature has documented and sought to 
explain the commonly observed gap between de jure and de facto budget practices in 
many developing countries (Schick 1998; Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009; 
Andrews 2010b & 2013). The analytical focus of this work has also shifted emphasis 
from formal institutions as drivers of outcomes to country context, informal 
institutions, and political economy. While these perspectives provide a useful entry 
point for analysis of ministry-level variation in budget performance by demonstrating 
that the execution of formal rules and procedures cannot be taken for granted and by 
conceiving of budget outcomes through an organizational (rather than purely political 
or institutional) lens, their analytical focus has nonetheless been on country-level 
variation, with little discussion of the existence or potential causes of variation at the 
organizational level.104 
 
While existing theory on budget institutions is thus of little help in explaining 
spending ministry-level variation, some broad sets of hypotheses can be derived from 
the limited empirical literature on spending ministry budgeting and other adjacent 
literatures. Stasavage and Moyo (2000) and Simson and Welham (2014) both 
document variation in expenditure outturns across ministries in several countries in 
Africa, and speculate that this variation could be attributable to differential political 
clout among ministries. Wildavsky (1975) suggests that uncertainty is a key variable 
for understanding budgetary processes, albeit in a country-level sense, and Dougherty, 
Klase, and Song (2003) describe “managerial necessity” in the face of uncertainty as 
                                                
104 The irregular enforcement of formal rules in cases of persistently poor budget execution bears a 
strong resemblance to the soft budget constraint syndrome, which has been influential in the literature 
on fiscal decentralization (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003). Although it has not previously been 
applied to the context of spending ministries (to the author’s knowledge), the soft budget constraint 
provides a useful way of conceptualizing the ex ante/ex post inconsistency in poor budget execution, 
and an alternative (although not mutually exclusive) explanation to Andrews’s (2013) invocation of 
isomorphic mimicry for why developing country governments might adopt formal structures but not 
implement them. 
 186 
motivating within-year rebudgeting in West Virginia cities. Dunleavy (1991) 
classifies different types of agencies according to their budget structures, and other 
authors examine challenges associated with particular types of spending, such as 
infrastructure (Flyvbjerg 2013), which differ in their incidence across ministries. A 
growing literature demonstrates significant variation in operational management 
quality and performance among public sector organizations in developing (Leonard 
2010, Gingerich 2013) and developed (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Bloom, 
Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen 2015) countries; financial management quality and 
budget performance could be characterized by the same range.  
 
While the following empirical analysis investigates the role of these broad sets of 
factors in explaining variation among spending ministries, it may also be the case that 
there is no single generalizable explanation for variation in ministries’ budget 
performance – that the diversity of budget problems may be matched by a diversity of 
causes. Indeed, sector-specific approaches to budgeting often emphasize the 
idiosyncratic challenges associated with budget management in particular sectors: 
Johnson (2013), for example, reports that Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
regularly faces difficulties because of misalignment between the national budget cycle 
and the growing seasons for various crops. To the extent that this particularity 
predominates over more general explanations for variation, it poses an even stronger 
theoretical challenge to the application of homogenous budget institutions and 
processes to all spending ministries. Engaging with the operational idiosyncrasies of 
specific sectors is untidy but also increasingly necessary as PFM research and theory 
struggles to move beyond its overwhelming emphasis on fiscal discipline (Wehner 
and de Renzio 2013) to develop a stronger understanding of the linkages between 
budget institutions and operational efficiency. 
 
4.2 BUDGET EXECUTION IN GHANA 
 
Budget execution has historically been a problem for Ghana, as for many developing 
countries, even though Ghana’s formal budget institutions are conducive to a high 
degree of control by the MoF and have been the subject of over 15 years of donor-
backed reform efforts. Budget formulation is highly centralized within the MoF, with 
Parliament’s role being limited in practice to approving the budgets proposed by 
 187 
Government and ex post monitoring. Ghana’s use of cash budgeting means that 
releases for budgeted activities must be requested and approved during budget 
execution, under general monthly warrants for goods and services and project-specific 
warrants for investment or asset expenditures. These releases are often subject to 
significant delays because of cash flow constraints, and this gives the MoF an 
effective veto and thus an even higher degree of discretion in budget execution.105 
Internal structures and processes for budgeting, planning, and monitoring within 
ministries are also subject to a rigid and highly prescriptive legal and administrative 
framework, aimed at ensuring uniformity across ministries. However, there is a 
significant gap between how these institutions work on paper and in practice, as noted 
by the country’s 2012 PEFA performance review: “While the rules and procedures are 
generally clearly established and described in the regulatory framework and internal 
guidelines, they are often not adhered to. Compliance to formal procedures and/or use 
of informal procedures seem to be a challenge across many areas in the budget 
execution.” (ECORYS 2013, 15) On the surface, then, Ghana seems a textbook 
example of a PFM system that is plagued by chronic overspending as well as a gap 
between de jure and de facto budget practices. 
 
Figure 1 confirms Ghana’s problems with expenditure control. From 2003-12, 
Ghana’s aggregate primary expenditure (PEFA PI-1) exceeded the budget in every 
year except 2009 (a post-election year of fiscal consolidation), overrunning by eight 
percent or more in seven of those years.106 The budget head-level compositional 
                                                
105 Salary levels are centrally determined, and are paid directly by the Controller and Accountant-
General’s Department. Ghana changed its budget classification scheme in 2012. For the purposes of 
this article, non-personnel expenditure is treated as spending in the categories of Services and 
Investment for 2009-11, and in the categories of Goods and Services and Assets for 2012. The budget 
procedures described here applied to the 2009-12 period. In 2011 Ghana began a reform to transition to 
programme based budgeting, but this did not take full effect until 2013. Programme budgets were 
prepared in a small number of ministries in 2011 and 2012 as a pilot, but these ministries also prepared 
the standard activity-based budgets and these served as the effective basis for budget management 
during these years.  
106 These figures are based only on appropriations and outturns for Ghana’s Consolidated Fund, as the 
official expenditure reports produced by Ghana’s Controller and Accountant General do not report on 
spending from donor projects or programs, ministries’ internally generated funds (IGF), or statutory 
funds. In some cases ministries may be able to use these resources to compensate for unpredictability 
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deviation in expenditure (PEFA PI-2) averaged 17.63 percent, and was within ten 
percent in only two of these years.107 The combination of aggregate overspending 
with high compositional deviation leads to the perverse situation that while the 
country as a whole suffers from chronic overspending, individual spending ministries 
experience unpredictability and frequent shortfalls of resources. 
 
 
Figure 1: Aggregate and Compositional Expenditure Deviations in Ghana, 2003-12 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows this unpredictability more vividly, using the distribution of ministry 
outturns for non-personnel expenditure from 2009-12 expressed as a ratio of budget 
allocations (i.e., zero indicates that a ministry’s actual expenditure exactly matched its 
allocation, and one indicates that the ministry overspent its budget by 100 percent).108 
                                                                                                                                       
of Consolidated Fund releases, but these alternative sources of funds are distributed highly unequally 
across ministries and (with the exception of IGF) are usually earmarked for specific purposes. The 
Consolidated Fund represents approximately 88% of overall central government operations, excluding 
donor funds and transfers to local government (ECORYS 2013, 42). 
107 The formulas for PEFA PI-1, aggregate expenditure deviation, and PEFA PI-2, compositional 
expenditure deviation, are:  
(PI-1)    !"#$%&!!!! !""#$%&'#(!!!!""#$%&'#(!!!   (PI-2)    !"#$%&!!!""#$%&'#(!!! !"#$%&!!!  
for all ministries i.  
108 Throughout this paper, I calculate each ministry’s mean expenditure outturn ratio as: 
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The focus is on spending on activities rather than personnel because personnel 
spending is centrally determined and paid, and thus largely out of the control of 
individual ministries. Despite high aggregate budget deficits, ministries’ outturns 
were less than their budget allocation for over 40 percent of the observations. At the 
same time, one third of ministry-year observations overspent their allocations by 100 
percent or more. There is a long tail of extremely high outturns, with one in ten 
ministry-year observations showing overspending of greater than 674 percent – up to 
a maximum of 20,461 percent. These figures actually understate the unpredictability 
of releases from the perspective of spending ministries, since the year-end aggregates 
mask project-level variation as well as delays in the timing of releases. 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Non-Personnel Outturn Ratio by Ministry, 2009-12 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       !"#$%&! − !""#$%&'#(!!""#$%&'#(!!! !  
for years t from 2009-2012. For allocations I use original budget allocations for 2010-12, since the 
original allocations better reflect the information that spending ministries use to plan for the year. 
However I use the supplementary budget allocations for 2009, since the previous budget was passed 
under a different government prior to the December 2008 election and thus reflected a different set of 
priorities. 
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However, the extent of these problems varies dramatically across ministries. Figure 3 
shows each ministry’s mean outturn on non-personnel expenditure for 2009-12, as 
well its standard deviation. Some ministries exceed their budget by huge margins 
while others receive less than their allocation on average, and some ministries also 
experience more resource volatility than others. The variation across ministries is not 
driven by a handful of outlier years – recalculating the mean outturn ratio after 
dropping the highest year for each ministry returns a very similar ranking, and the two 
means for each ministry have a correlation of 0.90.  
 
 
Figure 3: Average Non-Personnel Outturn Ratio by Ministry, 2009-12 
 
 
 
This dramatic variation in expenditure outturns is not inconsistent with the 
perspective that emphasizes informal budget institutions and the gap between de facto 
and de jure budget practices, but it does demand further explanation. Given the exact 
same formal budget institutions and processes, why do some ministries massively 
overspend their budgets while others spend below their allocations? Budget outturns 
in themselves are uninformative about the roots of these problems because they are 
the joint outcome of actions by the MoF and spending ministries. Overspending could 
be due to poor planning by the spending ministry or to a deliberate political decision 
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from the core executive, for example. Many different factors could be at work, and 
simply noting that there is a gap between de jure and de facto budget practices neither 
helps us understand which of these factors is driving outcomes nor explains variation 
across ministries. This interpretational ambiguity motivates the novel measures of 
budget performance introduced in the next section. 
 
4.3 DIFFERENT MINISTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS 
 
Systematic studies of de facto budget practices have been hampered by the difficulty 
of measuring informal practices and the lack of administrative data in many 
developing countries. Aside from actual budget outturns, publicly available data on 
spending ministries’ budget performance is scarce; in Ghana, even the MoF itself 
does not routinely track other indicators of spending ministries’ performance. To get 
around this, this section draws on structured interviews with 23 budget schedule 
officers in the MoF to construct two budget performance indices for each of Ghana’s 
23 spending ministries: a Processes Index and an Outcomes Index.  
 
Measuring Processes and Outcomes 
Each budget schedule officer is responsible for one spending ministry and processes 
all budget transactions for that ministry throughout the budget cycle. They interact 
with their schedule ministries on a daily basis and are therefore very well informed 
not only about the formal aspects of that ministry’s budget performance, but also 
about informal and contextual factors. At the time of the interviews, officers had been 
handling their schedule ministry for an average of 2.6 years, had worked in the 
Budget Division for an average of 11.5 years, and had all served on the schedule of at 
least one other ministry previously, so they were knowledgeable about their schedule 
ministry and well positioned to make comparative judgments about their performance 
over a multi-year period. 
 
The Processes Index is composed of six formal, procedural elements of budgeting 
with which all ministries are required to comply: 
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• Annual budget submission 
1) Timeliness 
2) Completeness 
3) Quality of costing 
• In-year release requests 
4) Timeliness 
5) Completeness 
• In-year financial reports 
6) Regularity of submission 
 
The Outcomes Index comprises schedule officer assessments of the extent to which 
budget implementation in the ministry is characterized by three negative outcomes: 
 
1) Extra-budgetary requests. How frequently the ministry makes in-year 
requests for significant expenditures outside of the annual budget. 
2) Strategic cost manipulation. The extent to which the ministry deliberately 
underestimates activity/project costs in the annual budget in order to include 
additional projects on the budget, under the assumption that this will allow 
them to start the project and then lobby for additional funds during the year.109  
3) Avoidable payment arrears from unapproved/unbudgeted commitments. 
Whether accumulation of significant payment arrears is a common occurrence 
in the ministry, either due to the ministry entering into commitments before 
receiving approval or to making extra-budgetary requests that receive the 
MoF’s approval but for which funds are not available since the expenditure 
was not budgeted for.110 
                                                
109 This phenomenon is similar to Engel, Fischer, and Galetovich’s (2009) description of how 
governments and firms instrumentalize soft budget constraints in the context of public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure to increase spending, with resultant distortions in project procurement, 
planning, and management. Studying the connection between ministry-level PFM processes and 
project-level outcomes would be a fruitful area for future study; see Flyvbjerg (2013) for one such 
effort.  
110 In both of these cases, the arrears are primarily attributable to actions and decisions of the ministry 
rather than the MoF. Arrears arising from genuine commitments (budgeted for and approved by the 
MoF) for which cash is simply not available are excluded, since this is out of the ministry’s control. 
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The design of the indices and interviews incorporated a number of features intended 
to reduce various sources of bias. The indices focus on aspects of budget management 
that are easy for schedule officers to discuss objectively, and thus exclude processes 
and outcomes that either require highly subjective evaluations or about which 
schedule officers may not be fully informed. Because there are well known biases 
associated with directly asking respondents for subjective assessments (Schwarz 
1999, Meier and O’Toole 2014), and following recent methodological innovations in 
the empirical management literature (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010), the interviews 
discussed each ministry’s performance in objective terms, starting with open 
questions followed by probing and requests for examples in order to establish the 
actual state of a practice or incidence of a particular problem in the ministry. 
 
Responses to each item were transcribed by hand and subsequently post-coded by the 
author on the scale [0 = Not a problem, 1 = Minor problem, 2 = Major problem]. For 
the timeliness of annual budget requests, for example, a response of “They are on 
time, but sometimes with a day or two lag - we have to chase them” was coded as 1, 
“Other [ministries] try to bring them on time, but [this ministry] always delays, I have 
to chase them to bring it” was coded as 2, and “They always meet the deadlines we 
give them” was coded as 0. To minimize concerns of potential interviewer bias and 
ensure consistency across ministries, the codings were anchored to the qualitative 
interview transcriptions. This was considered preferable to asking schedule officers 
directly for a subjective or numerical rating since the interpretation of the scale and 
evaluation criteria would likely be inconsistent across individuals, possibly in ways 
that would be correlated with the ministry’s performance. 111 
 
Importantly, all interviews were conducted anonymously both with respect to the 
schedule officer and the ministry being discussed. This step was necessary to elicit 
frank responses, but has the consequence that the analysis in the following sections 
cannot reveal the performance of specific ministries. To aggregate the items into 
                                                
111 The schedule officer interviews focused on the schedule officer’s entire experience with the 
ministry, not just the past year, in order to capture persistent patterns rather than one-off fluctuations. 
Schedule officers did not have any difficulty in making this distinction. 
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indices, each item was transformed into a normalized z-score and averaged, with any 
missing items excluded. The resulting index was then reconverted to a z-score and 
reversed so that the index is centered on zero with standard deviation of one, and 
positive scores indicate better performance. 
 
The coding scale for the two indices is coarse but nevertheless informative. It is 
difficult to validate the indices against other data sources, as the creation of the 
indices was motivated precisely by the lack of existing data. However, the Outcomes 
Index has a strong (-0.44) and statistically significant correlation with non-personnel 
expenditure outturns, and this is in the expected direction – worse scores on the 
Outcome Index are correlated with higher levels of overspending. While this 
correlation would not be expected to be perfect, since the Outcomes Index includes 
elements of budget performance other than simply fiscal discipline, it is nonetheless 
reassuring that these two measures have the expected correlation. 
 
While the item scores in the Outcomes Index may be less precise than actual 
expenditure outturns, they are in many ways more informative because they cover 
dimensions of performance that are not necessarily reflected in raw outturns. Extra-
budgetary requests, for example, cause cash flow problems for the MoF and 
undermine budget credibility, and strategic cost manipulation often has negative 
consequences for project planning and delivery. Furthermore, the items in the 
Outcomes Index can all be attributable to actions or inactions by the spending 
ministry (at the technical or political level), whereas budget outturns are a joint 
outcome of actions taken by the spending ministry and the MoF. In the absence of 
detailed administrative data – as is the case for most developing countries – these 
interview-based measures provide the most rigorous possible measure of spending 
ministry budget performance. 
 
Analyzing Variation in Processes and Outcomes 
Figure 4 shows that there is a significant amount of variation across every item in the 
two indices. Even though submission of in-year financial reports (for example) is a 
minor or major problem for most ministries, some ministries do submit them 
regularly. The same holds true for the Outcomes items: while extra-budgetary 
requests and arrears are problems for most ministries, other ministries avoid them. 
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Each item is a problem for some ministries but not for others; sometimes de facto 
actually does line up with de jure, and sometimes it does not. 
 
 
Figure 4: Performance on Processes and Outcomes Items 
 
 
 
Overall some ministries perform better than others, but it is not the case that some 
ministries do everything well and others do everything badly. Table 1 presents the 
item scores for ministries representing the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of each 
index. The 25th-percentile ministry on the Processes Index, for example, has major 
problems with its annual budget costing and in-year release request timeliness, minor 
problems with annual budget timeliness and in-year request completeness, but no 
issues with annual budget completeness or submission of in-year financial reports. 
The 75th-percentile ministry, by contrast, has a major problem with timeliness of in-
year release requests, but no other problems. The incidence of negative outcomes also 
varies: the ministry at the 25th percentile of the Outcomes Index has major or minor 
problems on all three items, whereas the 75th-percentile ministry only has a minor 
problem with extra-budgetary requests. Different ministries have different problems. 
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Table 1: Processes and Outcomes in Selected Ministries 
Budget Processes 
25th-percentile 
ministry 
50th-percentile 
ministry 
75th-percentile 
ministry 
Annual budget submissions    
Timeliness Minor Not Not 
Completeness Not - Not 
Costing Major Major Not 
In-year release requests    
Timeliness Major Minor Major 
Completeness Minor Not Not 
In-year financial reports    
Regular submission Not - - 
Processes Index score -0.74 -0.07 0.58 
Budget Outcomes 
25th-percentile 
ministry 
50th-percentile 
ministry 
75th-percentile 
ministry 
Extra-budgetary requests Major Minor Minor 
Strategic cost manipulation Minor - Not 
Arrears Major Minor Not 
Outcomes Index score -1.04 0.19 0.94 
Note: Author’s calculations from budget schedule officer interviews. Dashes indicate 
Don’t know/missing data. 
 
 
 
Equally surprisingly, there is no correlation between ministries’ performance on the 
Processes and Outcomes Indices, as shown by Figure 5. Some ministries do well on 
Processes and also have good Outcomes, while others that also score highly on 
Processes have very poor Outcomes. There is a similar range of Outcomes scores for 
ministries with poor Processes. These patterns are not attributable to differences 
inherent in the sectoral task characteristics of ministries: while infrastructure-sector 
ministries score better on Processes and worse on Outcomes than other ministries (on 
average), these differences are not statistically significant and most of the variation is 
within rather than between sectors.112 More generally, Appendix 4.1 demonstrates that 
the structural characteristics of ministries – expenditure composition, revenue sources, 
budget size and complexity, and sector – are only weakly (if at all) correlated with 
                                                
112 Sector classifications are based on Government of Ghana’s classification in budget statements, but 
with the Ministry of Energy reclassified as Infrastructure sector rather than Economic due to its focus 
on public investment activities. Treating it as an Economic sector agency further weakens these slight 
differences across sectors. 
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budget performance.113 While these structural characteristics may matter for budget 
performance, their impact is far from deterministic. 
 
 
Figure 5: Budget Processes and Budget Outcomes 
 
 
 
Again, the lack of an obvious relationship between budget processes and outcomes 
does not necessarily indicate the absence of a causal relationship, since there are many 
other mediating factors. However it does confirm that, at the ministry level, adherence 
to formal procedural requirements is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
good budget outcomes. It also paints a more nuanced picture of the interaction of de 
jure and de facto practices than is often portrayed by authors that emphasize the role 
of informality in developing country budget processes: formal procedures are not 
always followed but sometimes they are, and some ministries have poor budget 
                                                
113  The weak correlation between budget performance and ministries’ expenditure profiles is 
particularly surprising. As is common worldwide, Ghana applies different budget processes to these 
expenditure categories, with the implicit assumption that the necessary control and disbursement 
procedures vary according to the type of expenditure, rather than the spending organization – that 
ministries as organizations “matter” only through their spending profiles. These results suggest 
otherwise.  
 198 
outcomes while others do not. Understanding this diversity of performances is key to 
designing and implementing realistic reforms. 
 
4.4 SAME SYMPTOM, DIFFERENT DISEASES 
 
This section takes the analysis of diversity among spending ministries a step further 
by showing how the same problem can arise in different ministries for different 
reasons. Not only do different ministries have different problems, but what appears to 
be the same problem can have different causes. This section demonstrates this by 
supplementing the quantitative indices with qualitative interview data to illustrate how 
three social sector ministries which have a major problem with extra-budgetary 
requests each have a different reason for doing so. While the preceding analysis 
suggested that factors other than formal structures and processes are driving variation 
in budget performance across ministries, this section cautions against assuming that 
these “other” factors – political economy, informal institutions, and context – are the 
same for all ministries within a country. 
 
Ministry X has very poor planning and financial management, with the lowest 
Processes score of any ministry. Their annual budget submissions are always late – 
the schedule officer has to “chase” them to submit it. Even when it is submitted it 
does not conform to the guidelines given by the MoF, and the costing is “sometimes 
not proper”. Their in-year release requests are also consistently late and incomplete, 
and their financial reports are not filed. The schedule officer for Ministry X reports 
that the ministry also has a major problem with extra-budgetary requests, not because 
of political pressure or unpredictable events, but simply because each year they make 
requests for activities that they had put in their annual budget submission but which 
did not make it into the budget.  
 
Another ministry, Ministry Y, is above average on the technical aspects of budget 
management, but also consistently makes significant extra-budgetary requests. In their 
case, however, they are responsible for providing funding for activities whose 
occurrence and timing is entirely out of their control, so extra-budgetary requests are 
almost inevitable. These unexpected requests can present significant cash flow 
problems for the MoF, especially since resource constraints and aggregate 
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overspending prevent the accumulation of an adequate central contingency reserve. In 
these cases the MoF typically releases part of the money for the activity, the ministry 
somehow sources the remaining funds to enable the activity to take place – often off-
budget – and the difference ends up as payment arrears.  
 
In a third social-sector ministry, Ministry Z, extra-budgetary requests are also a major 
problem, due not to poor administration or unpredictable events but to political 
pressure. The ministry is large and high profile so politicians frequently make off-the-
cuff promises to communities which then have to be catered to immediately, through 
extra-budgetary requests. (Yet political salience alone does not appear to be sufficient 
to cause these problems – the other social-sector ministry which is similarly large and 
prominent does not experience this type of problems with extra-budgetary spending.) 
 
This illustrates why it is important for reforms to take into account not just the 
variation in budget performance among ministries, but also its causes. And just as a 
doctor’s treatment must focus on curing the disease rather than merely treating the 
symptoms, improving budget performance requires identifying and dealing with the 
different underlying problems in each ministry. Technical fixes, like stricter 
procedural controls or training, may be effective at reducing extra-budgetary requests 
in Ministry X, but would be useless for Ministries Y and Z. Greater commitment to 
fiscal discipline by politicians could help for Ministry Z, but would do little for 
Ministries X and Y. And in the absence of an adequate contingency fund, Ministry Y 
is likely to continue to accumulate arrears due to extra-budgetary requests regardless 
of anything done at the technical or political levels. The same point – that a common 
symptom may have different causes – can also be made about other aspects of budget 
performance discussed above, such as strategic cost manipulation, arrears, or even 
execution of basic budget procedures. 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate that different spending ministries in Ghana vary 
in their budget performance, in terms of overall budget execution, other budget 
outcomes, and the implementation of procedural requirements, and that the underlying 
drivers of budget performance also differ across ministries. In doing so, it suggests 
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that integrating spending ministries into positive theories of budget performance and 
reform is a crucial task for future research, especially in developing countries where 
budget execution and effective control of the bureaucracy cannot be taken for granted. 
It argues that this will require engaging with the operational and contextual 
idiosyncrasies of specific organizations. The article also sheds new light on the 
relationship between de jure and de facto budget institutions and their link to budget 
performance. There is widespread agreement in recent literature on PFM and 
governance more generally about the importance of informal institutions and context, 
but most existing research treats them as an amorphous residual category that is 
occasionally invoked on an ad hoc basis to explain why reality does not match what is 
on paper. The challenge for research now is to define and measure these phenomena 
precisely enough to integrate them rigorously into theory and analysis, so that the role 
of context in reform design can move beyond caveats and vague warnings. 
 
The article also takes some preliminary steps towards addressing budget outcomes 
beyond simple fiscal discipline. Linking research on financial and operational 
management is a crucial area for future study, since access to resource inputs is a 
critical element in public good delivery of public goods and operational efficiency is 
an important goal of budgeting. In highlighting the uneasy fit between diverse 
ministries and a homogenizing set of budget institutions, this article illustrates the 
theoretical and empirical challenge that this will pose. The article also contributes to 
this by introducing a structured interview methodology that addresses multiple levels 
of budget performance in an integrated (although by no means comprehensive) way, 
and is particularly suited to developing country contexts where availability of 
administrative data is limited.  
 
Variation among ministries also has significant normative implications for theories of 
the implementation, design, and reform of budget systems. As a matter of 
implementation, responding to the diversity among ministries would mean 
recognizing that ministries (like countries) have different arrays of contextual factors 
and baseline performance, and reforms will therefore face different sets of challenges 
and require different interventions. Potential responses to this challenge could include 
defining administrative indicators of procedural performance, fiscal discipline, or 
planning and monitoring processes, and conditioning certain aspects of budget 
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institutions (such as levels of discretion in expenditure) on compliance with minimum 
requirements – an institutionalization of the “basics first” approach (Schick 1998).  
 
This may be an area where practice has unconsciously crept ahead of theory: for 
example, the UK Treasury delegates different spending powers to different 
departments (“Treasury consents”), taking into account not only the characteristics of 
particular expenditure types but also the past performance of the department (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury 2013); Schick (2003, 78) reports that the Thai government has 
designed a “hurdle” system that grants broader discretion to agencies that meet certain 
minimum standards. The US federal budget process is known for Congress’s 
extensive use of earmarks (which are of course agency-specific), but these coexist 
with a multitude of authorization forms that give agencies more flexibility than 
traditional one-year direct budget appropriations. Likewise, in Ghana political and 
organizational differences among ministries (e.g. in technical capacity or political 
salience) are often taken account of informally through internal discussions within the 
MoF and the core executive. However, because there is little deliberate consideration 
of how best to do this, it is done on an informal or ad hoc basis. A more systematic 
approach could help provide guidance about how budget institutions can best 
recognize and accommodate the diverse sets of organizations that they serve. 
 
As a matter of budget system design, researchers and reformers alike need to ask 
whether one-size-fits-all approaches to budgeting might be as problematic within 
countries as they are between countries, given the diverse contexts within which 
ministries operate. The need for some amount of harmonization and consistency at the 
national level is clear, but is the current homogenizing approach optimal or merely a 
taken-for-granted relic of a purely accounting approach to budgeting? In practice the 
distinction between design and implementation is of course blurred, since most 
reforms take place over the medium- to long-term. Criticizing the tendency to impose 
overdetermined, multi-stage, long-term reform plans, Allen (2013) argues that PFM 
reform efforts at the country level should focus on “selectivity” rather than 
“sequencing” – picking the most important and winnable battles to fight, rather than 
trying to impose a unified blueprint – and this may also be true within countries. 
Similarly, Andrews (2006) recommends that reformers should move beyond the 
binary debate about “basics first” or “best practices” approaches: recognizing 
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variation among ministries may allow countries to prioritize “budget basics” where 
necessary while still allowing space to go “beyond” basics to more sophisticated or 
flexible processes in other ministries.  
 
4.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This paper’s most direct theoretical contribution is to the theoretical and empirical 
literature on budget institutions. Whereas the vast majority of this literature has 
studied the design and consequences of budget institutions at the national level 
(Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981; Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987; von Hagen and 
Harden 1995; Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein 1999; Hallerberg, Scartascini, 
and Stein 2009), this paper focuses on measuring and explaining variation across 
organizations within the same government. This is an area where both theory and 
evidence are significantly more limited – Stasavage and Moyo (2000) and Simson and 
Welham (2014) are the rare exceptions that do document and discuss variation in 
budget execution and performance across organizations within the same government. 
Although there is little well-established theory to explain variation across ministries, 
this paper synthesizes and examines some plausible hypotheses and finds that the 
observed variation is not well explained by any single one of these. Instead, different 
causes seem to be driving outcomes in different ministries, often in ways that are 
quite idiosyncratic to particular sectoral characteristics or contexts. While the 
implications of this finding are not simple or straightforward, they are nonetheless 
theoretically consequential and present a significant challenge for future theory 
generation and further empirical studies. 
 
The paper also makes secondary contributions to three related literatures on budgeting 
and public financial management. First, it extends the sparse but important literature 
on budget execution in developing (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, Addison 2014) and 
developed (Pitsvada 1983; Thompson 1993; Dougherty, Klase, and Song 2003) 
countries. In doing so it also presents a new theoretical argument, and introduces an 
interview-based mixed-method data collection methodology to engage more deeply 
with the informality and contextual uncertainty that are salient features of real-world 
budget execution. 
 
 203 
Second, this focus on organization-level budget execution suggests that the literatures 
on soft budget constraints among sub-national governments (Rodden, Eskeland, and 
Litvack 2003; Rodden 2006) and state-owned enterprises and other public 
organizations (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003; Kornai 2009) could also be usefully 
extended to the context of budget execution in central government ministries 
(although this exercise is beyond the current scope of this paper).  
 
Third, the empirical documentation and theorizing of systematic differences in budget 
execution among ministries has methodological implications for theories of political 
decision-making that use budget allocations as measures of policy change (e.g. Jones 
et al 2009; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010). If actual disbursements differ 
systematically from allocations, then the latter may not be a valid indicator of 
policymakers’ true policy intentions. Alternatively, and more interestingly, allocations 
and actual disbursements may each reflect the policy preferences of different sets of 
actors within government. Exploring this question would be a fruitful avenue for 
future research. 
 
In examining variations in management and performance among organizations that 
operate within identical formal budget institutions, this paper also helps shed light 
onto the sector-specific contextual and political economy factors that are highlighted 
by the policy-oriented literature on the reform of budgets and public sector institutions 
more broadly (Schick 1998; Killick 2005; Andrews 2010b & 2013; de Renzio, 
Andrews, and Mills 2011; Cangiano, Curristine, and Lazare 2013; Wehner and de 
Renzio 2013). As discussed above, the principal conclusion of this paper is that the 
operation of these factors is important, yet often quite idiosyncratic to particular 
sectoral contexts. While future research should seek to construct and test more 
systematic theories about how these factors are determined and affect ministries’ 
budget performance, an alternative (or possibly complementary) approach to 
academic investigation as well as practical reform might start by engaging with the 
particular problems of particular organizations rather than assuming a common 
diagnosis and common prescription.  
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APPENDIX 4.1: STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SPENDING 
MINISTRIES AND BUDGET PERFORMANCE 
 
The variation in measures of budget performance among ministries prompts the 
question: is this variation driven by unobserved informal, contextual, and 
organizational factors, or is it merely a function of the different structural 
characteristics of spending ministries? While the main body of this article focuses on 
the former, the analysis of these factors would be less pressing if variation was largely 
due to differences across ministries in “fundamentals” such as budget size and 
complexity, expenditure composition, and revenue sources. Ministries that 
predominantly undertake investment spending could be more prone to bad outcomes 
or difficult technical processes than ministries whose main expenditure is salaries, for 
example. This Appendix investigates this question. It demonstrates that while there 
are substantial differences in these variables across ministries, they are only weakly 
(if at all) correlated with measures of budget performance and explain only a small 
fraction of the variation across ministries. While these results must be interpreted with 
care, especially given the relatively small number of observations (although this 
sample does represent the universe of ministries within Ghana), they nonetheless 
suggest that variation in budget performance across ministries is not primarily 
attributable to simple structural differences. 
 
Table A1 demonstrates the immense diversity of ministries’ budgets in terms of size, 
complexity, expenditure profiles, and revenue sources. The average budget allocation 
of the smallest ministry from 2009-12 was 273 times smaller than that of the largest 
ministry, the number of pages in the budget ranges from 17 to 2117, and ministries’ 
staff size varies by a factor of over 200.114 Some ministries spend 87.9% of their 
budget on personnel, while others spend the same amount on investment and assets 
projects, and ministries range from 97.5% funded by the Government of Ghana’s 
Consolidated Fund to 75.6% funded by donors.  
                                                
114 Staff size figures are for staff of the ministry headquarters, plus those supervised departments and 
agencies which form part of the Civil Service. (According to Ghana’s administrative system, some 
agencies are part of the Public Service but not the Civil Service.) Consistent figures for the entire 
Public Service are not available, but these nevertheless give an indication of the variation across 
ministries. 
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Table A1: Structural Variation Across Ministries 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Size and complexity      
Total budget size (GH¢ 
millions) 23 184.6m 359.0m 6.1m 1,666.5m 
Budget complexity (no. 
pages) 22 252.5 576.7 17 2117 
Staff size 23 1224.8 1849.3 38 7822 
Expenditure composition      
% Personnel 23 59.5% 25.5% 10.8% 87.9% 
% Services 23 16.3% 15.4% 1.3% 70.5% 
% Investment 23 24.2% 23.1% 3.2% 87.9% 
Revenue sources      
% Government of Ghana 23 47.9% 31.2% 1.1% 97.5% 
% Internally generated 23 11.3% 13.4% 0.0% 40.1% 
% Statutory 23 17.6% 22.0% 0.0% 74.9% 
% Donor 23 23.2% 27.7% 0.0% 75.6% 
Note: Expenditure composition and budget size are calculated on mean 2009-12 allocations, revenue 
source is calculated on 2012 allocations only due to inconsistent reporting in earlier years, and 
budget complexity is the number of pages in the ministry's 2013 detailed budget allocation. Staff 
size is the number of civil service personnel working in the ministry and its departments and 
agencies as of May 2013 (earlier years not available). Services expenditure is calculated using the 
Services budget category for 2009-11 and Goods and Services for 2012, and Investment is 
calculated using the Investment category for 2009-11 and Assets for 2012. 
 
 
The variation in expenditure composition across ministries is particularly interesting – 
as is common worldwide, Ghana’s expenditure budget applies different processes to 
these spending categories, with the implicit assumption that the necessary control and 
disbursement procedures vary according to the type of expenditure, rather than the 
spending organization – that ministries “matter” only through their spending profiles. 
Likewise, in previous studies expenditure composition has been used as a basis to 
classify spending units (Dunleavy 1991) or distinguish among them (e.g. Breunig and 
Koski 2012). The share of investment spending may be thought to be especially 
important in determining budget performance, as infrastructure projects are notorious 
for delays, cost overruns, and other budgetary problems (Flyvbjerg 2013). Figure A1 
examines this assumption by plotting the Processes and Outcomes indices by quartiles 
of investment spending as a share of ministries’ total budget allocations.115 There is 
                                                
115 Aggregating the ministries into quartiles of investment share is necessary to maintain the anonymity 
protections afforded to budget schedule officers, since plotting these indices directly against publicly 
available fiscal data would make it possible to identify individual ministries. 
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no clear relationship for either index: a wide range of good and bad performers can be 
found in the top, bottom, and intermediate quartiles.  
 
 
Figure A1: Budget Performance by Investment Share in Expenditure 
 
 
 
Figure A2 plots mean non-personnel expenditure outturns against ministries’ 
investment share in expenditure, with selected ministries labeled. The overall 
correlation is positive, but not statistically significant. Among the five infrastructure-
sector ministries with high investment shares, Energy is a significant positive outlier 
(even after excluding its extremely high outturn for 2011), while Transport’s 
overspending is significantly below predicted and the other infrastructure ministries 
fall almost exactly on the trend line. Together, Figures A1 and A2 demonstrate that 
while infrastructure spending does entail its own challenges, its incidence across 
ministries is not driving the observed variation in budget performance. The bilateral 
correlations between other structural characteristics and budget performance (not 
shown) are similarly weak. 
 
To examine these correlations in a multivariate setting, Table A2 conducts descriptive 
regressions of the three measures of budget performance – Budget Processes, Budget 
Outcomes, and mean non-personnel outturn ratio – on the sets of structural 
characteristics. The lack of explanatory power that these structural characteristics 
have over the three measures of budget performance is striking. The only coefficients 
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that are even marginally statistically significant are between budget size and the 
Processes index in columns 1 and 4 (and even that is not robust to the inclusion of 
other variables in column 7), and between budget complexity and budget outturns in 
column 3. Even considered together, these structural characteristics are not good 
predictors of budget performance – a Wald test that all coefficients jointly equal zero 
is not rejected in any of the specifications.  
 
 
Figure A2: Budget Outturns by Investment Share in Expenditure 
 
 
 
These results must be interpreted cautiously due to the small sample size, which also 
restricts the possibility of adopting a more sophisticated modeling approach. 
Likewise, these (non-)relationships should of course be interpreted as correlations 
rather than causal claims, and this analysis is not presented in order to claim that 
structural characteristics are unimportant. Rather, the analysis simply suggests the 
more humble conclusion that the observed variation in budget performance is not well 
explained by these structural characteristics alone. This makes the task of 
understanding how informal, contextual, and other usually unobserved factors affect 
budget performance even more pressing. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Processes Outcomes Outturns Processes Outcomes Outturns Processes Outcomes Outturns
Size and complexity
Ln budget size 0.351 -0.172 0.72 0.382 -0.171 0.793 0.204 -0.131 0.409
(0.184)* (0.197) (0.510) (0.195)* (0.209) (0.547) (0.208) (0.240) (0.582)
Budget complexity -0.216 0.005 -1.079 -0.192 -0.046 -1.019 -0.098 -0.034 -0.870
(0.210) (0.224) (0.581)* (0.219) (0.234) (0.614) (0.226) (0.261) (0.632)
Ln staff size -0.113 -0.031 0.460 -0.079 -0.038 0.538 -0.113 -0.018 0.453
(0.146) (0.156) (0.403) (0.155) (0.166) (0.435) (0.148) (0.170) (0.413)
Expenditure composition
% Services 1.427 -0.661 3.310
(1.575) (1.683) (4.409)
% Investment 0.861 -1.211 2.047
(0.987) (1.054) (2.761)
Revenue sources
% Internally generated -1.197 1.092 0.708
(1.709) (1.971) (4.782)
% Statutory 1.657 -0.348 4.990
(1.091) (1.257) (3.051)
% Donor 0.390 -0.368 1.586
(0.854) (0.984) (2.388)
Constant -4.671 3.249 -8.998 -6.011 3.901 -12.109 -2.810 2.631 -5.628
(2.981) (3.186) (8.248) (3.367)* (3.596) (9.421) (3.249) (3.746) (9.089)
R-squared 0.19 0.06 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.10 0.33
F test: Coefficients jointly = 0 1.38 0.40 1.54 1.06 0.50 1.06 1.24 0.29 1.24
Prob > F 0.28 0.75 0.24 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.34 0.93 0.34
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A2: Structural Characteristics and Budget Performance
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are the mean non-personnel outturn ratio (2009-12), the Budget Outcomes index, and the Budget Processes index. 
Expenditure composition and budget size are calculated on mean 2009-12 allocations. Revenue source is calculated on 2012 allocations only due to inconsistent reporting in 
earlier years. Budget complexity is the natural logarithm of pages in the ministry's 2013 detail budget allocation. Staff size is the number of civil service personnel working in 
the ministry and its departments and agencies as of May 2013 (earlier years not available). The omitted categories are % Personnel for expenditure composition, and % 
Government of Ghana Consolidated Fund for revenue sources. Services spending is calculated using the Services budget category for 2009-11 and Goods and Services for 
2012, and Investment is calculated using the Investment category for 2009-11 and Assets for 2012.
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Chapter Five 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND REFORM 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Abstract 
 
This chapter ties together the diverse threads of this dissertation’s three papers and 
considers their collective theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. It 
then sets out this dissertation’s potential practical relevance for reformers inside and 
outside of government. I conclude with a somewhat more speculative discussion of 
the role of organizations in the long-term development of state capacity. 
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Conclusion: 
Organizations, Institutions, and Reform 
 
This dissertation began with the observation that the administrative apparatus of the 
state is composed of a set of organizations, and suggested that there may be 
advantages to thinking about states and state capacity in developing countries through 
an explicitly organizational lens. The introduction laid out a conceptual framework to 
array the various levels of determinants of organizational performance, and put forth 
two motivating questions that each paper addresses: 
 
1. What is the extent of within-government variation in performance? 
2. What mechanisms generate this variation? 
 
While these two central questions are far too broad and rich for any study to answer 
comprehensively, each of the three papers in this dissertation has sought to provide 
novel empirical evidence of substantial organization-level variation in a different 
context, and to illustrate different mechanisms that generate this variation. The first 
paper focused explicitly on the question of within-government variation in 
management quality among organizations, and proposed a mechanism grounded in 
relational contract theory to explain this variation within a common institutional 
context. The second paper showed that fiscal institutions – meso-institutions in 
Ménard’s (2014) terminology, and organizations in their own right – can have 
significant impacts on the performance of the service delivery units they fund, and 
demonstrated a political economy mechanism through which this effect occurs. 
Finally, the third paper showed that there is also substantial variation in organizations’ 
budget management and performance despite operating within a formally identical set 
of budget institutions, structures, and processes, and argued that the mechanisms that 
generate performance are heterogeneous and idiosyncratic across ministries. The 
diversity of empirical contexts and theoretical mechanisms examined in these three 
papers reinforces the importance – as well as the potential richness – of within-
government variation in performance as a topic for research.  
 
In this brief conclusion, I first draw some connections among the theoretical, 
methodological, and empirical contributions of the three papers. Each paper already 
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contains a discussion of its specific contributions, so to avoid repetition I instead 
focus on their broader collective contributions. I then consider – somewhat more 
speculatively – the implications of these contributions for theories of reform, 
beginning with normative recommendations for reform design and moving on to 
deeper questions about the extent to which the long-term development of state 
capacity might be led by organizational rather than institutional change. 
 
5.1 TOWARDS AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE  
 
At the broadest level, this dissertation has aimed to demonstrate that examining the 
organizational basis of government bureaucracies in developing countries is both a 
necessary and productive task for studies of public service delivery, governance, and 
state capacity. It is necessary, because within-government variation in performance at 
the organization-level is empirically significant and unexplained by prevailing 
theories that focus on government-wide institutional and political determinants. And it 
is productive, because it opens up connections to several rich and highly developed 
bodies of theory and empirical methods in other fields or sub-fields where 
organizations have long been a key unit of analysis. For example, “From Institutions 
to Organizations” drew on relational contracts theory from organizational economics 
(Hart and Moore 2008, Gibbons and Henderson 2013) as well as the literatures on the 
management of discretion and on organizational performance, two key themes for 
public administration and management in developed countries (Mintzberg 1983; 
Wilson 1989; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). These literatures complement 
and extend the comparative politics and governance literatures on informal 
institutions that have been influential in studying developing states but nonetheless 
have significant limitations (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Andrews 2013). Likewise, in 
a parallel to the American politics literature on how agencies mediate distributive 
politics (Bertelli and Grose 2009, Berry and Gersen 2010, Gordon 2011, Ting 2012), 
“Policy Implementation, Distributive Politics, and Fiscal Institutions” showed that 
fiscal institutions can play a similar role in a developing country setting and with 
respect to implementation as well as distribution.  
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Further exploring the connections between these bodies of theory could be useful not 
only to studies of government in developing countries, but also in developed ones. 
Although informality, weak enforcement of administrative rules, and poor policy 
implementation certainly tend to be more salient features of states in poor countries 
than in wealthy ones, they are by no means absent, as discussed for example by the 
literatures on the practices of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) and policy 
implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1974). Imperfect contracting and relational 
contracts between organizations have also been studied in developed countries in the 
context of outsourcing and policy networks (Bertelli and Smith 2009), and integrating 
a relational view of management within organizations is an area in which significant 
lessons could be learned from studies of developing country governments.  
 
One reason why there have been few medium- or large-N studies of organizations in 
developing country governments is methodological: whereas government statistics 
offices produce and publish national- and regional-level data that scholars can easily 
draw on, little such data is available at the organizational level. This problem is 
exacerbated by the difficulty of measuring and comparing the outputs of many public 
organizations, and by the importance of informal and non-verifiable internal processes 
in their operation. Given these data constraints, this study’s adaptation and use of 
structured interview techniques for integrated mixed-method analysis is perhaps its 
main methodological contribution. This approach provides something of a 
compromise between small-N case studies, which provide rich qualitative data but a 
small and possibly unrepresentative sample, and large-N studies (either those that use 
administrative data, such as this dissertation’s second paper, or closed-ended surveys) 
that provide statistical power and representativeness but may be misleading in 
contexts where informality and discretion are important and the gaps between de jure 
and de facto practices are large.116 This approach also has some drawbacks: like 
qualitative studies it requires some discretion and judgment on the part of the 
interviewer or researcher; as with quantitative studies there is a tradeoff between 
comparability and flexibility; and analytical methods for small-N and large-N studies 
                                                
116 With Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger, I am currently implementing a follow-up study in which the 
same interview method is being used by 45 civil servant enumerators to conduct a management survey 
of all 4,000 senior civil servants in Ghana. Although this is methodologically more similar to the 
original Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) study and Rasul and Rogger’s (2014) adaptation, we have 
nevertheless attempted to integrate aspects of qualitative data collection. 
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are both more standardized and commonly accepted than those for analyzing medium-
N data. Nevertheless, this method can be another useful tool for researchers interested 
in the functioning of government bureaucracies in both developing and developed 
countries. 
 
Empirically, each paper of this dissertation has made a novel empirical contribution: 
“From Institutions to Organizations” showed the range of within-government 
variation in management practices and demonstrated the qualitative alignment of this 
variation with that predicted by relational contract theory; “Policy Implementation, 
Distributive Politics, and Fiscal Institutions” provided the most comprehensive 
estimate to date on the extent and costs of project non-completion in any country, and 
demonstrated that fiscal institutions can not only affect project completion but also 
mediate the impact of distributive pressures on implementation; and “One Size Does 
Not Fit All” is (to my knowledge) the first study to systematically document and 
explore variation in budget performance and management among spending ministries 
in a single country.  
 
Collectively, these three papers make a strong case for scholars beyond the public 
administration sub-field to engage with the mundane bureaucratic practices and 
iterated organizational processes through which states translate policies into outputs. 
While political scientists and economists alike are showing an increased interest in 
policy implementation and service delivery, a great deal of this work has either 
focused on corruption (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2007; Beekman, Bulte, 
and Nillesen 2014), even though this is merely one cause or mechanism of 
implementation failure, or has studied the impact of a one-time intervention or policy 
change (Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004; Reinikka and Svensson 2011; Banerjee et 
al 2014; Yanez-Pagans and Machicado-Salas 2014) even though these effects may 
dissipate as agents and organizations settle into long-run equilibrium (Olken and 
Pande 2012). Lasting and longer-term improvements in performance are likely to 
require continuous and iterated improvement – and thus better management and 
improved organizational cultures – rather than one-off external interventions. 
Understanding when, where, and how these improvements occur requires scholars to 
think of bureaucracies as organizations, and design their research strategies 
accordingly. 
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5.2 AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON REFORM 
 
Thinking about state bureaucracy as a set of organizations rather than as an institution 
also has implications for the design of reforms. In particular, the diagnoses of 
government performance on which large-scale public sector reforms are based are 
often homogenizing, in that they assume that the same problems exist across the 
whole of government. Yet this homogenous view of the performance landscape within 
government is contradicted by this dissertation’s empirical findings on the extent of 
variation in performance at the organizational level. Homogenizing, one-size-fits-all 
approaches to governance reform have been much criticized for trying to impose “best 
practice” solutions that may not fit with countries’ diverse contexts, with differences 
in technical capacity treated as one such contextual variable (Grindle 2004, Andrews 
2013). Due to their focus on cross-country variation, however, these critiques have 
often conflated horizontal heterogeneity – in institutional, political, and socio-cultural 
context – with vertical heterogeneity in levels of performance or management quality. 
This dissertation focuses attention on the latter by examining variation within 
government at the organization level, thus holding constant the main country-level 
drivers of horizontal heterogeneity, and showing that one-size-fits-all reforms can 
become one-size-fits-almost-none even when abstracting from the horizontal 
dimension of context. The diversity of management quality in a single government – 
and the resulting implications for reform elaborated herein – suggest that treating 
differences in management quality as more than just one element of country context 
can be one important way of moving beyond the mantra that “context matters” 
towards a specific understanding of when, where, and how it matters. 
 
The existence of systematic within-country variation in the performance of 
government organizations demands a change in the conceptual frameworks applied to 
improving management and performance. This article has argued that a significant 
amount of this variation is of a vertical nature rather than horizontal – differences in 
quality rather than context (although the latter doubtless also exists). To the extent 
these differences are a reflection of poor management, rather than constrained 
optimization or optimization of a different set of goals, it suggests that incremental 
approaches to reform are both possible and meaningful. At a practical level, an 
incremental approach requires a different mindset when defining reform objectives 
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and content. In their discussion of persistent performance differences among private 
sector firms, Gibbons and Henderson remark: “…one needn’t aspire to move a 10th 
percentile firm to the 90th; moving up a quartile would be a big deal, so we need to 
know whether (and, if so, how) it can be done” (2013, 684). Analogously, public 
reforms need not aim to improve an organization’s performance from the 10th 
percentile to the 90th, or some other lofty standard of “best practice”; simply moving 
up a quartile would be a big deal, and so reform efforts should focus on making 
meaningful yet realistic steps towards better performance.  
 
The recognition of vertical heterogeneity among government bureaucracies implies 
that improving management means different things in different organizations, both in 
terms of the ambition of reform (reform objectives) and the specific steps necessary to 
improve performance (reform content). Instead of defining a reform by specifying the 
set of management practices that are desired for all organizations ex post, reform 
should start with a diagnosis of where each organization actually is ex ante and then 
identify reform interventions that would improve on them incrementally yet 
meaningfully. This perspective complements an existing body of work on policy and 
management reform that emphasizes incrementalism as a response to context 
(Andrews 2013) and complexity (Hausmann 2008) – both elements of horizontal 
diversity. Elaborating the connections between these two perspectives is an important 
area for empirical study and theory development. In terms of reform content, such an 
approach would recognize that different organizations have different problems, 
perhaps driven (as in this dissertation’s third paper) by different causes, and therefore 
differentiate among the immediate steps necessary for each organization’s 
improvement. This differentiation could either be explicit, or achieved by laying out 
graduated steps as done (for example) by the United Kingdom’s Departmental 
Capability Review program (Cabinet Office 2009). This is, of course, easier said than 
done, as illustrated by the debates in the budget reform literature on “basics first” 
versus best practices approaches (Andrews 2006) and on selectivity versus sequencing 
(Allen 2013).  
 
In this sense, recognizing the need to move away from homogenizing diagnoses and 
prescriptions does not answer all the difficult questions of reform design, but it does 
push reformers to deal with a more productive set of questions. To return to the 
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“growth diagnostics” analogy put forward in the introduction, it pushes reformers not 
to ask “What are the problems of government on average?” but instead to ask “What 
are the specific binding constraints to performance in each organization?” Instead of 
using this appreciation of heterogeneity to design reforms that are more complex and 
nuanced but equally rigid in their application, reform and organizational improvement 
should be conceived of as ongoing, iterative processes – more in the spirit of 
Andrews’s (2013) “problem-driven iterative adaptation” or the “continuous 
improvement” management philosophy that has proven so influential in the private 
sector and organizational economics literature on organizational performance (Liker 
and Franz 2011). Although public sector reforms are often imagined as “once and for 
all” reforms that will simultaneously “fix” every bureaucratic problem, the continued 
existence of significant variations and shortcomings in performance even within 
developed country governments and private sectors should signal to reformers in 
developing countries that any reform is but one step of many in a long journey. 
 
Finally, this dissertation has shed new light onto the potentials and limitations of 
externally and internally driven attempts to improve organizational performance. 
First, the conceptual framework presented in the introduction points out that the 
determinants of performance are simultaneously external (both government-wide and 
organization-specific) and internal to each organization. While many reform efforts 
are driven by forces external to the organization – either from higher-level 
government authorities or by international donors – the non-codifiable, non-verifiable, 
discretion-intensive nature of many aspects of public bureaucracies’ operations limits 
the extent to which these external parties can observe, enforce, and incentivize 
important aspects of performance. To return to the language of relational contracts, 
external parties and interventions may be able to force organizations to achieve 
perfunctory performance – compliance with the letter of the law, execution of formal 
management processes – but are unlikely to be able to force them to achieve 
consummate performance – compliance with the spirit of the law or process. 
Improving performance may thus entail qualitatively different steps for different 
organizations: focusing on compliance with formal processes for struggling 
organizations (again reminiscent of the “basics first” mantra in public financial 
management) but then on the complementary informal aspects of performance for 
those that are already executing formal processes well. However, the dynamics of 
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reform may not be as straightforward as this simple heuristic – for example, 
Chassang’s (2010) theoretical model of the development of relational contracts in 
organizations argues that first achieving perfunctory performance may actually make 
reaching consummate performance more difficult – and the empirical literature on 
changing relational contracts within organizations is in its infancy (Bloom et al 2013; 
Atkin et al 2015; Blader et al 2015; Martinez et al 2015), so this is an urgent and 
exciting area for future study. 
 
5.3 ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CAPACITY 
 
Adopting an organizational perspective on the design and mechanisms of these short- 
to medium-term reform processes also poses a challenge to macro-historical theories 
of the long-term development of bureaucratic capacity. While existing theoretical and 
empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on explaining cross-country (or 
cross-region) variation or national-level changes in state capacity driven by broad 
political economy pressures and institutional development (North 1990; Tilly 1990; 
Evans and Rauch 1999; Acemoglu 2005; Greif 2007; Besley and Persson 2009; 
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2011), they have largely overlooked the mechanisms 
through which these broad political and institutional forces are translated into routine 
bureaucratic practices in specific organizations. The closest this literature comes to 
discussing these mechanisms is Besley and Persson’s (2009) model of the process 
through which rulers “invest” in state capacity, but even here it is assumed that there 
exists an investment technology that is perfectly predictable and known to rulers, as if 
the process of bureaucratic reform were as simple as collecting interest on a savings 
deposit. The simplicity of this investment function contrasts with theoretical and 
empirical studies of actual public sector reform processes, which emphasize the 
challenging and uncertain nature of these reforms. This raises the question: in the 
long-term of historical state development, are the challenges of organizational reform 
mere footnotes to larger trajectories driven by broader political and institutional 
forces? Or might there be a macro-historical parallel to the microeconomic theory and 
evidence that organizational performance is not fully determined by external 
contextual factors, and that public organizations’ political principals cannot always 
manipulate agents to achieve their desired outcomes? 
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Within-government variation in organizational performance poses another related 
question of the macro-historical literature: when state capacity increases in response 
to broad political and institutional forces, does it do so simultaneously across the 
whole of government? Or does it increase organization by organization, through 
contemporaneous but semi-independent organizational processes? This may seem like 
a semantic question, but it has deep consequences for understanding the causes and 
mechanisms of both long- and near-term theories of bureaucratic reform. If 
bureaucratic development is driven primarily by forces whose operation is 
government-wide – social norms, judicial systems, average education levels, 
meritocratic service-wide personnel systems, etc. – then one would expect this rising 
tide to lift all boats more or less simultaneously. But as the conceptual framework 
suggests, these forces could also affect government organizations unevenly, through 
organization- or sector-specific channels. Besley and Persson’s (2009) bellicist model 
of the development of state capacity is one of the rare formal models that does 
disaggregate the concept of state capacity by distinguishing between rulers’ 
investments in the state’s legal capacity and fiscal capacity, but even this only 
disaggregates along two dimensions. More generally, however, these “investments” 
may be spread across government agencies in different patterns in cases where state-
building is motivated more by economic modernization drives than external threats, 
and in different patterns still where politicians’ incentives are shaped more by 
electoral accountability than by external threats. This idea that state-building can take 
different shapes is consistent with the case study literature that has emphasized the 
role of particular government organizations in countries’ historical development, such 
as the professionalism of the British navy during the 18th century, when the British 
army was essentially a patronage organization for aristocrats (Fisher and Lundgren 
1975), or Japan’s Ministry of Trade and Industry during the post-war boom (Johnson 
1982). State capacity could also develop unevenly due to sector- or organization-
specific constellations of interests, for example depending on the composition of 
business coalitions and their relationships with the state as suggested by the literature 
on business-state relations (Bräutigam, Rakner, and Taylor 2002; Opoku 2010). In the 
conceptual framework from this dissertation’s introduction, these would be examples 
of external, organization-specific factors that could drive uneven development of state 
capacity.  
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An equally interesting question for future study is whether significant advances in 
state capacity can occur endogenously, through internal developments in particular 
organizations. While the literature on state capacity has largely focused on how 
factors external to the state drive improvements in bureaucratic capacity, this 
dissertation has argued theoretically and empirically that these structural and 
contextual factors may not be as determinative of organizational performance as they 
are often thought to be. Institutionalist treatments of organizations tend implicitly to 
treat organizational variation as a stochastic process that essentially cancels itself out 
over time. Even if these developments are as-random, however, they can still be 
consequential if leading organizations play a role in shaping the development of other 
organizations, for example through the diffusion of organizational innovations (Guler, 
Guillen, and Macpherson 2002), development of professional organizations 
(Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002) or isomorphism within institutional fields 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Tolbert and Zucker (1983) find some evidence of this 
in their classic study of civil service professionalization in American municipalities: 
structural characteristics of municipalities predicted adoption of civil service reforms 
among early adopters but these factors lose their explanatory power for later adopters, 
suggesting that once these reforms became seen as legitimate their spread was driven 
by isomorphism rather than structural factors. Stochastic organizational performance 
improvements could also lead to (positive or negative) endogenous development of 
state capacity through network effects; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 
(2015) find empirical evidence of such network effects in Colombia. The idea that 
small random events can lead to persistently different long-term equilibria due to the 
dynamics of path dependence is also at the heart of the theoretical literature on the 
development of relational contracts within organizations (Chassang 2010). 
 
This dissertation also points to a broader need to reconsider the role of organizations 
in institutional change. Although previous discussions of institutional change have 
recognized that organizations’ activities can lead to incremental changes in 
institutions (North 1990) which may or may not reinforce that institution (Greif and 
Laitin 2004) or subvert its original intent (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hacker, 
Pierson, and Thelen 2015), they focus solely on the interaction between institutions 
and organizations rather than engaging with the internal dynamics of organizations 
that drive this interaction. Through management and hierarchy, organizations act 
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calculatively and continuously to shape the formal and informal constraints and 
incentives that their members face when carrying out their day-to-day activities – in 
this sense the organization is a nexus of institutions. And if these organizational 
processes play a significant role in the long-run development of state capacity, might 
they also play a significant role in the long-run development of other societal 
institutions? This dissertation has argued theoretically and empirically that 
organizations may be less constrained by institutional and political equilibria than is 
often assumed by institutional and political economy approaches to government 
performance; this leeway should lead to a corresponding increase in our estimation of 
organizations’ potential role in effecting institutional change, whether deliberately or 
“as a by-product of [their] maximizing activities” (North 1990, 78). Yet the direction 
of this change, and organizations’ effectiveness in achieving it, depends on the 
outcome of internal organizational processes that this dissertation has argued are 
complex and subject to multiple equilibria. To understand the role of organizations in 
institutional change thus requires a deeper engagement with these internal processes 
and dynamics. 
 
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons for adopting an organizational approach to the 
study of state bureaucracies. Even if institutions and political economy factors are 
more powerful determinants of performance than purely organizational factors, the 
available levers for reform – for politicians, bureaucrats, donors, and citizens alike – 
often take the form of organizations or organizational processes. Even when 
reforming an abstract and diffuse informal institution or rewriting a constitution is 
beyond the power of any actor or group, the same actors may nonetheless be able to 
achieve more humble steps such as improving organizational culture in one 
government agency, instituting a new monitoring system in a fiscal institution, or 
simply writing out a divisional to-do list so that staff know what to do when they 
come to work on Monday morning. This dissertation has demonstrated empirically 
that these marginal yet collectively significant variations in performance exist 
contemporaneously within the same government, and has developed theoretical 
explanations for the mechanisms underlying this variation. While the power of these 
organizational mechanisms may often be overshadowed by higher-level institutional 
and political factors, this does not detract from the potential of organizations to be 
meaningful vehicles for reform. To paraphrase Gibbons and Henderson, we needn’t 
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aspire to move a 10th-percentile bureaucracy up to the 90th, either across or within 
governments; moving up a quartile would be a big deal, so we need to know whether 
– and how – it can be done.  
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